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DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
And now I wilt describe in a figure the enlightenment or unenlighten­
ment of our nature:— Imagine human beings living in an underground cave 
which is open towards the light; they have been there from childhoodi 
having their necks and legs chained, and can only see into the cave.
At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners 
a raised way, and a low wall is built along the way, like the screen 
over which marionette-players show their puppets. Behind the wall 
appear moving figures, who hold in their hands various works of art, and 
among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the 
passers-by are talking and others silent. "A strange parable," he said, 
"and strange captives." They are ourselves, I replied; and they see 
only the shadows of the images which the fire throws on the wall of the 
cave; to these they give names, and if we add an echo which returns 
from the wall, the voices of the passengers will seem to proceed from 
the shadows. Suppose now that you suddenly turn them round and make 
them look, with pain and grief to themselves, at the real images; will 
they believe them to be real? Hill not their eyes be dazzled, and will 
they not try to get away from the light to something which they are able 
to behold without blinking?
Plato,
Republic, vii
4th Oxford Edition, Jowell Trans.
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PREFACE
This study examines Air Force efforts to establish an R&D 
program based on lessons learned from World War II, a program which 
would give to research and development (R&D) the organizational priority 
that the Second World War indicated it should have. The aim here is to 
examine the images of R&D that Air Force leaders held to see how these 
images were related to the Air Force response to the challenges and 
opportunities posed by research and development, and to consider their 
effect upon Air Force management of R&D. The period of major concern 
begins in 1945 with the closing of World War II and ends in 1950 with 
the Air Force decision to establish a major organization with responsi­
bility for R&D.
By an image I mean simply a mental impression or representation 
of reality. Research and development comprised an activity which for 
the most part was outside the professional experience of many of the 
civilian and military leaders who made the decisions regarding the R&D 
policies that the Air Force would follow. The images of R&D they came 
to accept assisted them to organize their thoughts about R&D and helped 
them to relate research and development to their experience and their 
major concerns both of which lay in the military-operational realm of 
Air Force activity. It was on the basis of their images of R&D, not on
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the realities of R&D and the actualities of the situations within the
National Military Establishment, that these leaders made the decisions
that shaped Air Force R&D policy between the end of World War II and
1950. As Walter Lippmann once wrote:
What each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, 
but on pictures made by himself or given to him. If his atlas 
tells him that the world is flat he will not sail near what he
believes to be the edge of our planet for fear of falling off
. . . .  The way in which the world is imagined determines at 
any particular moment what men will do.l
Although this study'examines the historical background of a 
facet of United States Air Force development, the reader must understand 
that the Air Force as he might know it today— an independent military 
service, coequal with the Army and the Navy within the Department of 
Defense— did not exist before 1947. Between 1907 and 1947 various in­
stitutional and organizational changes, usually accompanied by name 
changes, have affected the military aviation agency which became the 
U.S. Air Force. A brief sketch of these preliminaries here will provide
the background for the events with which this study is principally con­
cerned.
Prior to 1947 that part of national military aviation associated 
with the United States Air Force of today was a part o:. the United States 
Army. The aviation component of the Army was first organized in 1907 
as the Aeronautical Division in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer.
In 1914 the Army’s air arm became the Aviation Section by act of Con­
gress. Four years later Army aviation was removed from the jurisdiction 
of the Signal Corps and became known as the Army Air Service. By 1926
^Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1954), p. 25.
aviation had increased in importance and this change was reflected in a
2new designation— the Array Air Corps.
Following the beginning of World War II in Europe, the Array Air 
Corps was expanded and became the Array Air Forces through a 20 June 1941
3reorganization. It was the Array Air Forces that conducted the great 
aerial war against Germany and Japan in the Second World War. Two 
years after the ar the Array Air Forces were separated from the Array 
and became the United States Air Force. As will be seen later, this 
came about as a result of the 1947 Unification Act which merged the 
Department of the Navy and the War Department into the Department of 
Defense- Within the Department of Defense, three equal divisions were 
established: the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
It has been virtually impossible to avoid using some of the 
specialized language and abbreviations that were in vogue among the 
principals of this study. The need to quote from key documents, alone, 
necessitates the introduction of language and symbols that may be 
foreign to some readers. Accordingly, I have prepared a glossary of 
terras and abbreviations which may be found at the end of the work.
At times, for the sake of simplicity, I use the term "Air Force" 
to refer collectively to the Array Air Forces and the United States Air
2Chase C. Mooney and Edward C. Williamson, Organization of the 
Army Air Arm: 1935-1945, USAF Historical Studies, no. 10 (Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama: USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Insti­
tute, Air University, July 1956), p. 1 (hereafter cited as Mooney and 
Williamson, Organization of the Army Air Arm).
^Ibid., pp. 5, 7.
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Force. This is usually done when referring to events, activities, and 
the like, that were common to both the AAF and the USAF. Thus, I may 
speak of "Air Force leaders" when referring to AAF and USAF leadership 
between 1945 and 1950.
The most pleasant task of preparing this study i'' giving credit 
to all of those who were so helpful. The person I owe the most to in 
this regard is my wife, Peggy. She has been a constant source of en­
couragement through almost four years of graduate school and through
the additional year required to complete this dissertation. She has
typed numerous pages of drafts and patiently proof-read all pages of 
this final version. My children— Don, Jr., Kathy, and Richard— have 
given me great moral support and have understandingly sacrificed by 
carrying on many family activities without the participation of their 
father,
Without the patience and untiring efforts of Dr. Thomas M.
Smith this work could not have been brought to whatever level of accept­
ability it might represent.
Finally, to Dr. Smith and Dr. Duane H. D. Roller I owe a great
debt for their toil in training me as an Historian of Science. Like all
truly great teachers, they always seemed to enjoy their efforts as much 
as their student enjoyed being the focus of these efforts. My conver­
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AIR FORCE IMAGES OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
AND THEIR REFLECTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT POLICIES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
By 1950 standards the image of research and development (R&D)
accepted in the pre-World War II Army aviation arm was unsophisticated.
In 1939 within the Army at large research and development was little
more than "a budgetary rubric common to all the supply services.'*^ For
the Air Corps, R&D involved "the engineering, research, and testing at
Wright Field in connection with the construction by industry of new or
improved models of airplanes, engines, and airborne and ground equip-
2ment peculiar to air operations." Research was sometimes divided into 
fundamental and applied research, but in practice the Air Corps made no
3distinction between the two as far as administration was concerned.
^Martin P. Claussen, Materiel Research and Development in the 
Army Air Arm; 1914-1945, Army Air Forces Historical Studies, no. 50 
(Washington, D.C.: AAF Historical Office; Headquarters, Army Air
Forces; November 1946), p. 3 (hereafter cited as Claussen, Materiel 




Although Wright Field had become the center for the Air Corps
R&D function by 1939, it was not the original R&D center for the Army's
air arm. In 1917 the Army Air Service had chosen McCook Field near
Dayton, Ohio, as the location for its experimental center and before
the end of World War I had constructed there such important laboratory
facilities as dynamometer buildings, a propeller test laboratory, and
4a nine-inch wind tunnel. But in 1927 the McCook-based research and 
development organization of the Army Air Corps moved into more exten­
sive and modern facilities at Wright Field which was also located in 
the Dayton area.^
The R&D organization that used these facilities was small and 
uncomplicated in comparison with the R&D organization created by the 
Air Force in 1950. The Aviation Section's 1918 R&D organization was 
divided into the Experimental Engineering Department and the Production 
Engineering Department, both of which were under the direction of the 
Airplane Engineering Division. This last organization was directed by 
the Bureau of Aircraft Production which had been established in such a 
way as to make it independent of the Signal Corps to which the Aviation 
Section belonged.^
As a result of a 1926 reorganization the experimental
4Ibid., p. 16.
^Ibid., pp. 23, 41; and Alfred Goldberg, "From the Balloon to 
the B-17, 1907-1939: Between World Wars," in A History of the United
States Air Force: 1907-1957, ed. Alfred Goldberg (Princeton, N.J.,
Toronto, New York, and London: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957),
p. 37 (the volume is hereafter cited as Goldberg, History of USAF).
^Claussen, Materiel R&D in the Army Air Arm, pp. 16-17.
engineering and production engineering elements became part of the Avia­
tion Section’s Materiel Division.^ IVhen World War II opened, this 
Division was responsible for developing air service equipment and pro-
g
viding maintenance and supply services.
Between 1936 and 1939 the Materiel Division had been adminis­
tered directly by the Chief of the Air Corps whose advisor on materiel 
matters was the Supply Division Chief.^ In 1939 the Chief of the 
Materiel Division and part of his staff moved to Washington and replaced 
the Supply Division Chief as the Air Corps Chief's advisor on materiel 
matters, including R&D. The Chief of the Materiel Division left his 
Technical Executive, Assistant Chief, and the bulk of the technical 
and laboratory staffs at Wright Field.
By 1941 the work load of the Materiel Division had become so 
great that it was relieved of its responsibility for maintenance and 
supply and left only with responsibility for the development of new 
equipment for the Army Air Forces. The tasks of maintenance and supply 
were taken over by the Air Corps Maintenance Command which became the 
Air Service Command on 17 October 1941; the headquarters of this
^Ibid., p. 53.
g
Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.. The Army Air 
Forces in World War II, 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1948-53), vol. VI (1955) Men and Planes, USAF Historical Division of 
Research Studies Institute, pp. 64-65 (hereafter cited as Craven and 
Cate, Men and Planes).
^Ibid., p. 65.
^^Claussen, Materiel R&D in the Army Air Arm, pp. 54-55; Mooney 
and Williamson, Organization of the Army Air Arm, pp. 14, 35-36.
organization was located at Patterson Field, Ohio.^^
The Materiel Division became the Materiel Command as a result
of a March 1942 reorganization. Its headquarters was at Wright Field.
Until August 1944, the Materiel Command remained the AAF's only 
agency for research and development and for the procurement and 
modification of equipment. The experimental work of its engineers 
was centered in an elaborate plant at Wright Field: for procure­
ment the command worked through a system of d i s t r i c t s . ^2
The separation of maintenance and supply (under the control of the Air
Service Command) from the development of new materiel (under the control
of the Materiel Command) led to confusion and friction. To solve this
problem the Air Technical Service Command, combining maintenance,
supply, and the development of new equipment, was formed on 31 August 
131944.
In spite of the numerous name changes undergone by the R&D 
organization of the Army's aviation branch, this organization remained 
"relatively simple and consistent throughout the whole period 1917-
1945."^^ This seems to have been especially true of the period from
1939 to 1945. As one official history described the situation:
Wright Field activities continued, whether they were called the 
Materiel Division, the Materiel Center, the Materiel Command, 
or the Air Technical Service Command, while the staff office in 
Washington likewise merely underwent various changes in name,
^^Craven and Cate, Men and Planes, p. 65.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
14U.S., War Department, Army Air Forces Historical Office, Com­
parative History of Research and Development Policies Affecting Air 
Materiel: 1915-1944, U.S. Air Force Historical Study no. 20 (Washing­
ton, D.C.: Headquarters, Army Air Forces, June 1945), p. 9.
with, however, essentially the same leadership, the same n.cleus 
of the key officers and civilians, and the same channels over 
the whole period 1939-1943.
In the decade before World War II the importance of research 
and development to maintaining a combat air force comparable to those 
of other nations was constantly being pointed out to Air Corps lead­
ers. Aviation technology was progressing so rapidly that planes were 
rapidly becoming obsolete and having to be replaced.
As of 1 September 1934 the first-line longevity of Air Corps 
models was six years for pursuit, attack, and bomber aircraft; 
eight years for observation planes; and ten years for all others.
By 1 September 1939 first-line longevity was estimated at four 
years for pursuit, five years for attack and medium bomber, six 
years for heavy bomber and observation, eight years for trans­
port, and ten years for all other aircraft.1?
But the lesson of this high obsolescence rate may have been
blurred by the manner in which the Air Corps conducted its research and
18development program. As previously noted. Air Corps R&D was the work 
done at Wright Field in conjunction with the construction by private 
industry of new or improved aircraft models for the Air Corps. As one 
observer has expressed it, military technology in the period prior to 
World War II was "advanced mainly by drawing upon automotive and air­
craft progress. In other words, the technology of warfare advanced
19primarily by feeding on advancing civilian technology." The Air
^^Claussen, Materiel R&D in the Army Air Arm, p. 55.
Craven and Cate, Men and Planes, pp. 176-77.
^^Ibid.
18_Supra, p. 1.
19Melvin Kranzberg, "Science-Technology and Warfare; Action, 
Reaction, and Interaction in the Post-World War II Era," in Science,
6
Corps research and development organization was not on the cutting edge 
of the aviation R&D community.
In addition to its dependence on civilian industries for nec­
essary R&D, the Air Corps relied on the National Advisory Committee
20for Aeronautics for most of its basic research. The development of
aircraft weapons for the Air Corps was carried out by the Ordnance
Department of the Army. The Air Corps did have responsibility for
developing power plants, airframes, fire control systems, and aircraft 
21armor.
During World War II the Army Air Forces continued to depend
upon Army Ordnance to develop its weapons and to rely on the Signal
22Corps for applications of radar to aircraft. Furthermore, the 
exigencies of the war made production matters and short-range R&D 
projects the most engaging problems for Army Air Forces leaders.
The pressure of German victories in Western Europe prior to the 
American entry into World War II led to the assignment of a low priority
Technology, and Warfare: The Proceedings of the Third Military History
Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 8-9 May 1969, ed. Monte 
D. Wright and Lawrence J. Paszek (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970), p. 161.
20Craven and Cate, Men and Planes, pp. 180-81, 235.
^^Ibid., p. 194.
22Ibid., pp. 194, 232; and Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. 
Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Technical Services; The Ordnance 
Department— Planning Munitions for War, United States Army in World 
War II, Vol. VI, part 3, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), pp. 423-24. In 
this book an excellent example is presented of how military specifica­
tions that are too rigid can restrict development (p. 424).
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to the development of new aircraft in this country. Emphasis was placed
on aircraft that could be delivered ready for combat, in six months to
a year. The Materiel Division was told that R&D must be given a lower
priority during fiscal year 1941.
During the summer, when deliveries of aircraft fell behind sched­
ule, the manufacturers complained that developmental projects 
took the time of engineers needed to speed up production, and in 
September Arnold directed the Materiel Division to defer all such 
projects and to release the engineers until deliveries were once 
more up to schedule.23
By the end of 1940 a better balance between production and
development was being sought, but this change was reversed when the
United States entered the war at the end of 1941. From then until peak
production was reached in 1943 the emphasis was again on quantity as
opposed to innovation in design. As the war approached its conclusion,
24R&D was again given top priority.
Thus one sees that although World War II may have been the most 
technical war in the history of man until 1945, the Army Air Forces 
benefitted little from its experiences as far as learning how to con­
duct an effective R&D program. The AAF depended on outside agencies 
for a great deal of the wartime research and development work. Its o\m 
R&D program was hampered by a low priority status throughout much of 
the war, and it possessed only a small, if not insignificant, R&D 
organization.
Many significant technical advances were made during World War
23Craven and Cate, Men and Planes, pp. 228-29. The quotation 
is found on p. 229.
24Ibid., pp. 229-30.
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II— the atomic bomb, radar developments, the DUKW amphibious vehicle,
and others. One of the most famous examples of such advances is the
proxi.dty fuze that was developed under the direction of the Office of
25Scientific Research and Development.
This device used the interference pattern caused by the inter­
action between a continuously radiated radio signal and a target to 
determine the distance to the target. The fuze detonated a shell, a 
bomb, or a rocket at just the right distance from the target to secure 
the "most lethal effect.
The proximity fuze improved the accuracy of anti-aircraft fire
considerably. In the case of five-inch naval guns, the improvement was
27at least five-fold. Proximity fuzes in conjunction with advanced 
fire-control systems took a heavy toll of German V-1 buzz bombs that 
were aimed at England. For example, in the last full week of firings 
during the war, seventy-nine percent of those bombs engaged were 
destroyed; during the last day in which there were heavy firings 
against England 104 missiles were detected by radar— sixteen failed to 
reach the coast of England, fourteen were destroyed by the British Air 
Force, two were downed by barrage balloons, and sixty-eight were
25James Phinney Baxter III, Scientists Against Time (Boston; 
Little, Brown and Company, 1947), pp. 222, 241 (hereafter cited as 
Baxter, Scientists Against Time).
^^Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the 
Role of Science in Preserving Democracy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1949), pp. 38, 41 (heareafter cited as Bush, Modern Arms).
27Bernard and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb: Th; Evolu­
tion of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare, rev. ed. (Bloomington and 
London: Indiana University Press, 1973; Midland Books, 1973), p. 214.
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destroyed by anti-aircraft fire. Wlien the fuze was combined with a 
different type of fire control system it proved to be a highly effec­
tive weapon against the Japanese kamikazes in the Pacific Ocean 
28theater.
Perhaps the most graphic illustration of the impact of the
proximity fuze came in the case of land warfare where the fuze was used
to detonate artillery shells at a preset distance above the terrain.
Artillery shells so exploded produced more casualties in enemy 
29troops. General Patton wrote to General Levin Campbell, Chief of 
Ordnance:
The new shell with the funny fuze is devastating. The other 
night we caught a German battalion, which was trying to get 
across the Sauer River, with a battalion concentration and 
killed by actual count 702. I think that when all armies get 
this shell we will have to devise some new method of warfare.
I am glad that you all thought of it first.
Vannevar Bush even went so far as to credit the proximity fuze with
 ̂ 31possibly saving Liege during this battle.
Like the proximity fuze, most of the other major advances were
the contributions of extraordinary R&D organizations in which the in-
32fluence of civilian scientists was strong if not dominant. The AAF
28Baxter, Scientists Against Time, pp. 235, 237.
29Ibid., p. 233.
30George Patton to Levin Campbell, 29 December 1944, quoted in 
Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 236.
31Bush, Modern Arms, p. 31. For more on the impact of the 
proximity fuze on land warfare, see: Baxter, Scientists Against Time, 
pp. 115-17.
32Baxter, Scientists Against Time, passim; and Friedrich Klemm, 
A History of Western Technology, trans. Dorthea Waley Singer (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 371.
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R&D program generally concentrated on such short-term projects as
fighter aircraft range-extension tanks, computing gun sights, and gun 
33turrets.
As World War II approached its conclusion, the conditions that 
spaimed the extraordinary R&D program associated with the war also came 
to an end. Faced with the loss of vital R&D support. General Henry li. 
"Hap" Arnold, wartime leader of the Army Air Forces, sought to create 
within the AAF an organization that could produce the same kinds of 
results as the extraordinary R&D organizations of the wartime era.
33Craven and Cate, Men and Planes, pp. 242-43.
CHAPTER II
EARLY EFFORTS TO EMPHASIZE R&D:
THE ARMY AIR FORCES PERIOD,
1945-47
Dr. Theodore von Karman's Science: The Key to Air Supremacy^ 
expresses an R&D philosophy that was to help guide Army Air Forces 
efforts to translate the experience of World War II into an effective 
research and development program. The circumstances and events sur­
rounding the origins of this philosophy include a significant informal 
meeting in September 1944 between Dr. von Karman and General "Hap" 
Arnold. Arnold was enroute to a conference in Quebec and asked von 
Karman to meet him at La Guardia Airport. The scientist was driven to 
the end of the runway in an Army Air Forces car where he was met by 
Arnold. The General dismissed the driver and spoke to von Karman 
alone.
We have won this war, and I am no longer interested in it. I do 
not think we should spend time debating whether we obtained the 
victory by sheer power or by some qualitative superiority. Only
^Th[eodore] von Karman, Science: The Key to Air Supremacy. This 
study was formally produced as part of a larger report: U.S., War De­
partment, A[rmy] A[ir] F[orces] Scientific Advisory Group, Toward New 
Horizons: A Report to General of the Army H. H. Arnold, 33 vols.,
15 December 1945. (Von Karman's study is hereafter cited as von Karman, 




one thing should concern us. %at is the future of air power 
and aerial warfare? What is the bearing of the new inventions,
such as jet propulsion, rockets, radar, and other electronic
devices?2
%en von Karman asked what Arnold wanted him to do, Arnold replied:
"'I want you to come to the Pentagon and gather a group of scientists
who will work out a blueprint for air research for the next twenty,
3
thirty, perhaps fifty years.'"
Von Karman agreed to Arnold's request. The group of scientists 
he gathered around him produced the monumental, thirty-three-volume 
study. Toward New Horizons, which was completed in December 1945.^ From 
the standpoint of this study, the most important of these volumes is 
von Karman's own Science:. The Key to Air Supremacy.
2General Arnold quoted in Theodore von Karman, The Wind and 
Beyond: Theodore von Karman— Pioneer in Aviation and Pathfinder in 
Space, with Lee Edson (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 
1967), pp. 267-68 (hereafter cited as von Karman, The Wind and Beyond). 
Arnold's connections with von Karman may be traced back to the 1930's 
when Arnold was Commander of March Field, California, and von Karman 
was at the California Institute of Technology. (H[enry] H. Arnold, 
Global Mission [New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1949], pp.
132, 139, 152-53 [hereafter cited as Arnold, Global Mission].) Arnold 
was interested in various practical technical problems at the time of 
his early contact with von Karman and was introduced to von Karmân 
through Dr. Robert A. Millikan. (Interview with Theodore von Karman, 
by Donald Shaughnessy, 27 January 1960.)
3General Arnold quoted in von Kârmân, The Wind and Beyond, p. 
268. For a discussion of the process that led to the selection of von 
Kârmân for this task, see: Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 532-33. While
Arnold did not describe the La Guardia Airport meeting with von Kârmân, 
he did state that he attended a conference in Quebec on 11 September 
1944. (p. 523)
^Thomas A. Sturm, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First 
Twenty Years, 1944-1964 (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Division 
Liaison Office, 1 February 1967), p. 9 (hereafter cited as Sturm, USAF 
SAB). For a complete listing of the volumes in Toward New Horizons, 
see Sturm's book, pp. 164-65. For von Kârmân's comments on Toward New 
Horizons, see: The Wind and Beyond, pp. 289, 291, 294.
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General Arnold was so pleased with the study that he distributed
copies of it to key menibers of his staff. His view of the report in
general and of von Karmân's volume in particular is concisely stated in
a 3.January 1946 letter to Major General Edward M. Powers:
This is the first Report of its kind ever produced. A preliminary 
review of the Report leads me to believe that it can be used for 
some time to come as a guide to the Commanding General, Army Air 
Forces, in discharging his responsibilities for scientific re­
search and development in the Air Forces. I have had it repro­
duced and am submitting Volumes I and II to you and Generals 
Spaatz, Fairchild, Vandenberg, LeMay, Norstad and my Advisory 
Council. These volumes were prepared by Dr. von Karman and con­
stitute the main report.
I would like you to review these volumes. I have asked 
General Spaatz to call you. Dr. von Karman and the above named 
together and prepare recommendations for me as to additional 
distribution which should be made of the main Report.5
The names mentioned in this letter should be kept in mind, for Spaatz,
Fairchild, Vandenberg, and LeMay all became important figures in the
development of Army Air Forces and Air Force R&D policy.
Von Kârmân's study described the nature of research and devel­
opment, examined its importance to the Army Air Forces, and discussed 
what the air service must do to assure itself of an adequate R&D pro­
gram. During World War II such technological weapons as the atomic 
bomb, the proximity fuze, and radar had shown the importance of R&D to 
modern warfare.^ And just as the war ended, von Kârmân's report appear­
ed; it explained what the Army Air Forces had to do to assure itself of
Ĥ. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to Major 
General Edward M. "Pop" Powers, 3 January 1946, p. 1, in von Kârmân 
memorabilia in the United States Air Force Academy Library, Colorado. 
Volume I is Science: Key to Air Supremacy.
^Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 497, 509-10; and Difight D. Eisen­
hower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1948), pp. 260, 455-56.
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the blessings of R&D.
In Science: The Key to Air Supremacy von Karman stressed that 
the research and development activity of World War II be continued in 
some form. In the first place, he argued that the pace, of technological 
innovation in the war had indicated "the necessity for continuous 
scientific research to insure maintenance of our national security."^
He noted that the Air Forces had enjoyed the fruits of an extraordinary 
research organization during World War II, but could not expect to rely 
on this organization during time of peace. To insure that the nation 
was prepared to wage effective aerial warfare, the Army Air Forces 
"must be able to call on all talents and facilities and creative work 
of scientists and industry." Furthermore, von Karman held that the Army 
Air Forces "must be authorized to expand existing AAF research facili­
ties and create new ones to do their own research and also to make such 
facilities available to scientists and industrial concerns working on 
problems of the Air Forces." In short, von Karmân recommended that
the Air Forces "lay down the leading principles of their own policy and
gestablish the foundation of organized research in their own realm."
In the area of specific organizational recommendations, von 
Karmân advocated the creation of "new facilities, under one command, 
entirely separated from procurement and supply, with the objective of 
developing supersonic and pilotless aircraft." This organization should




be called the "Center for Supersonic and Pilotless Aircraft Development 
(SPAD)."^^ He also favored the creation of a permanent scientific ad­
visory group, "consisting of qualified officers and eminent civilian 
scientists" reporting directly to the Commanding General of the Army 
Air Forces "on important new developments and advising him on the plan­
ning of scientific r e s e a r c h . ^
In regard to the management organization for research and
development von Kârmân had this to say:
The plan for management of research and development is a sore 
point in all large organizations or companies. It mostly under­
goes periodic changes, which emphasize one or the other side of 
the question, ranging from separate and almost independent re­
search laboratories to decentralization of research and develop­
ment into the operating units. In the special case of the Air 
Forces, two solutions have been proposed: (1) the establishment
of one Air Staff section for research and development; and (2) 
a supervising and directing agency attached to the office of 
the Chief of Air Staff. Both solutions have advantages and 
disadvantages. Obviously it would be extremely difficult to 
remove the actual operation of all research and development 
facilities from all the various existing staff sections and 
concentrate them in one new section. On the other hand, the 
central supervising and directing agency would have a hard task 
introducing new ideas into the operation of a large number of 
dispersed sections and commands engaged in research and develop­
ment.
Von Kârmân showed himself to be a keen analyst, for his remarks 
proved to be prophetic of subsequent developments in the later history 
of the AAF and USAF R&D program. If he had hoped to avert the problems 
he foresaw, his efforts were in vain. The principals involved apparent­





It was characteristic of the depth of von Karman’s analysis
that he regarded the Scientific Advisory Group as not the only function
for which the Army Air Forces needed technically qualified officers.
In the letter of transmittal accompanying Science: The Key to Air
Supremacy, he told General Arnold: ’’The use of scientific means and
equipment requires the infiltration of scientific thought and knowledge
throughout the Air Forces, and therefore, certain organisatory changes
13in recruiting personnel, in training, and in staff work." What he 
had in mind becomes clear when one reads in the body of the report the 
argument that the Air Forces must be able to recruit and train people so 
that the air service can procure and use technically advanced equip­
ment.^^ Furthermore, as von Karman noted later in his report:
New scientific discoveries will continually have a profound in­
fluence on the concepts of air warfare, and the Air Forces must 
be flexible and capable of adjusting themselves to thse [sic] 
new concepts. This requires, above all, that the Air Forces be 
permeated by officers who have the training which will make them 
capable of evaluating scientific facts with good technical judge­
ment and vision.15
Von Karman also made recommendations regarding the technical
training officers should acquire in order to manage R&D effectively.
The Army Air Forces should "organize a broad training program for
officers in various fields of science and engineering." Some of the
X3 ^Theodore von Karman to General of the Army H. H. Arnold, 15
December 1945, in von Karman, Key to Air Supremacy, p. xi (hereafter 
cited as von Karman to Arnold, 15 Dec 45). In Key to Air Supremacy, p. 
86, von Karman stated that the AAF should have as its ideal goal estab­
lishing a scientific attitude within the Air Forces and keeping the 
scientific community interested in AAF problems.
^ Von Karman, Key to Air Supremacy, p. 81.
l^Ibid., p. 107.
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officers would be trained through a program that employed civilian
scientific institutions and colleges for the educational process.
Others would be trained in an expanded Army Air Forces Engineering
School; exceptional graduates would be sent to selected civilian
schools for further scientific training.
Although von Karman's study presented a detailed blueprint for
the R&D program the Air Forces should seek to establish in the post-
World War II era, and although it provided general instructions on how
its "blueprint" might be turned into an actual R&D program, it did not
explain extensively the nature of the R&D enterprise itself. Instead,
the report simply makes this statement about the relationship of basic
science to national defense:
It is generally recognized that an adequate national program for 
extending the frontiers of knowledge in various fields of basic 
science is a necessary adjunct to the maintenance of military 
security of the nation. Every scientific development eventually 
finds its way into the field of military applications.^^
Then von Karman went on to note that basic research requires time and
"an atmosphere of freedom from immediate specific goals and time 
18tables." For this reason, he argued, government authorities should 
"foster, but not dictate, basic research." In fact, according to von 
Karman's view, "the Air Forces do not desire to do basic scientific 
research in their own organizations; however, they wish to encourage 
and sponsor such research as they deem necessary for the defense of
l^Ibid., pp. 107-09.




Von Karman's highly acclaimed plan for the R&D program the AAF 
should seek to establish was not the only available source of guidance 
on the research and development enterprise. In August 1945, before the 
official completion of von Karman's Science; The Key to Air Supremacy, 
Major General St. Clair Streett, Commanding General of the Continental 
Air Command, addressed a letter to General Hap Arnold. Streett remarked 
that the Army Air Forces was, in one sense, on trial for its life. The 
"fruits of scientific advances will be forced upon us whether we like it 
or not and if the Air Forces does not take them up as they develop, they 
will be snatched up at random by all other branches and the confusion 
and loss of effectiveness will be tremendous." Among actions he recom­
mended to avoid the development of such a situation was the indoctrina­
tion of the AAF to maintain intimate contact with the scientific world 
and to foster in the scientific community an intense interest in Air 
Forces problems.
Attached to General Streett's letter was an enclosure apparently
21prepared by F. Russell Bichowsky, a research consultant. In the en­
vironment Bichowsky recommended for AAF R&D, research would be isolated 
from development, both in the management structure and in the
^^Ibid.
20St. Clair Streett to Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
31 August 1945, Subject: "Establishment of a Firm Plan for Research
and Development," Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 
pp. 1-2 (hereafter cited as Streett to Commanding General, 31 Aug 45).
21Bichowsky's name appears at the end of the enclosure as a 
research organization consultant.
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laboratories. "It is vitally important, as all industrial experience
22shows, to separate completely research from development."
In general, the discussions of R&D contained in the Streett
letter and the von Karman report were weak in their descriptions of the
nature of research and development. This void subsequently was filled,
at least partially, during a national debate on government science
policy carried on between the end of World War II and 1950. At the end
23of that time the National Science Foundation was finally established.
Part of this debate was devoted to an extensive discussion of the nature 
of R&D. Many of the images that came to be used in dealing with re­
search and development in government circles were articulated during 
this discussion.
One of the most important figures in this post-war discussion 
of national science policy was Vannevar Bush, wartime director of the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). As A. Hunter 
Dupree has remarked, OSRD was the nearest thing to a central science 
organization in the history of America to that time.^^ Because of the
22 Streett to Commanding General, 31 Aug 45, pp. 2a, 4, of the 
letter's enclosure. For a more complete exposition of Bichowsky's views 
of research and development, see his Industrial Research (Brooklyn, N.Y.! 
Chemical Publishing Co., Inc., 1942). Page i of this book states that 
Bichowsky organized the Navy's Divisions of Chemistry and Thermodynamics, 
For views similar to those expressed in the enclosure to Streett's let­
ter, see: pp. 26-27, 30, 74-77, and especially pp. 100-01.
23Donald Ralph Baucom, "The Congress, the Armed Forces, and 
Basic and Applied Research: 1945-1953" (Master's Thesis, University of 
Oklahoma, 1970), passim (hereafter cited as Baucom, Thesis).
24"Paths to the Sixties," in Science in the Sixties: The Tenth 
Anniversary AFOSR Scientific Seminar, ed. by David L. Arm (Albuquerque, 
N.M.: The University of New Mexico Office of Publications, 1965), p. 5.
20
success of OSRD under Bush's leadership, many Congressmen viewed him as
25an authority on the management of research and development.
In November 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had asked
Bush for his recommendation on a national science policy. In July 1945
Bush responded with Science: The Endless Frontier.
In his report. Bush stressed the importance of "basic scientific
research." Of its relationship to national defense he wrote: "Our
defense against aggression demands new knowledge so that we can develop
new and improved weapons. This essential, new knowledge can be obtained
27only through basic scientific research."
Basic research he described as being performed without thought 
of practical ends and as leading to "general knowledge and an under­
standing of nature and its laws." From this knowledge, said Bush, come 
the answers to large numbers of practical problems, "though it may not
give a complete specific answer to any one of them. The function of
28-pplied research is to provide such complete answers." It is "statis­
tically certain that important and highly useful discoveries will result 
from some fraction of the undertakings in basic science," argued Bush,
25Baucom, Thesis, p. 13.
26Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier— A Report to the 
President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945) (here­
after cited as Bush, Science; The Endless Frontier). Roosevelt's re­
quest for Bush's recommendation is contained in Bush, Science: The 
Endless Frontier, pp. vii-viii. Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of 
Pure Science (New York: New American Library, Inc., 1967), pp. 104-06 
(hereafter cited as Greenberg, Politics of Pure Science). Greenberg 
claims that Bush himself wrote the 17 November letter for the President's 
signature.




"but the results of any one particular investigation cannot be predicted 
29with accuracy." Basic research more than ever before, he asserted,
30is the "pacemaker of technological progress."
Bush was quite specific about where the cradle of basic research 
was to be found:
Publicly and privately supported colleges and universities 
and the endowed research institutes must furnish both the new 
scientific knowledge and the trained research workers. These 
institutions are uniquely qualified by tradition and by their 
special characteristics to carry on basic research. They are 
charged with the responsibility of conserving the knowledge 
accumulated by the past, imparting that knowledge to students, 
and contributing new knowledge of all kinds. It is chiefly in 
these institutions that scientists may work in an atmosphere 
which is relatively free from the adverse pressure of conven­
tion, prejudice, or commercial necessity. At their best they 
provide the scientific worker with a strong sense of solidarity 
and security, as well as a substantial degree of personal in­
tellectual freedom. All of these factors are of great impor­
tance in the development of new knowledge, since much of new 
knowledge is certain to arouse opposition because of its 
tendency to challenge current beliefs or practice.
Basic science could rarely flourish under the conditions prevailing in
32an industrial laboratory. Bush continued. Furthermore, most of the 
research conducted in governmental laboratories was of an applied 
nature. Because of this, governmental research, like industrial re­
search, was largely dependent on the universities and non-profit re-







This dichotomy, which would make basic research the child of 
the university and the non-profit research organization and applied 
research the offspring of industrial and government research institu­
tions, Bush then applied to the military services.
It is the primary responsibility of the Army and Navy to train 
the men, make available the weapons, and employ the strategy 
that will bring victory in combat. The Armed Services cannot 
bo expected to be experts in all of the complicated fields which 
make it possible for a great nation to fight successfully in 
total war. There are certain kinds of research— such as research 
on the improvement of existing weapons— which can best be done 
within the military establishment. However, the job of long- 
range research involving application of the newest scientific 
discoveries to military needs should be the responsibility of 
those civilian scientists in the universities and in industry 
who are best trained to discharge it thoroughly and successfully.
It is essential that both kinds of research go forward and that 
there be the closest liaison between the two groups.
Later views presented by Bush in his 1970 book. Pieces of the Action,
remain consistent with his 1945 position;
There is a point here which is worth dwelling on. I have 
written that a military organization must be tightly formed and 
controlled in order to fight well. But this carries a great 
disadvantage when it comes to a question such as this one.
Only officers of relatively junior grade have the technical 
background, the time, the interest, fully to understand a 
radically new departure in weapons and methods. The top brass 
does not. It does not even have time to listen and learn.
Yet the top brass makes the decisions, and junior officers can­
not protest. Fortunately, there are senior officers who appear 
once in a while who know how to break through this i m p a s s e . 35
Bush did not limit himself to the written word when presenting 
his ideas on R&D. He was a frequent witness before Congressional
^^Ibid., p. 28. See also p. 12 where Bush discussed "military 
research" that must be carried out in secrecy and can only be undertaken 
by the government. Military research is research on military problems.
35Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action (New York: William Morrow 
and Company, Inc., 1970), p. 110.
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committees interested in the various aspects of research and develop­
ment. For example, on 22 May 1945 Bush appeared before the House 
Committee on Military Affairs, when that body was conducting hearings 
on research and development. In 1947 Bush testified during House 
hearings on the National Security Act of 1947. In answer to a question 
about duplication between the proposed National Science Foundation and 
the military research and development program Bush said:
The Science Foundation when it is formed will be concerned with 
basic and fundamental research. The military research and de­
velopment programs are primarily applied to [sic] research, so 
that while the foundation will, I think, greatly aid in laying 
the foundation and background for the later-applied work, there 
really is no conflict between them.3?
In addition to these appearances before Congress, Bush also
seems to have influenced Congressmen who used Science: The Endless
38Frontier or Bush's advice when drafting science policy legislation.
Bush's unquestioned wartime achievements made him a man whose views
could not be overlooked by any organization seeking Congressional action
39on a matter pertaining to research and development.
^^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Research
and Development, Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs
on H.R. 2946. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945 (hereafter cited as House 
Military Affairs Committee, Hearings on H.R. 2946), pp. 7-8.
37U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Execu­
tive Departments, National Security Act of 1947, Hearings before the
House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on H.R.
2319. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 565 (hereafter cited as House 
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Hearings on H.R. 
2319).
38Baucom, Thesis, pp. 24, 26.
39As General Laurence C. Craigie once said: "Vannevar Bush was
a big name, anything he said was accepted." (Laurence C. Craigie, 
Lieutenant General, USAF [Ret.], USAF Academy, United States Air Force
24
The policy view requiring separation of basic research from 
applied research, which Bush expressed, was a view to be found also in 
the testimony of the man who became the first Secretary of Defense in 
1947, James V. Forrestal. During hearings on the Naval Appropriation 
Bill for fiscal year 1946, Forrestal advocated the formation of an inde­
pendent research organization "devoted to longer-term, basic research, 
securing its own funds from Congress, and responsive to, but not domi­
nated by, the Army and the Navy." This organization would not replace 
or compete with military R&D organizations, but would rather "supplement 
their efforts by providing the basic military research from which their 
o\ra programs must stem and which they are themselves ill-equipped to 
pursue." This group's independence would prevent diversion of funds 
from the research program during tight-budgcc years and keep the re­
search program from being dominated by military doctrine.
Forrestal also presented this view to the Senate Military Af­
fairs Committee in 1945. Here he contrasted "abstract research in the 
field of pure science" with "applied science." The Navy’s real job was 
to see that the discoveries of abstract science were available to the 
Nav̂ ’ if they were applicable to war. The Navy's bureaus should continue
Oral History Program, Interview Number 637 by Major Paul Clark and 
Captain Donald Baucom, 24 September 1971, p. 45 [hereafter cited as 
Craigie, Interview 637].)
40U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Navy 
Department Appropriations Bill for 1946, Hearings before a subcommittee 
of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 1. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 
1945, pp. 11-12.
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41to carry out applied research.
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson expressed similar views 
during these 1945 hearings of the Senate Military Affairs Committee.
He believed the War Department should conduct research, fundamental or 
otherwise, which might be required in carrying out the functions of the 
Department. But in most cases, according to Patterson, basic research 
could best be carried on by civilian institutions working under contract. 
He advocated a partnership between the military and the science fou: Na­
tion then being considered by the Senate subcommittee before which he
was appearing. The foundation should be responsible for basic re-
. 42 search.
It was also during these same hearings that Senator Harley M. 
Kilgore divided research into basic and applied research and largely 
excluded basic research from the realm of military research. Kilgore 
remarked that "the national defense aspects of science are really 
applied science." The basic ideas are applied to some particular de­
structive use. National defense would "be well taken care of it we 
look after the basic research.
In 1946 Congressional proceedings one finds more of the same
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hear­
ings on Science Legislation (S. 1297 and Related Bills), Hearings before 
a subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs Pursuant to S. Res. 
107 (78th Congress) and S. Res. 146 (79th Congress) Authorizing a Study 
of the Possibilities of Better Mobilizing the National Resources of the 
United States, Part 2. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, pp. 243-44 (here­





discussion of research as it related to the military. In Senate Report 
1136 of that year there is the following statement: "There are two
fields of applied research which should be supported in conjunction with 
the recommended program for basic research and scholarship. They are 
(1) health and medical sciences, and (2) national defense research.
And in the Congressional Record for 1946 there is a discussion of re­
search that divides it into basic research which should be cared for by
a proposed National Science Foundation and applied research that would
45be looked after by the Armed Forces.
The debate on a national policy for science extended beyond 
Congress during 1947 when the Executive Branch of the government pro­
duced the extensive, five-volume Steelman Report, so called after the 
name of the Chairman of the President’s Scientific Research Board, John 
R. Steelman. World War II had shown the importance of research and 
development in modern warfare, and the Steelman Report typically re­
flected the impact of the recent wartime experience in these words:
A generation which has witnessed the awful destructiveness of the 
atom bomb or which has read newspaper accounts of developments in 
biological warfare needs no special demonstration of the relation 
of science to military preparedness. In the war, the laboratory 
became the first line of defense and the scientist, the indis­
pensable warrior. There is no likelihood that this would be 
changed in event of another conflict.46
44U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, National 
Science Foundation, S. Rept. 1136, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, Senate 
Miscellaneous Reports, III, 9.
45U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator James M. Mead of New York 
speaking for S. 1248, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, Congressional Record, 
XCII, p. 7936.
46U.S., President, President’s Scientific Research Board, Science 
and Public Policy, 5 vols. (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
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Volume three of the Steelman Report provided detailed defini­
tions of the elements of research and development. Basic research was 
divided into fundamental research and background research. Fundamental 
research was referred to as "theoretical analysis, exploration or ex­
perimentation directed to the extension of knowledge of the general 
principles governing natural or social phenomena." Background research, 
according to the report, "is the systematic observation, collection, 
organization, and presentation of facts using known principles to reach 
objectives that are clearly defined before the research is undertaken 
to provide a foundation for subsequent research or to provide standard 
reference data."^^
Applied research, commented the Report, "is the extension of 
basic research to the determination of generally accepted principles 
with a view to specific application, generally involving the devising 
of a specified novel product, process, technique, or d e v i c e . D e v e l ­
opment, the report continued, "is the adaptation of research findings 
to experimental, demonstration, or clinical purposes, including the 
experimental production and testing of models, devices, equipment, 
materials, procedures, and processes." Development is related to work 
on current models, devices, etc. "Developmental research differs from
1947), vol. I: A Program for the Nation, p. 3 (hereafter cited a": Steel­
man Report, I). The passage quoted here was italicized for emphasis in 
the Report. For other pronouncements of this lesson of World War II, 
see: Baucom, Thesis, passim.
^^U.S., President, President's Scientific Research Board,
Science and Public Policy, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1947) vol. Ill: Administration for Research, p. 6 (hereafter 
cited as Steelman Report, III).
^^Ibid.
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applied research in that the work is done on products, processes,
techniques, or devices that have previously been discovered or in-
, .,49 vented.
The armed forces were taking an increasing interest in basic 
research, the report pointed out, because military men had noted that 
"new weapons, as contrasted with modifications of existing weapons, 
must be based upon fundamental exploration at the boundaries of scien­
tific knowledge." Additionally, the report remarked that the "conduct 
of research by the armed forces is an effective means of linking mili­
tary men to scientific work. This link is vital.
However, the report went on to say that the military interest 
in basic research was not the normal situation.
The great bulk of the armed forces research and development 
funds are spent for development because the improvement of 
weapons, vehicles, food, clothing, transportation, and the whole 
array of equipment needed by the Army, Navy and Air Forces iiust 
take high priority. Research is generally supported only when 
the results of the research appear to be applicable to an end- 
product useful to the military. Basic research in universities 
supported by the Office of Naval Research is a major exception 
to this generalization.51
Or as the situation was described in volume one of the report: " . . .
military research is overwhelmingly a matter of the application of known
52basic principles to military needs, . . .."
^^Ibid.
^%.S., President, President's Scientific Research Board,
Science and Public Policy, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1947), vol. II: The Federal Research Program, p. 7 (here­
after cited as Steelman Report, II).
^^Ibid.
52Steelman Report, I, 22.
29
The overall result of the national debate which produced such 
documents as Bush’s report and the Steelman Report was the articulation 
of a view separating basic from applied research. Basic research, 
requiring an atmosphere of freedom, was an enterprise that was best 
performed in universities and non-profit organizations; its function was 
to produce new knowledge. Applied research, on the other hand, in­
volved the application of scientific knowledge to practical problems; 
and such agencies as the armed forces, industry, and other government 
organizations might reasonably engage in it.
In general, basic research should be supported by a national 
organization for science; it would have some responsibility for assist­
ing the military with its research program. The military establishment 
itself would conduct an R&D program that concentrated on applied re­
search and development.
In the interest of getting Congress to establish a national
53organization to support basic research, America's statesmen of science 
stressed the unique nature of ba^ic science. It was the underpinning 
of all forms of research, including military research. At the same 
time it was unique in the enterprise of research and development in its 
requirement for a special environment of freedom from guidance and 
fluctuation of goals. The military services could not really provide 
such an environment, but national defense dollars could be used to
53This term is used in the sense employed by Greenberg, Politics 
of Pure Science, pp. 5, 6-8, 14. Greenberg discusses men who were "con­
cerned with the practical problem of administering the affairs of the 
scientific community" (p. 5), and he called these men politicans of 
science who "on the whole, . . . first made their mark in the substan­
tive work of their professions, and then moved into the politics" (p. 
14).
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support basic research witliout unduly shackling it. Here was the ideal 
situation: there would be an organization (the National Science Founda­
tion, established in 19 50) responsible for fostering basic research, 
while at the same time additional funding for fundamental research 
would be provided by the defense establishment without the accompani­
ment of military control. As Eugene Rabinowitch stated in an editorial 
appearing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in November 1946:
We realize that the Army or Navy is proceeding in a reasonable 
fashion in granting liberal contracts for fundamental research.
But having granted this, we must realize that organizational , 
subordination of science to the Armed Forces is an evil thing.
There was emerging a national-science-policy position, and as
debate on the issues progressed. Congress provided a forum in which the
expressions of legislators and civilian experts evoked responses from
military leaders and thereby opened the way for an interchange of views
on national defense and science policy that was without precedent in
the history of the nation. Under such circumstances, all parties were
feeling their way, so to speak, even when their public statements were
categorical and unequivocating. World War II had brought science and
warfare together and made science practical in the minds of Congress- 
55men.
^^E[ugene] R[abinowitch], "Editorial: Which Way for American
Science? Science, A Branch of the Military?" Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, II, Nos. 9 and 10 (1 November 1946), 1. For an additional 
article in the debate over military control of science, see: Louis N.
Ridenour, "Military Support of American Science, a Danger?" Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, III, No. 8 (August 1947), 221-30. Other items 
in this debate may be found in the same edition of The Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists in which Rabinowitch's editorial appears.
^^Baucom, Thesis, p. 102.
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The statesmen of science wanted the nation to establish a 
national science policy, and this required Congressional action. The 
image of science as vital to national defense was an image that could 
inspire Congressmen to act. I-Jhen authorities on R&D like Vannevar Bush 
appeared before Congress, they spoke about R&D in a manner consistent 
with the policy they wished Congress to adopt. This forced military 
leaders to articulate an image of R&D that was consistent, to a certain 
extent, with the views of these statesmen of science. The military 
leaders found themselves using terms consistent with these images when 
defending or discussing their own R&D programs before Congress. For, 
just as Congress must enact laws to establish and fund a national sci­
ence program, so it must also approve legislation and funding for the 
R&D programs of the armed services.
During an early stage of the debate on a national science 
policy. General Hap Arnold appeared before a Congressional subcommittee 
that was conducting hearings on science legislation. At first he seem­
ed to be in agreement with the views of research and development that we 
have already seen civilian experts expressing during this national 
debate. According to Arnold, there were primarily two types of re­
search— fundamental, or basic, research and applied research. The 
former was obviously a task for an agency like the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics, while the latter was carried out for the 
military services in their own laboratories or in commercial laborato­
ries. Arnold held that there was "a well-defined line of demarcation 
between the types of research that we must have."^^ The Air Forces
^^Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Science 
Legislation. 1945, p. 352.
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did not desire to perform basic research in its own organization, but 
"must encourage and sponsor such basic research as they deem necessary 
for the defense of the Nation and see that it is accomplished."^^ The 
importance of basic research for the Army Air Forces lay in its rela­
tionship to applied research. "Applied research in and for the Air
Forces will produce entirely new types of equipment originating from
58the results of basic research."
But near the end of his appearance before the Senate subcommit­
tee in 1945 Arnold received a question about pure research at Wright 
Field, Ohio. The well-defined line that in theory separated applied 
from basic research became an indistinct boundary as General Arnold 
began to speak about what he thought were the realities of research and 
development.
Basic or fundamental research we try to eliminate completely 
from the Wright Field laboratory. You can’t do it completely
because they are so intimately tied one with the other.......
There are new ideas cropping up at the laboratory there at Dayton 
all the time. . . . That is why it is so difficult a problem to 
put down any hard and fast rule covering all the cases.59
In 1947 General Curtis LeMay who was serving as Deputy Chief of 
the Air Staff for Research and Development expressed sentiments similar 
to those of General Arnold. While appearing before a subcommittee of 
the House Appropriations Committee LeMay testified:
The AAF is interested in all fields which can contribute to 
security from attack in the air, but in the ultimate we are in­
terested in physical items of Air Force equipment. We cannot
^^Ibid., p. 345. 
^^Ibid., p. 357. 
^^Ibid., p. 360.
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draw a clear line of separation between research and develop­
ment, although it is possible to recognize the two fields. The 
scientist is concerned primarily with research; the engineer, 
with development. The Ai\P is interested in research as a field 
which eventually will produce a development project of value to 
national security; but its interest, in terms of money, is far 
greater in the field of development than in the field of research.
In the development field, the really top-flight scientist is not 
essential— in fact, it would be wasteful of our human resources 
to employ him here. Development is the field of the engineer; 
and the United States is fortunate in having a very large number 
of capable engineers and a somewhat smaller number of engineer- 
scientists.
A third expression of this view of research and development 
which holds that R&D's components cannot be easily separated is to be
found in a 1947 article by Colonel Frederic E. Glantzberg, Chief of the
New Developments Division of the Air Command and Staff School, Air Uni­
versity.^^ Glantzberg had served as military director for von Karman's
Scientific Advisory Group and later participated with von Karman in a
62study of German World War II inventions. In his article he noted that
there were many interrelated steps involved in the development of a
particular weapon. In different cases, some of these steps could be 
omitted, but in general the steps included: "pure science, applied
science, development, laboratory tests, service tests, .... As the 
steps are interrelated, they cannot easily be separated.
^^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Military 
Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1948, Hearings before the subcom­
mittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 
p. 641 (hereafter cited as House Appropriations Committee, Military 
Appropriation Bill for 1948).
^^"The Contributors," Air University Quarterly Review, I, No. 1 
(Spring 1947), 120.
62Von Karman, The Wind and Beyond, p. 269.
63Frederic E. Glantzberg, "The New Air Force and Science," Air 
University Quarterly Review, I, No. 1 (Spring 1947), 8-9 (hereafter 
cited as Glantzberg, "Air Force and Science").
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Glantzberg commented also on the relationship betifeen basic and 
applied research:
Strong interactions between pure and applied science occur 
as the latter develops better implements to probe the unknown. 
Furthermore, applied science uses all the methods of pure science 
to make advances in the major fields of k n o w l e d g e . 64
But of the two types of research, pure research was the more fundamen­
tal.
To make significant progress, pure science must be supported in 
its efforts to advance fundamental knowledge. Many authorities 
have called attention to the fact that applied science has vir­
tually caught up with knowledge of pure science. This is why 
the armed services are sponsoring basic r e s e a r c h . 65
The situation that led to applied research catching up with
basic research was described by Glantzberg in these words:
As already indicated, the background of basic scientific knowledge 
accumulated over a number of years prior to the war has been vir- 
turally exhausted by maximum exploitation during the war in the 
development of new weapons. While the war was being fought, 
little basic research was done because almost all of our scien- 
tists were engaged in developing projects essential for victory.
G^ibid., p. 9.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., pp. 12-13. For similar views of the effects of the war 
on basic research, see: Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier, pp. 2, 22;
Steelman Report, I, 5; U.S., Department of the Air Force, Secretary of 
the Air Force, Report of the Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary 
of Defense for Fiscal Year 1948 (1 July 1947-30 June 1948) (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 December 1948), pp. 96, 114 
(hereafter cited as Secretary of the Air Force, Report for FY 1948); 
U.S., President, Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age: A Re­
port by the President's Air Policy Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1 January 1948), p. 73 (hereafter cited as 
President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age); U.S., 
Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, National Military Estab- 
listment Appropriations Bill for 1950, Part 2: Department of the Air 
Force, Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria­
tions. 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, p. 507 (hereafter cited as House 
Appropriations Committee, Hearings on Military Appropriations for 1950, 
Part 2).
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The result of this situation, as Glantzberg saw it, was that the U.S. 
was "practically bankrupt in fundamental scientific knowledge necessary 
to carry on applied research. This basic knowledge must be augmented 
and the frontiers of science pushed back if we are to make appreciable 
progress in the development of new weapons.
Glantzberg's article was partly based upon the ideas of Dr.
Hugh Latimer Dryden of the National Bureau of Standards^^ who had spoken 
on 10 January 1947 to the Air War College upon "Science and the Air 
F o r c e . A  comparison of Glantzberg's article with Dryden's lecture 
reveals how extensively the former relied on the latter for his views 
on R&D. Dryden told the Air War College:
Any development of a specific weapon involves a large number 
of steps, some of which may be omitted in special cases. We may 
label the steps as follows: Pure science, applied science, de­
velopment, laboratory tests The steps are interrelated
and can not always be s e p a r a t e d . 70
In speaking of pure science, Dryden remarked: "Here we are in
contact with the unknown and the mere existence of some practical goal 
is no help. The discovery of radio waves was not made by [Heinrich]
Hertz because of any practical task such as a proximity fuze or even
^^Glantzberg, "Air Force and Science," p. 13.
^^"The Contributors," Air University Quarterly Review, I, No. 1 
(Spring 1947), 120.
^^H[ugh] L[atimer] Dryden, "Science and the Air Force," Air War 
College Lecture, 10 January 1947 (hereafter cited as Dryden, "Science 
and the Air Force").
^^Ibid., p. 2. Compare this quotation with the words of Glantz­
berg given on p. 33 above. The words omitted from this quotation are 
virtually the same words omitted from the appropriate Glantzberg quota­
tion on p. 33 above. To illustrate what he meant by different, inter­
related stages of research and development, Dryden took his audience 
through the development of the proximity fuze (pp. 2-3).
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the goal of long distance communication."^1
The words used by Dryden to describe the interactions between
basic and applied research once again show how strongly Glantzberg
relied on Dryden for his thoughts. "There are strong interactions
between pure and applied science as applied science develops better
tools to explore the unknown. Likewise applied science applies all of
the techniques of pure science to exploit in detail major fields of
72knowledge and to make advances." In the matter of the primacy of
pure research, Dryden expressed the same ideas that Glantzberg was later
to present: Basic research furnishes the foundation for applied and
73industrial research.
Thus the dialogue on the nation's science policy and the dis­
cussion of research and development by Air Forces leaders show that 
although there were areas of agreement between the statesmen of science 
and AAF leaders, there were also areas of disagreement. Air Forces 
leaders agreed that basic research was of fundamental importance to the 
military R&D program. They also agreed in general that basic research 
by itself was not an area of valid concern for the Armed forces. But 
where basic research was inseparably involved in the R&D process the 
AAF must conduct basic research or have it accomplished by an organiza­
tion outside the AAF.
In addition to disagreeing with the dichotomous view of R&D that
^^Ibid., p. 3.
72Ibid., pp. 3-4. Compare with Glantzberg’s quotation on the 
same subject on p. 34 above.
73Ibid., p. 8.
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would exclude the AAP from doing virtually any basic research, Air 
Forces leaders appeared to disagree with some of the concepts of organ­
ization expressed in the debate on a national science policy. This is 
not to say that there was no expression of support for a national 
science policy. In testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Com­
mittee in 1945 General Arnold informed the Committee that "the Air 
Forces favor the Magnuson bill (S. 1285) which implements the report of 
Dr. Vannevar Bush to the President.
The Bush Report referred to is Science: The Endless Frontier. 
When Magnuson introduced his bill he claimed that the bill was based 
upon the Bush Report. Indeed, virtually every paragraph of the bill 
appears to have its origins in the ideas expressed in Science: The End­
less Frontier. S. 1285 proposed to establish a National Research Foun­
dation containing five research divisions; these divisions were the 
same five recommended by Bush in his report. One of these was to have 
been a "Division of National Defense" that would be dominated by 
civilians.According to General Arnold: "It is clearly in the
national interest to establish a national research foundation charged 
with the responsibility of furthering basic research and development in 
all branches of science.
But Arnold did have one recommendation for an improvement in the 
organization of the National Research Foundation. It should have a
74Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Science 
Legislation, 1945, p. 347.
^̂ Baucora, Thesis, pp. 15, 17, 24-25.
^^Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Science 
Legislation, 1945, p. 347.
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Deputy Director whose sole duties would be to concern himself with the
long-range problems of the Air Forces. This Director should be familiar
77with the functioning of the air arm and interested in its well-being.
There is evidence that the displeasure of Air Forces leaders
with the proposed National Research Foundation may have gone beyond the
omission of a Deputy Director responsible only for Air Forces problems.
In 1945 Roscoe C. "Dim" Wilson who eventually rose to the rank of
Lieutenant General and held the position of Deputy Chief of Staff,
Development, USAF, was an Army Air Forces colonel serving on the staff
of General Curtis E. LeMay then the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for
78Research and Development. Wilson wrote in a memorandum to LeMay:
There is considerable doubt, especially in the minds of the Army 
Services Forces, as to the desirability of a review of Army Re­
search and Development by the National Academy of Science [sic].
They feel that service organizations of the Army should conduct 
their own review before calling upon the services of an outside 
agency.
The second reason for opposing General Borden's new sugges­
tion [that the Research and Development Board be eliminated and 
its functions assumed by the National Academy of Sciences] is 
that it might weaken the Army's position with respect to the 
proposed National Research Foundation. It would seem better to 
have the Army present the NRF with its own review of research 
and development than to have the report made by some other agency, 
such as the National Academy of Science [sic].'9
^^Ibid., p. 348.
78"Pentagon Profile: Lt. Gen. Roscoe C. Wilson, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Development, USAF— AF Soft Spots Caused Reorganization Shifts," 
Armed Forces Management, VII, No. 8 (May 1961), 15-16 (hereafter cited 
as "Pentagon Profile: Roscoe C. Wilson"); Curtis E. LeMay, Mission with
LeMay: My Story with MacKinlay Kantor (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 
& Company, Inc., 1965), p. 396 (hereafter cited as LeMay, Mission with 
LeMay) .
79R[oscoe] C. Wilson, Memorandum for General LeMay, Subject: 
"Research Problems for the R[esearch] B[oard] [for] N[ational] S[ecuri- 
ty]," 20 December 1945, p. 1. For a discussion of the Research Board
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Further indications of apprehension among Air Forces leaders
over possible interference of civilian science agencies with the AAF
R&D program appear in a 28 February 1949 memorandum prepared for General
Donald L. Putt's signature by Doctor Teddy F. Walkowicz who was an Air
SOForce major at that time. Walkowicz seems to have been a part of, or 
at least a witness to, many of the important events in the development 
of the Air Force R&D structure. He prepared one of the studies in the
Toward New Horizons study that was prepared by the Scientific Advisory
81 > ^Group. Theodore von Karman credited Walkowicz with devising the name
82Toward New Horizons for the study. In November 1948 Walkowicz became
the secretary of the Scientific Advisory Board and held that post until
November 1950. In late 1950 Walkowicz became the executive to the Air
Force's Chief Scientist. In 1959 and again between 1961 and 1962 Walk-
83owicz served as a member of the Scientific Advisory Board. Walkowicz 
was also a member of the ad hoc Committee of the Scientific Advisory
for National Security, see: Daniel J. Kelves, "Scientists, the Military,
and the Control of Post-war Defense Research: The Case of the Research 
Board for National Security. 1944-46," Technology and Culture, XVI, No.
1 (January 1975), 20-47.
^^[Teddy F.] Walkowicz, Memorandum prepared for the Signature of 
Brigadier General Donald L. Putt, Subject: "Civilian Control of Mili­
tary Research," 28 February 1949, p. 1, in U.S., Department of the Air 
Force, Air Research and Development Command Headquarters, Office of Com­
mand Historian, Air Adjutant General, History of the Air Research and 
Development Command: 23 January 1950-30 June 1951, II (the volume is 
hereafter cited as ARDC Office of Command Historian, History of ARDC:
23 Jan 50-30 Jun 51, II; and the memorandum is hereafter cited as Walk­
owicz, Memorandum, "Civilian Control of Military Research"). More will 
be said later about General Putt.
81T[eddy] F. Walkowicz, Future Airborne Armies : A Report Pre­
pared for the AAF Scientific Advisory Group, September 1945 (Wright 
Field, Dayton, Ohio: Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Publications 
Branch, Intelligence T-2; May, 1946), in AAF SAG, Toward New Horizons.
82Von Karman, The Wind and Beyond, p. 291.
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Board that examined the Air Force research and development program in 
1958.84
It was while Walkowicz was secretary of the Scientific Advisory
Board that he prepared the memorandum for General Putt's signature.
Here he referred to a July 1945 plan put forward by Vannevar Bush
(probably Science: The Endless Frontier) that would provide for a
civilian-controlled organization with clear authority to do military
research, including the development of new weapons. According to
Walkowicz, General Arnold, supported by Dr. von Karman, opposed Bush's 
85  ̂ ^proposal. Von Karman seems to confirm this in his memoirs, for he 
reported that Bush opposed the efforts of the Scientific Advisory Group. 
Bush thought military research should be restricted to improving current 
weapons, and the production of new scientific ideas should be the work 
of a civilian agency. Von Karman wrote: "Bush's statement, made in
response to a direct request for an evaluation of research by President 
Roosevelt in 1944, was an open slap at the Air Force." And when von 
Karman told General Arnold that he disagreed with Bush and could justify 
military research, even if it made him unpopular with the scientific 
community, Arnold, through a letter and a visit by General Norstad with
Q O
Sturm, USAF SAB, pp. 27, 45, 135.
84U.S., Department of the Air Force, Scientific Advisory Board, 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Research and Development (Washington,
D.C.: Headquarters United States Air Force, June 1958), p. 4 (hereafter 
cited as the Stever Report after the name of the chairman of the ad hoc 
committee Dr. H. Guyford Stever).
85Walkowicz, Memorandum, "Civilian Control of Military Research," 
p. 1. This reported opposition on the part of von Karman seems to be in 
line with his belief that no single organization should become the single 
intermediary between science and the AAF (Key to Air Supremacy, p. 85).
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Bush, persuaded Bush to publicly revoke his position.
This incident which saw Arnold and von Karman aligned against 
Bush is but one of several indications of the existence of an alliance 
between Arnold and von Karman for the purpose of creating an R&D policy 
for the Army Air Forces. Earlier evidence for the existence of this al­
liance is to be found in General Arnold's October 1945 testimony before 
a subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee as we shall 
now see.
87Although Major General St. Clair Streett's recommendations
for an AAF R&D program were being reviewed by the Air Staff just before
88and during the appearance of Arnold before the Senate subcommittee, 
Streett's views do not appear to have influenced Arnold's testimony. 
However, there does seem to be sufficient similarity between some of 
the ideas Arnold expressed and ideas that appear in von Karman's Science : 
The Key to Air Supremacy which was not officially completed until 
December 1945, two months after Arnold's appearance before the Senate
Von Karman, The Wind and Beyond, pp. 271-72.
87Supra, pp. 18-19.
83Alfred R. Mawjell, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Requirements 
Division of the Air Staff, Interoffice Memorandum, Subject: "Establish­
ment of a Firm Plan for Research and Development," 10 September 1945;
E. M. Powers, Major General, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, 
Supply, Memorandum for the Chief of the Air Staff, Subject: "Establish­
ment of a Firm Plan for Research and Development," 12 September 1945; 
Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Lieutenant General, U.S.A. , Assistant Chief of the 
Air Staff, Training, Memorandum for the Chief of the Air Staff, Subject: 
"Establishment of a Firm Plan for Research and Development," 12 Septem­
ber 1945. All of these memoranda are in the Air Force Archives, Maxwell 
Air Force Base, Alabama. Additionally, I have seen a draft letter in 
reply to General Streett's letter that carries a date after Arnold's 
18 October testimony and indicates that a copy of Arnold's testimony 
was sent to Streett. This document is also in the Air Force Archives.
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subcommittee, to suggest that the two men were exchanging ideas while 
von Karman's report was still in preparation.
Arnold began by informing the subcommittee of the need for a 
balanced and continuous research program within the military. The re­
search and development program that had served the nation so well 
during World War II must be continued in some form. As Arnold expressed 
it:
During World War II the Air Forces have enjoyed the fruits 
of research work accomplished by several scientific research 
bodies organized or called upon for the duration of the war. The 
whole scientific manpower of the Nation was mobilized for the 
benefit of the services, and a great portion of it for the Army 
Air Forces. With the termination of the war, it is incumbent 
upon the Congress, with the advice of the executive branch of 
the Government, the services, industry and science, to find the 
best form of organization and the most efficient scheme for unit­
ing all efforts to create the best possible peacetime basic and 
applied scientific research and development facilities and to 
utilize all available scientific talents to that end. Only by 
such efficient organization can our Air Forces reflect at all 
times the rapid advances in aerodynamics, physics, chemistry, 
electronics, the sciences basic to rockets, jet propulsion, radar, 
aviation medicine, and revolutionary developments as yet uncon­
ceived . 89
Much of this statement by Arnold can be found in virtually identical 
wording in von Karman's December 1945 study. On page eighty-one the 
following statement appears:
During World War II, the Air Forces enjoyed the fruits of 
research work being done by several scientific bodies organized 
or called upon for the duration of the war. Moreover, the 
whole scientific manpower of the nation was available to the 
services, and a great portion of it to the Army Air Forces.
How to secure the cooperation of science and industry during 
peacetime is a very different p r o b l e m . 90
The same relationship can be found between von Karman's
89Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Science 
Legislation, 1945, pp. 345, 347.
90Von Karman, Key to Air Supremacy, p. 81.
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statement on what the AAF’s position on basic research should be and
Arnold's statement on this matter to the Senate subcommittee. The
resemblance of von Karman's position quoted on page seventeen above to
the following statement by Arnold is apparent:
The Air Forces do not desire to do basic scientific research in 
their own organization, but they must encourage and sponsor such 
basic research as they deem necessary for the defense of the 
Nation and see that it is accomplished.91
Although Arnold's testimony was given about two months before
the official completion of Science: The Key to Air Supremacy, it is
impossible to determine from the evidence at hand which man borrowed
from the other. Von Karman had been working on his project since late 
g?1944, “ and the work of the Scientific Advisory Group was carried out 
in the Pentagon with apparently close coordination with General Ar­
nold.
Since both von Karman and Arnold were in close agreement on 
their views and had worked together for several years, each may be pre­
sumed to have been influenced by the other. There is little question 
that Arnold and his staff had advance knowledge of the contents of
91Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Science 
Legislation, 1945, p. 345. For further evidence of close similarities 
between Science: The Key to Air Supremacy and Arnold's testimony com­
pare pp. 85-86 and 107-108 of von Karman's report with Arnold's ideas 
as expressed on pp. 345-49 and 353-54 of the Hearings on Science Legis­
lation.
92  ̂ >Von Karman, The Wind and Beyond, pp. 267-68, and H. H. Arnold, 
Memorandum for Dr. von Karman, Subject : "AAF Long Range Development
Program," 7 November 1944, in von Karman, Key to Air Supremacy, pp. 
iii-vii.
93Von Karraan, The Wind and Beyond, pp. 268-72. For brief com­
ments on the work of the Scientific Advisory Group by General Arnold, 
see: Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 532-33.
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Science: The Key to Air Supremacy and drew upon that knowledge when 
preparing Arnold's October 1945 comments. The apparent use of von 
Karman's report by Arnold is an indication that Arnold's praise for the 
report, mentioned earlier in this chapter, was not merely bureaucratic 
verbiage designed to soothe egos while the Army Air Forces followed 
its own inclinations. Arnold, at least, was serious about using 
Science: The Key to Air Supremacy as a blueprint for AAF activities in 
the R&D area.
In January 1946 the Army Air Forces issued a regulation that 
established as Air Forces policy some of the recommendations made by 
the von Karman report. This regulation established the Office of 
Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development and specified its 
functions. The task assigned to this office was described in these 
words :
>
Mission. The Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and 
Development will direct and supervise research and development 
and test activities of the AAF in order to provide coordination, 
integration, and completeness and to eliminate duplication of 
effort; and will direct and prosecute long-range projects in the 
field of research and scientific s t u d y . 94
Some of the specific duties of this office included liaison with tech­
nical agencies within the government and without and the preparation 
and defense of the AAF R&D budget. The R&D deputy also served as ad­
visor to the Commanding General of the AAF on matters pertaining to 
93R&D.
94U.S., War Department, Army Air Forces, Regulation 20-62, 
"Organization: Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development," 
Washington, D.C., 10 January 1946, p. 1 (hereafter cited as AAFR 20-62).
^^Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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The first officer to hold the position of Deputy Chief of Air 
Staff for Research and Development (DCAS/R&D) was Curtis E. LeMay, at 
that time a Major General. LeMay's assignment to this position in late 
1945 reveals something about the nature of the Army Air Forces. He was 
one of the bright stars in the rising constellation of Army Air Forces 
officers. General Arnold referred to him as a "great group and Air 
Division commander," a "rugged" wing commander, and "a leading figure" 
in the bombing campaign to destroy Germany's industrial capacity.
But he had no particular qualifications for his job as the AAF's chief 
R&D officer.
LeMay, in his memoirs, described discussions among General Carl 
A. "Tooey" Spaatz, first Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, 
himself, and other Army Air Forces leaders in post-war Washington. The 
topic of discussion was what had to be done in the AAF now that the war 
was over.
Somebody must go out to Wright and take active command of Re­
search and Development there, and somebody must do the staff 
job for R&D in Washington.
It was decided that I’d be the one to go to Wright Field, 
and O'Donnell would stay on the staff. I remember his bitching 
about that. He was going to have to buy a house; and all I'd 
have to do was to breeze out there to Ohio and move into a nice 
set of quarters.
Helen felt fine about the Ohio deal: it was our old stamp­
ing ground— our mutual native State— and why shouldn't we like 
to be in Ohio? Furthermore, I wasn't very keen on the idea of 
staff work. Told myself that I was a field commander. . . .97
But the situation did not work out as originally planned, and
^^Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 176, 446, 564.
97LeMay, Mission with LeMay, p. 395; and Ira C. Baker, "Gen. 
Carl A. Spaatz, USAF: June 28, 1891-July 14, 1974," Air Force Magazine, 
LVII, No. 9 (September 1974), p. 43.
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LeMay was appointed DCAS/R&D. LeMay wrote: "They were going to fire
off an elaborate program. That would be my job, down there in the
98Pentagon. And Rosie [O'Donnell] was going out to Wright."
LeMay noted that he had a great deal to do in his new job. He
had "to get organized, and plan for the budget, and try to get some
99money into the account. Speaking of his situation in the R&D staff
position, LeMay wrote:
I certainly hadn't been screeching with enthusiasm about my 
new duties, but it didn't take me long to become mighty inter­
ested. It was strictly a management job. I didn't know much 
about Research and Development . . . I'd had my little bit of 
engineering education. So they gathered in a lot of folks who 
did know something about the whole program: Bim Wilson and
such.
Yet although LeMay had become deeply involved in the R&D business by 
the time he left the assignment to become Commander of the United States 
Air Forces, Europe, in the fall of 1947, he wrote: "[1] could never
forget that essentially 1 still considered myself a field commander.
Shortly after the establishment of the office of the Deputy 
Chief of Air Staff for R&D, another recommendation of von Karman's 
report was implemented when the temporary wartime Scientific Advisory
98LeMay, Mission with LeMay, p. 395.
99Ibid., pp. 395-96.
^°®lbid., p. 396.
^^^Ibid., pp. 400-01. LeMay's own words and the manner in which 
the Army Air Forces supplied him with a staff of "folks" who knew the 
R&D program indicates that there was more to selecting an officer for a 
position in the R&D hierarchy than selecting the man possessing the most 
experience with and knowledge of R&D. The exact nature of the addition­
al factors involved (additional to R&D knowledge and experience) will 
become clearer when the selection of General Earle E. Partridge as Com­
mander of the Air Research and Development Command is discussed later.
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Group was institutionalized as the permanent Scientific Advisory Board
in the office of the DCAS/R&D (then LeMay’s office). The Board met for
102the first time in June 1946.
In addition to following von Karman's advice for changes in the
organization of the Air Staff, Army Air Forces leaders seemed to have
103accepted his recommendations for educational reform. In their 
efforts to implement these recommendations, AAF leaders responded in a 
pattern that was to be oft repeated in Air Force dealings with R&D: 
they called for the advice and assistance of civilian experts. John R. 
Markham, Associate Professor of Aeronautical Engineering at Massachu­
setts Institute of Technology, W. H. Pickering, Associate Professor of 
Electrical Engineering at California Institute of Technology, E. E. 
Sechler, Professor of Aeronautical Engineering at California Institute 
of Technology, and Th. Troller, Professor of Aeronautical Engineering 
at Case School of Applied Sciences, were experts in technical educa­
ti o n. To ge th er  they became known as the Markham Committee.
In a report prepared for the AAF the Markham Committee noted
102Sturm, USAF SAB, pp. 2-3, 15. See also U.S., War Department, 
Army Air Forces, Headquarters Office Instruction No. 20-76, "Organiza­
tion: The AAF Scientific Advisory Group," Washington, D.C., 4 March 
1946, p. 1. This HOI provided for the transferring of the Scientific 
Advisory Group "including all personnel, functions, records, and office 
equipment" to the office of the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for R&D.
103 n-jSupra, p. 16-17.
^^^John R. Markham, W. H. Pickering, E. E. Sechler, and Th. 
Troller, AAF Officers Technological Education (Preliminary Report),
1 March 1946 (hereafter cited as Markham, Technological Education).
^^^Mervin E. Gross to Muir S. Fairchild, 27 June 1946, p. 1 
(hereafter cited as Gross to Fairchild, 27 Jun 46).
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that the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through his Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Research and Development, had requested that a study be 
made of
a. The necessary technological educational needs of officers of 
the AAF as brought out by the last war and as anticipated 
for the future.
b. The best manner of supplying the necessary technological back­
ground to AAF Officer personnel.
After defining "technological" as covering "the fields of Engineering, 
Maintenance, Procurement, and Logistics," the committee concluded that 
the AAF needed approximately one thousand technically educated officers. 
The committee's report noted that a technical school had already been 
set up in the AAF, but "advances in science and engineering in the 
immediate past indicate a need for an extension of the education pro­
gram beyond the scope" of that which already had been established. The 
committee therefore recommended the establishment of the Army Air 
Forces Institute of Technology under the Air Technical Service Command. 
This school was to complement the Air University (of which more will be 
said later) and was to produce graduates having "a level of education 
corresponding to that of a student graduating with a Bachelor of Science 
Degree from a recognized college." Additionally, it was recommended 
that "the Bachelor of Science Degree should be awarded for the satis­
factory completion of the prescribed courses." Selected graduates of 
this school should then be sent to existing civilian institutions for 
advanced or specialized study.
An official description of the start of the Air Institute of
^Markham, Technological Education, p. 1. 
lO^Ibid., pp. 1-2, 4.
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Technology states that it was designed to replace the Air Corps En­
gineering School at Wright Field. The new school would have a larger 
number of students (the first class was scheduled to include 300 offi­
cers) and a broader scope of instruction when it began operation in 
108September 1946. The mission of the Institute was to provide
instruction to assure scientific technological development of 
AAF equipment, and efficient operation of procurement, supply, 
maintenance and engineering responsibilities assigned to the 
AAF. . . . Initially, emphasis will be given to develop young 
officers scientifically educated to act as links between the 
Air Force and the scientific world. 0̂9
For its Institute the Air Forces wished to recruit the finest 
teachers possible, and one glimpses AAF efforts along this line in a 
letter from Brigadier General Mervin E. Gross, Commandant of the Insti­
tute of Technology, to Major General Muir S. Fairchild, Commanding 
General of the Air University, in June 1946. Gross discussed his travel 
plans with Fairchild, informing him that he planned to visit Austin, 
Texas, to "confer with an educator whom we have hopes of acquiring for 
the AAFIT." Then Gross would travel to Los Angeles for the "Annual 
Summer Meeting of the Institute of The Aeronautical Sciences." This 
part of his trip Gross referred to as a "sort of personnel recruiting 
e xp e dition.After this discussion of his recruiting campaign. Gross
1 A O
"Air Technical College," AAF Review; The Official Service 
Journal of the U.S. Army Air Forces, XXIX, No. 6 (July 1946), 34 
(hereafter cited as "Air Technical College").
1OQDavid M. Schlatter, "Air University," AAF Review; The Official 
Service Journal of the U.S. Army Air Forces, XXIX, No. 6 (July 1946),
11 (hereafter cited as Schlatter, "Air University").
^^^Gross to Fairchild, 27 Jun 46, p. 1. General Gross was kill­
ed in an October 1946 crash of a P-80 jet fighter (Charles Villency,
"The Big Stick," Air Force: Official Journal of the Air Force Associa­
tion, XXX, No. 4 (April 1947), 45 [hereafter cited as Villency, "Big 
Stick"]).
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told with chagrin how the Air Forces had just missed securing the
services of highly regarded Dr. Clauser^^^ as Dean of the College of
Engineering. Clauser had been lured away from the Douglas Aircraft
Company by The Johns Hopkins University, which had offered him the full
use of the school's laboratory facilities and full freedom in research
112unencumbered by teaching or administrative duties.
The AAF school would offer two basic courses. One would be a 
series of courses in fundamental engineering subjects, with some train­
ing in logistics to give its graduates the ability to coordinate the 
problems of engineering and supply. The second course would present 
the basic principles of logistics and business. For those desiring
specialization in nuclear physics and electronics, courses in these
113areas were being considered for qualified students. Selected gradu- • 
ates of the Institute would "pursue highly specialized post-graduate 
courses in nuclear physics and electronics.
^^^Subsequently, T[eddy] F. Walkowicz, "USAF Scientific Advi­
sory Board," Air Force: The Magazine of American Airpower, XXXVIII,
No. 6 (June 1955), 52, identified Clauser as Francis H. Clauser, Chair­
man of the Aeronautics Department at The Johns Hopkins University and 
member of the Scientific Advisory Board.
112Gross to Fairchild, 27 Jun 46, p. 2.
Ill"Air Technical College," p. 34.
^^^Schlatter, "Air University," p. 11. For an appraisal of the 
Institute approximately one year after its creation, see: Villency,
"Big Stick," pp. 44-45, 60. Villency reported that the school consisted 
of two colleges, engineering and logistics, with the engineering college 
offering "instruction in aeronautical engineering with specific appli­
cation to AF requirements and application of scientific developments 
and related subjects. . . . Specifically, the engineering program 
includes such subjects as aerodynamics, physics, mechanics, design, etc" 
(p. 44). It was expected that the Institute would be recognized as 
meeting the standards of civilian schools and would be able to grant a 
Bachelor of Science degree (pp. 44-45).
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Four years later, on 1 April 1950, the Institute, then known 
as the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), was transferred 
to the jurisdiction of the Air University from that of the Air Materiel 
Command under which it was originally established. The physical facil­
ities of the Institute, however, remained at Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base.
The. 1 April 1950 transfer was not the first association between 
Air University and AFIT. Major General David M. Schlatter in an 
article appearing in the July 1946 edition of the official journal of 
the Army Air Forces discussed the early relationship between these two 
organizations. Army Air Forces Regulation 20-61 required Air Univer­
sity to exercise broad supervision of the Air Institute of Technology 
as it was called in 1946.^^^
The Air University itself was established by the Army Air 
Forces on 12 March 1946 as one of its major commands, ranking organiza­
tionally on a level with the Tactical Air Command, the Strategic Air 
Command, and the Air Transport C o m m a n d . T h i s  organization marked 
the first time that the major responsibility for Army Air Forces edu­
cation had been centered under the control of a single headquarters.
^^^U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air University History;
1 January 1950-30 June 1950, II, 349-50, Air Force Archives, Maxwell 
Air Force Base, Alabama; and Schlatter, "Air University," p. 11.
^^^Schlatter, "Air University," pp. 9-10; and "Air Technical 
College," p. 34.
117„The Air University," Air Force and Space Digest; The 
Magazine of Aerospace Power, IL, No. 9 (September 1966), 158; and 
"Organization Chart of the AAF (As of June 1946)," AAF Review : The
Official Service Journal of the U.S. Army Air Forces, XXIX, No. 8 
(September 1946), 50.
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A part of this headquarters was the Educational Services Division that
was staffed by leading specialists who had been recruited from civilian
universities because AAF leaders recognized the professional officer
118corps was weak in the field of higher education.
To help guide its mission. Air University developed a doctrine
that included the view that "technical developments must be given
continuous study and presentation to keep abreast of scientific
119developments and to project doctrines toward the future." For addi­
tional guidance General Carl Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, established 
a board of visitors composed of a number of the foremost educators and
heads of great universities to periodically review the operation of the 
120Air University.
The initial meeting of the Board of Visitors was held at the
121Air University, Maxt̂ ell Field, on 15-16 July 1946. The meeting was 
addressed by the Commanding General of the Air University, Major General 
Muir S. Fairchild. His address gives a clear picture of the role Air 
Forces leaders envisioned the Air University playing with regard to 
the AAF R&D program.
Fairchild noted that the Air University had been established 
"to remedy the difficulties which were recognized in the pre-war school
1 1 O
Schlatter, "Air University," p. 11.
ll^Ibid., p. 10.
IZOibid., p. 11.
^^^U.S., War Department, Army Air Forces, Air University,
"First Report of the Board of Visitors," Maxwell Field, Alabama, 16 
July 1946, p. 1 (hereafter cited as AAF, AU, "First Report of Board of 
Visitors").
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system" of the air service. The Air University was "to coordinate the 
functioning of its constituent schools and to plan the overall educa­
tional program of the Army Air Forces both within service schools and
122in post-graduate work in civilian institutions."
According to Fairchild there were t\fO major aspects of this
mission of the Air University. The first of these was the education
of Air Forces officers so that they would have the knowledge needed for
their profession. The second major aspect was the "creation of
doctrine, and the maintenance of doctrine up to date and in constance
[sic] with the latest scientific developments and the latest thought as
123to the grand strategy of any future conflict."
This second major aspect was of special importance in the eyes 
of Fairchild. Its importance was due to the long, five-year period
between the original idea for a new weapon and the time when a weapon
based upon the idea is ready for mass production; an error in thinking 
in 1946 could mean a catastrophe in 1951. With the decline of civilian 
interest in military problems following wartime, it was imperative that 
the Air University take responsibility for guiding thought and doctrine 
toward appropriate goals. "This even applies, I believe, in the field 
of scientific research and development.
In the Air Forces' efforts to improve its educational system, 
then, one sees the influence of von Karman's recommendations and of the
^^^Muir S. Fairchild, "Introductory Address" to the Air Univer­
sity First Board of Visitors, 15 July 1946, in AAF, AU, "First Report 
of the Board of Visitors," p. 9.
■̂ ■̂̂ Ibid., pp. 9-10.
124ibid., p. 10.
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civilian university as a model for the improvement effort. On the one 
hand, there were the extravagant, inspirational remarks attributed to 
General Schlatter, Deputy Commanding General of .the Air University:
" . . .  the entire AAF is really a university, and the formal instruc­
tion presented in the Air University is simply the core or the heart 
12 Sof the system."
On the other hand, there is the more tangible indication of 
this influence in the institutional titles invoked by AAF leaders for 
the components of their reformed educational system. The Air Univer­
sity would provide the intellectual activity to assure the proper inter­
action between doctrine and R&D. The AAF's Institute of Technology
126would be organized into colleges under the direction of deans.
There is evidence of a still more direct influence of the 
university model on the AAF efforts to establish an effective R&D 
program. Some of those advising and speaking to AAF leaders about R&D 
thought there was a direct relationship between the university and 
effective research and development.
In Science: The Key to Air Supremacy, von Karman advised the
Air Forces on the type of environment which should prevail in its 
laboratory facilities. But he first instructed AAF leaders on the 
"physical attributes of scientific life" which he claimed were 
"libraries, laboratories, publications, [and] society meetings."
Von Karman then commented on the success of several laboratories started
125Schlatter, "Air University," p. 11.
^^^Gross to Fairchild, 27 Jun 46, p. 2; and Villency, "Big 
Stick," p. 45.
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by the National Defense Research Committee during the Second World
War. These laboratories had been established "in close connection
with universities and directed by scientists belonging to the univer- 
127sities." The results of these "cooperative laboratories" suggested
to von Karman that the Air Forces should establish such laboratories
in which the administration and financial responsibility and 
management would remain with the government, and the scientific 
direction would be undertaken by faculty members. This method 
would solve the security problem and yet have the advantages of 
the geographical and spiritual connection with a place of scien­
tific learning.
This was not the first time that von Karman had mentioned the 
importance of ties with an institution of scientific learning. He had 
earlier noted the importance of initiative and freedom in research.
Von Karman considered freedom to be even more essential to a healthy 
scientific undertaking than are free enterprise and initiative to a 
sound economy. He then commented: "It is imperative from this point
of view that the Air Forces continue and expand their present direct 
relations, spiritual and contractual, with various universitites, 
research laboratories, and individual scientists." This was a necessity
127  ̂ ^Von Karman, Key to Air Supremacy, p. 86.
128 > >Ibid. Von Karman greatly enjoyed his life as a university
professor. For some of his recollections of university life, see: 
von Karman, The Wind and Beyond, especially pp. 152-55, 176-77. For a 
comment on the manner in which scientists tended to favor university 
science in advice they give the government, see: Greenberg, Politics
of Pure Science, p. 16. Greenberg quoted Alvin Weinberg, who was 
director of the Atomic Energy Commission's Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
at the time, commenting on the nature of the thinking involved in 
advice from the scientific estate to the government. Weinberg said:
"the whole structure and cast of thinking is geared to the problem of 
university science, and the limitations of the university as an instru­
ment of government are overlooked. It would not be a great exaggeration 
to describe the advisory apparatus . . .  as a lobby for the scientific 
university."
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if the Air Forces was to have "the freedom to call on institutions and
individuals whose assistance they deem to be of the greatest benefit
for their program." No single agency must be allowed to become the
"only source of information and the sole intermediary agency between
129science and the Air Forces."
A slightly different view of the freedom required in an R&D
program was presented in a January 1947 speech delivered to a group of
prospective Air Forces leaders attending the Air War College. The
130speaker was Dr. Hugh Dryden of the National Bureau of Standards. He 
spoke of the creation of a scientific atmosphere within the Air Forces 
which
implies not only the building of an organization in which the 
scientific method and procedure is applied in the broadest possible 
way but still more the development of an esprit de corps favorable 
to these methods and procedures. There must be not only a willing­
ness but a desire to use objective and quantitative procedures 
where possible, to rely in technical matters especially, on those 
with expert knowledge, and to Igok for technical leadership to 
technically qualified leaders.^
Dryden spoke specifically of the conditions necessary for basic
research to flourish. He noted that basic research or the search for
new knowledge is "an intellectual activity of the highest type and
flourishes only in the atmosphere of greatest freedom." It must be
free from immediate and specific goals, time tables, controls and 
132restrictions. Such freedom is to be found primarily in the
X29  ̂ ^Von Karman, Key to Air Supremacy, p. 85.
130"The Contributors," Air University Quarterly Review. I, No.
1 (Spring 1947), 120.
131Dryden, "Science and the Air Force," p. 7.
1 37^^^Ibid., p. 8.
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university environment if one accepts the views of Vannevar Bush.
This belief in a direct relationship between universities and a healthy 
environment for R&D continued to be a strong element of the image of 
R&D entertained by some Air Force leaders, as will be shown later.
Another aspect of AAF efforts to establish a viable R&D 
program appeared during General Arnold's October 1945 appearance before 
Congress. This was the need to create personnel policies that would 
make working for the AAF an attractive career for scientists. He told 
the Senate subcommittee:
As I see it in the Air Forces, the day is now over when we 
were all pilots. There was a time when the pilot was probably 60 
percent of flying. Then, as time passed, we became more and more 
mechanical in our operation of our planes. . . .  We are now coming 
to the point where the pilot hasn't the importance he used to have. 
We have to have a corps of scientists, of technicians, of equal 
importance to the pilot; we have got to have a corps of adminis­
trators; and then we have to have a corps of pilots to do the 
actual operation— three different pyramids building up within the 
Air Corps, all coming up to a common top.^^3
General Arnold believed the AAF had to have scientists in uni­
form as well as civilian scientists. But both the civilian and the 
military scientists had to be provided with a flexible status of 
employment where travel, working accommodations, continued education, 
honorary and social recognition, and opportunity to publish papers were 
e m p h a s i z e d . A  formal AAF Letter of April 1946 reflects an effort on 
the part of the Air Forces to establish this flexible status as a part 
of the R&D environment of the AAF. The Letter noted the following:
133Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Science 
Legislation, 1945, p. 355.
134Ibid., pp. 354-56.
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The air force of the future will require an even greater 
level of education in technical and scientific subjects on the part 
of its personnel. Recent developments have emphasized the neces­
sity for such a background. Education should be a continuing 
process and the trend of thinking kept in current and progressive 
channels. This is particularly necessary for those officers of the 
AAF who have attended postgraduate college courses in selected 
scientific subjects or who possess technical s k i l l s . 1^5
To enhance the value of officers to the AAF they were to be encouraged
to participate in professional societies such as the American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, the National Academy of Sciences, and the
136"American Academy [sic] for the Advancement of Science."
Dr. von Karman also expressed considerable concern about AAF 
personnel policies in Science; The Key to Air Supremacy. He recom­
mended long tenure for officers in charge of laboratories. This tenure 
was essential if such officers were to learn their duties sufficiently
well to be effective. This long period in one assignment must not be
137allowed to jeopardize the technical officer's career.
In addition to the recommendations with respect to tenure of
office, von Karman argued that the size of the organization commanded by
a technical officer must be a significant criterion for his promotion.
The appropriate promotion criteria in the case of technical officers
138should be the importance of their work and technical achievements.
With regard to civilian scientists, von Karman commented on the
135U.S., War Department, Army Air Forces Letter 35-104, 
"Membership of AAF Personnel in Scientific Institutions and Societies," 
Washington, D.C., 15 April 1946, p. 1.
^^^Ibid.
137  ̂ ^Von Karman, Key to Air Supremacy, p. 103.
^^^ibid.
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deficiencies of the civil service system. The Air Forces must be
allowed to hire and fire civilian scientists outside the normal civil
service system. Indeed, von Karman even recommended the establishment
139of a special branch of the civil service for scientific personnel.
In August 1946 the need for qualified scientific personnel was 
again noted, this time in a memorandum entitled "Meed for a Coordina­
tion of Planning of Research and Development Activities." Here it was 
pointed out that sufficient trained personnel, along with ample funds, 
adequate facilities, and solvable problems, are the four essential 
elements in a successful R&D program.
The effort to create a favorable environment for research 
personnel was not restricted to the undertakings of AAF officers and 
their civilian advisers. A conference of War Department scientific 
and professional civilian personnel was held in March 1947. After 
recommending that a long-range research program and a stable budget for 
research and development be established, the conference report called 
for a clearer establishment of the division of research (basic and 
applied) between the War Department and civilian research contractors. 
The report also called for the relief of top research scientists from 
administrative work by assigning them administrative assistants. 
Finally, the report recommended that the R&D field be opened up to
l^^ibid., pp. 103-04.
^^^"Need for A Coordination of Planning of Research and 
Development Activities," 28 August 1946. Unsigned memorandum with 
Col. Wilson's name (possibly Colonel Roscoe C. Wilson) penciled in at 
the top. The memorandum was marked for file under "Scientific 
Personnel." This document is available in folder 168.64-25A 1946-47 
at the Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
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military personnel by offering them recognition and advancement.
During that same spring of 1947 when the War Department 
personnel conference met. Colonel Glantzberg published his article on 
the Air Force and science in the Air University Quarterly Review.
Colonel Glantzberg, it will be recalled, had served as military 
director for von Karman's wartime Scientific Advisory Group. He was
firmly committed to the close dependence of applied research upon
u • u 142basic research.
For Glantzberg, a crucial factor in a good research program 
was good people.
The effectiveness of these [research and development] facilities 
depends entirely upon the caliber of the men using them. It is a 
common mistake to judge the scientific competence of a laboratory 
by the number, variety, and appearance of special pieces of 
apparatus. The most impressive laboratories can conceivably turn 
out inferior scientific work and many major contributions to science 
have come from inadequately equipped and poorly supported labora­
tories. The point is that the effective use of scientific and 
technical facilities requires the best available personnel, and 
that good facilities are not a substitute for able scientists. . . .
. . . Well qualified scientists are needed not only in research 
and development activities but also as members of staffs and of 
operating units. Moreover, all personnel in positions of responsi­
bility should be able to evaluate scientific facts with sound 
judgment and with some vision of future d e v e l o p m e n t s . 1^3
Not everyone in the Air Force should be trained as a specialist in all
fields of science, but everyone should have a broad knowledge of
^^^"Report of Conference of Scientific and Professional Civilian 
Personnel of the War Department," 10 March 1947, pp. 1-2. The subject 
of the conference was: "Creation of a True Professional Environment in
War Department Research & Development Installations." The report of 
the conference may be found in the Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force 
Base, Alabama, folder 168.64-25A.
147Supra, pp. 33-34.
^^^Glantzberg, "Air Force and Science," p. 15.
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scientific and technical matters. This is not to say the Air Forces
must be composed entirely of "jacks-of-all-trades and masters of none."
The Air Force must have some leaders in highly specialized fields or
144it will be doomed to mediocrity.
Glantzberg noted that both General Arnold (in January 1945) and
General Spaatz (in 1946) had stated the need for changing regulations
that limited the responsibility and career opportunities of non-flying
technical officers. In addition to these changes, the Air Forces must
assure that research and development was not hampered by unrealistic
security policies and that adequate facilities were available.
Concluding his article on a cautionary note, Glantzberg wrote:
The problem of creating conditions within the Air Force that 
are attractive to technical personnel is extremely complex and 
difficult, but it is one which we must solve if America is to 
remain a first-class power.
In retrospect, it can be seen that a spirit of change pervaded 
the policy atmosphere of the Army Air Forces during the early postwar 
period. Extensive changes in the AAF approach to R&D were recommended 
by such R&D experts as Theodore von Karman and F. Russell Bichowsky.
And in the wider context of the federal government a similar atmosphere 
prevailed, as Congress sought to work out a national science policy. 
Furthermore, several Air Forces leaders in high, policy-making posi­
tions— of whom the most influential was General Hap Arnold— had spoken 
out as strong advocates of a changed R&D policy.
^^^Ibid.
145^^^Ibid., pp. 12, 14-16.
^^^Ibid., p. 16.
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Some changes had even been begun. A Deputy Chief of Air Staff 
for Research and Development had been established, and the temporary 
Scientific Advisory Group had been transformed into a permanent part of 
the AAF organizational structure.
But these turned out to be merely surface changes. And 
beneath the surface the AAF R&D program continued to be conducted along 
conservative and traditional lines. R&D continued to be regarded as 
properly a part of, and thoroughly subordinate to, the overall materiel 
function of the AAF, as events of the postwar forties were to demon­
strate.
Such a view of the proper place for R&D derived from the policy 
view that the major functions involved in a fighting organization are 
operations (the combat arm), personnel, and supply. Personnel provides 
trained men that are equipped by the supply organization to accomplish 
military objectives sought by the operational organization.
The development of the AAF organizational structure during 
World War II reflects the deep-rooted adherence to this traditional 
view of military management and organization. On 2 March 1942 the 
United States Army issued Circular Number 29 in response to perceived 
realities that were being experienced in World War II. One of these 
realities, or images, was the growing importance of airpower. The 
Circular divided the Army into three basic components : the Army Air
Forces, the Ground Forces, and the Army Services and Supply.
^^^Byron E. Gates, "Organization of the Army Air Forces," Air 
Force; Official Service Journal of the U.S. Army Air Forces, XXVI, No. 
2 (February 1943), 13 (hereafter cited as Gates, "Organization of AAF")
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The Circular described the mission of the AAF as follows:
"'The mission of the Array Air Forces is to procure and maintain equip­
ment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide air force units 
properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations.
To assure accomplishment of this mission the AAF was reorganized in 
1942. Since the AAF was a part of the Army, the new AAF headquarters 
organization paralleled that of the Army. The headquarters consisted 
of four major staff elements: Personnel (A-1), Intelligence (A-2),
Training and Operations (A-3), and Supply (A-4). These agencies kept
in constant touch with their Army equivalents which were designated as
149G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4.
The impact of this traditional view upon the management of 
research and development becomes obvious when one examines AAF regula­
tions that pertain to R&D. About a month after the establishment of 
the DCAS/R&D in January 1946,^^^ the Army Air.Forces created its AAF 
Technical Committee. This committee was established as a part of the 
Air Technical Service Command at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. Its 
purpose was to
provide a centralized agency to consider and recommend action upon 
all matters of research, development, classification, and procure­
ment of materiel designed for and intended to be used by the 
armed forces coming within the jurisdiction of the AAF and upon
^^^United States Army Circular Number 29, 2 March 1942, quoted 
in Gates, "Organization of AAF," p. 13.
149Gates, "Organization of AAF," p. 13. The close relation­
ship between AAF staff agencies and those of the War Department was 
also noted on p. 45 of Craven and Cate, Men and Planes.
^^°AAFR 20-62, p. 1.
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such matters as may be referred to it by the Commanding General, 
AAF.l^l
The following is a brief summary of some of the major functions 
assigned to the Technical Committee:
1. "Review all new research and development projects before 
initiation of work or prior to making contractual commitments, bearing 
in mind that it is often necessary that preliminary research and 
development work be conducted without a clear idea of what the results 
will be." Once it is decided that a development is desirable, an 
investigation was to be conducted to see if similar work that might be 
helpful has been done. Then a development project may be initiated.
2. Insure coordination with various other R&D agencies.
3. Rule on what equipment is to be considered obsolete.
4. "Assure that specifications for articles of equipment 
peculiar to the AAF, and not assigned to other Services, conform to 
approved military characteristics in all cases in which specifications 
for procurement are based upon approved military characteristics and 
that procurement is based on approved requirement programs."
5. Review AAF R&D programs.
6. "Recommend to the Commanding General, AAF (ATTENTION: 
AC/AS-4) [Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Supply] [italics 
mine], the release of research and development projects for limited 
production, which have not progressed to a point justifying standardi­
zation."
^^^U.S., War Department, Army Air Forces Regulation 20-63, 
"Organization: AAF Technical Committee," Washington, D.C., 15
February 1946, p. 1 (hereafter cited as AAFR 20-63, 15 Feb 46).
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7. "Forward to Headquarters, AAF (ATTENTION; AC/AS-4)
[italics mine], for review and approval, all major research and
development projects desired to be initiated by Air Technical Service
Command. The class of projects to be considered will be those with
high development cost, the procurement of complete aircraft, and those
upon which the opinion of higher authority as to eventual tactical
152usage are believed desirable."
AAFR 20-63 also stated that the commander of Air Technical 
Service Command was responsible for initiating or recommending the 
initiation of R&D projects "as may be required to produce the most 
satisfactory article complying with or surpassing established military 
characteristics." He was also responsible for initiating or recommend­
ing projects "as may be required generally to advance applied research 
or to surpass performance of articles required by military character­
istics or foreseen as a possible future requirement, though not specif-
153ically required by established military characteristics."
In addition to the requirements levied on the AAF Technical 
Committee with respect to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel 
and Supply (AC/AS-4), the secretariat of the Committee was required to 
furnish AC/AS-4 with an agenda and a complete set of minutes for each 
m e e t i n g . O n e  might well wonder, at this point, what had happened 
to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for Research and Development.
152Ibid., pp. 1-3.
IS ^ ib id .
^^^Ibid., p. 4.
66
In July 1947 a fundamental reorganization occurred at the 
Cabinet level of the Executive Branch, and although it offered potent 
implications for a reappraisal of R&D in association with military 
operations, a new day did not dawn immediately. Instead, the struggle 
between the conservative and the more innovative-minded managers 
continued, but within an altered institutional framework which offered 
greater flexibility of maneuver. For on 26 July 1947 President 
Harry S. Truman signed into law the bill that established the Depart­
ment of the Air Force which was coequal to the Department of the Army 
and the Department of the Navy. All of these departments were con­
tained within the Department of Defense.Henceforth the Army Air 
Forces would be known as the United States Air Force (USAF).
In September 1947 an organization similar to the former AAF 
Technical Committee was established at Headquarters USAF; this was the 
USAF Aircraft and Weapons Board. Its mission was to "determine the 
aircraft and weapons development and procurement program for the armed 
forces which comes within the jurisdiction of the USAF." Additionally, 
it was to "consider such other related matters as may be referred to 
it by the Chief of Staff, USAF."^^^
The Board was to determine "the basic types of aircraft and 
weapons required to carry out the mission and plans of the USAF." It 
was also to determine military characteristics for weapons and planes,
^^^Eugene M. Emme, Aeronautics and Astronautics; An American 
Chronology of Science and Technology in the Exploration of Space; 1915- 
1960 (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
1961), p. 57 (hereafter cited as Emme, Aeronautics and Astronautics).
^^^U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 
No. 20-10, "Organization; USAF Aircraft and Weapons Board,"
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set requirements for new aircraft and weapons development projects, 
and select aircraft and weapons for procurement.
The Assistant Chief of Air Staff for R&D was included as a 
member of this board. But the Board was heavily weighted in favor of 
operations; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and the 
Commanding Generals of Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Air 
Defense Command, and Air Transport Command were also members. Addi­
tionally, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel and the Commanding 
General of the Air Materiel Command were Board members.
The operations element of the Air Force was given additional 
power on the Board by assigning to the Chief of the Requirements 
Division of the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, the 
duties as Secretary of the Board. The Secretary was responsible for 
preparing the agenda and the minutes for each meeting. Furthermore, 
the Secretary was to "take action for the Board within the scope of 
authority delegated by the Board.
% e n  the Air Force first achieved independent status in 1947, 
there was, inevitably, discussion of organizational changes at Head­
quarters USAF. The major rationale for the changes was given as the 
need to reduce the number of staff elements that reported directly to 
the Chief of Staff USAF from thirteen to seven. Early evidence
Washington, D.C., 29 September 1947, p. 1 (hereafter cited as USAFR 





indicated that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Research and Develop­
ment would become the Director of Research and Development and be given 
a staff position which would place him on the same organizational level 
as the Director of Personnel, the Director of Plans and Operations, the 
Director of Materiel, and the Comptroller. But eventually R&D was to 
be given lower organizational status.
On 10 October 1947 the Air Force placed in effect a new organi­
zational structure. The reorganization provided for four major staff 
elements under the office of the Chief of Staff, USAF: the Air
Comptroller, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Materiel. The Assistant Chief of Staff for R&D had become the 
"Director of Research and Development," but this constituted an organi­
zational demotion, for the various "Directors" on the USAF staff 
reported not to the Chief of Staff, but to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. 
Research and Development staff responsibility had been absorbed by the 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Matériel, and the traditional 
emphasis still prevailed.
On 31 October 1947 a new USAF Regulation 20-10 replaced the 
29 September 1947 version of the regulation. It reflected the impact 
of organizational changes that had occurred since the appearance of the 
original regulation. The Assistant Chief of Staff for R&D was no longer
160„Life Begins at Forty: US Air Force," Air Force; Official
Journal of the Air Force Association, XXX, No. 9 (September 1947),
20-21 (hereafter cited as "Life Begins at Forty: USAF").
lôliiAir Staff Changes," Army and Navy Journal, LXXXV, No. 5 
(4 October 1947), 107.
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on the USAF Aircraft and Weapons Board.  ̂ Here one can see tangible 
evidence of what it meant for R&D to be relegated from the Assistant or 
Deputy Chief of Staff level to the Directorate level. There was no 
longer a member of the Aircraft and Weapons Board who represented 
strictly R&D interests.
A second revision of USAFR 20-10 appeared in November 1947.
Only one change was made— a section of definitions was added.
Definitions. "Aircraft and weapons" are defined for the 
purposes of this Regulation as complete military aircraft and 
weapons intended for assignment to and employment by organized 
combat units and training establishments of the armed forces; the 
term is not intended to include component parts of such aircraft 
and weapons, nor does it include purely research aircraft and 
weapons which have no immediate military application, but which 
promise to be useful research vehicles for future development.
Thus the Air Forces had attempted to graft an R&D organization 
onto its traditional organizational structure without making any 
really fundamental changes in the way R&D was managed. The graft 
failed to take, and subsequent interpretations of this failure seem to 
have been related to the attitude held toward the management of R&D. 
Those who wished to have the management procedures and organization of 
the past continued largely as they had been tended to regard the 
failures as due to a violation of proper military organizational 
principles; the failure that their resistance to change had helped to 
produce was thus viewed as a vindication of their views on the
162U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 
20-10, "Organization: USAF Aircraft and Weapons Board," Washington,
D.C., 31 October 1947, p. 1.
163U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 
20-10, "Organization: USAF Aircraft and Weapons Board," Washington,
D.C., 21 November 1947, p. 1.
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management of research and development.
On the other hand, those who favored a new departure in the 
management of research and development thought that the failure 
resulted from making changes that were merely superficial in nature. 
According to the advocates of more fundamental change, the Army Air 
Forces and the new Air Force had simply failed to establish an organi­
zation capable of properly managing R&D. They did not abandon their 
efforts to give R&D the increased emphasis and qualified independence 
which they thought it required.
CHAPTER III
COMPETING IMAGES OF BASIC RESEARCH 
AND R&D: 1947-1949
The establishment of a Deputy Chief of Air Staff for R&D in 
January 1946 was regarded at the time as an essential step toward the 
implementation of the reforms recommended in von Karman's Science: The 
Key to Air Supremacy. Yet in October 1947 this office was eliminated 
and its functions absorbed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Materiel. Then, some fifteen months later, von Karman again rec­
ommended the establishment of a DCS/R&D, this time to General Hoyt S. 
Vandenberg who was then serving as the USAF Chief of Staff.^ And less 
than two and a half years after the elimination of the DCAS/R&D the Air 
Force established a Deputy Chief of Staff for Development and created 
the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC).“ The circumstances 
which produced this turnabout are worth examining. How could such
^Theodore von Karman to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 15 January 1949, 
p. 1, in ARDC Office of Command Historian, History of ARDC: 23 Jan SO­
SO Jun 51, II (hereafter cited as von Karman to Vandenberg, 15 Jan 49).
2Muir S. Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, Memorandum for 
the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and The Deputy Chiefs of Staff for 
Personnel, Comptroller, Operations, and Materiel, "Organization for 
Research and Development in the USAF," 23 January 1950, in the Air 
Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, p. 1 (hereafter cited 
as Fairchild, Memorandum, "Organization for R&D," 23 Jan 50).
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fundamental changes in organizational structure be affected within 
thirty months of the time when similar changes had been blocked and 
even undone?
Traditionalism continued to be a strong factor in the R&D milieu 
of the Air Force during the late forties and early fifties. Advocates 
of the traditionalist approach to R&D management continued to resist 
efforts to revise the Air Force research and development policy. One 
indication of how successful they were is to be found in a 1949 "in- 
house" report which received attention in upper echelons of Air Force 
command— the "Ridenour Report." Said this Report, in part:
The entire complex of activities: fundamental research
(new knowledge), applied research and initial development (the 
first approach to a specific end), engineering (for a tactically 
useful version), procurement, quality control, testing to speci­
fications, technical evaluation, supply, maintenance, industrial 
planning and mobilization— are presently considered in the Air 
Force under one heading. Materiel,3
Perhaps the most prevalent element of this continuing tradi­
tionalism was the view that the Air Force is predominantly a combat 
arm. In literature dealing with the Air Force R&D program, this trait 
was frequently referred to in negative terms. Thus, Colonel Arthur A. 
Fickel observed the following during a July 1949 meeting of the USAF 
Scientific Advisory Board:
The Air Force until a decade ago was a combat arm, leaning in all 
directions for its research and development. I do not intend to 
slight the excellent work of the Engineering Division starting in
3U.S., Department of the Air Force, Scientific Advisory Board, 
Research and Development in the United States Air Force, Report of a 
Special Committee of the Scientific Advisory Board to the Chief of 
Staff, USAF, September 1949, p. V-5 (hereafter cited as the Ridenour 
Report). Louis N. Ridenour was the influential Chairman of the Special 
Committee. Other comments on materiel control of the R&D may be found 
on pp. 111-1, V-1, and V-2 of the Report.
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1915 and even before; I merely say that, at least in general im­
pression, the Air Service, or the Army Air Forces, had been 
primarily a supplicant either to the other Services of the Army 
and the Navy or to the aircraft industry.4
Although Fickel referred to the air service as it was ten years earlier,
his reference to the Array Air Forces indicates that he also had more
recent times in mind.
There is little doubt that the drafters of the Ridenour Report 
were concerned about the combat orientation of the Air Force when they 
wrote;
The Air Force is no longer merely a combat arm. It is now 
a Department with the responsibility of being self-sufficient.
It cannot achieve self-sufficiency unless it becomes competent 
in research and development, . . ..5
Even more pointed was a comment contained in the "Air University 
Study" of USAF R&D that was prepared in 1949 by the Air University 
Committee headed by Major General Orville A. Anderson and including as 
members Major General Donald L. Putt, Brigadier General Ralph P. Swof- 
ford, Jr., and Colonel Keith K. Compton.^
The USAF should be more than a combat arm in being. Its 
present emphasis is such that it ia primarily a combat arm—  
and, if the present emphasis is continued, it is a combat arm 
which will radically decrease in significance and war potential 
as technology progresses beyond the familiar boundaries of
4Transcript of Scientific Advisory Board Conference, Held 12 
July 1949, Room 4C-961, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., (Conference con­
vened at 3:20 PM and adjourned at 5:05 PM), Dr. Louis Ridenour, Chair­
man, Presided. USAF Presentation by AFOAT, Gen. D. M. Schlatter, and 
Colonel A. A. Fickel, n. 15 (hereafter cited as SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 
49).
^Ridenour Report, p. VII-2.
^U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air University Committee, 
"Air University Study; Research and Development in the United States 
Air Force," 18 November 1949, in ARDC Office of Command Historian, 
History of ARDC: 23 Jan 50-30 Jun 51, II (hereafter cited as Air Uni­
versity Study).
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World War II. Current emphasis upon day-to-day operational and 
materiel problems has been so great as to radically and adversely 
affect the long term development of the Air Force.
Nearly ten years later similar sentiments that the Air Force 
was predominantly a combat arm were offered in a 1958 article by 
Colonel Edward N. Hall, Director of Weapon System 133A, the "MINUTEMAN" 
intercontinental ballistic missile program. Wrote Hall:
Traditionally the military services have been combat-oriented; 
their major task has been operational, and everything else has 
been treated as an unfortunate diversion to be delegated whenever 
possible to appropriate civilian agencies.&
If it was not the primary cause, combat orientation at least 
contributed to certain attitudes, views, and situations which were not 
conducive to a flourishing Air Force R&D program. For one thing, there 
were those in the Air Force who thought that R&D should be subordinate, 
even subservient, to the operations and logistics elements of the ser­
vice. An expression of this view is found in a briefing presented to 
General D. M. Schlatter prior to a 3 January 1950 meeting of the Air 
Staff. In its discussion of the establishment of a Deputy Chief of 
Staff for R&D the text of the briefing contains these words:
^Ibid., pp. 2-3.
^Edward N. Hall, "Industry and the Military in the United 
States," Air University Quarterly Review, X, No. 3 (Fall 1958), 27, 39 
(hereafter cited as Hall, "Industry and the Military"). For a more 
recent statement on the combat orientation of the American military, 
see: Robert G. Gard, Jr., "The Military and American Society,"
Foreign Affairs, IL, No. 4 (July 1971), 702. Here Colonel Gard, 
speaking of more recent events, wrote: "Bureaucratic imperatives
demanded that the military develop within its ranks new technical, 
analytical and managerial skills of a high order. But continued 
military preoccupation with the combat function precluded an adequate 
response to this requirement."
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The other Deputies and staff personnel oppose a deputy [for R&D] 
on general principles and also on the basis of a philosophy that 
operations and logistics are the military concerns which technology 
serves. The three are not co-equal as would be implied by a deputy 
for "research and development."
One of the most outspoken proponents of change in the Air 
Force R&D program was General Donald L. Putt. In November 1949 Putt 
addressed the Air War College on the subject of Air Force R&D. A 
statement in his address concerned the relationship between scientists 
and fighting men, and in this statement one sees another indication of 
the subordinate role in which research and development was cast by the 
emphasis on combat activities. As Putt expressed it: "Scientists must
be more than mere consultants to fighting men. They must become full 
and responsible partners in the conduct of war."^^
General Putt also indicated that there were those in the Air 
Force who did not possess favorable views of the activities of 
scientists :
There are those in high positions in the Air Force today who 
feel that scientists and technical personnel, in and out of the 
military, are an odd group wasting millions of dollars promoting 
their own pet ideas and producing very little that will contribute
9Text of a Briefing for General Schlatter prior to the Air 
Staff Meeting of 3 January 1950 on the Air Force Research and Develop­
ment Studies, p. 3, in ARDC Office of Command Historian, History of 
ARDC; 23 Jan 50-30 Jun 51, II (hereafter cited as Text of Briefing for 
General Schlatter). See also Brigadier General N. B. Harbold, Inspector 
General, Air Material Command, Memorandum to General Streett, Subject: 
"Report of the Special Committee of the SAB," 5 December 1949, p. 1, in 
U.S., Department of the Air Force, History of the Separation of Research 
and Development from the Air Materiel Command, Vol. Ill (hereafter cited 
as History of the Separation of R&D from AMC, III). Harbold questions 
if R&D is important enough to be given separate command status.
^^Donald L. Putt, "USAF Research and Development," Speech to 
the Air War College, Air University, Maxifell Air Force Base, Alabama,
17 November 1949, p. 16 (hereafter cited as Putt, "USAF R&D").
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to the Air Force of today or tomorrow.^
The tendency to subordinate R&D to other considerations in the
Air Force seems to be the underlying cause of another problem cited by
General Putt. In July 1949 Putt remarked to a conference of the
Scientific Advisory Board that the Comptroller of the Air Force had cut
1500 manpower spaces from the R&D program "to take care of repair and 
12utility needs." In his later address to the Air War College Putt 
noted that demobilization in the period following World War II had led 
to manpower raids on R&D functions to fill overseas manpower spaces. 
Since many of the R&D specialists were unwilling to serve overseas, 
the Air Forces lost the services of "several hundred highly trained 
technical officers.
Another problem that combat orientation seems to have caused 
for R&D was in the area of the directives that governed the functioning 
of the Air Force. The Air University Study described the situation 
as follows;
Standard Air Force regulations which are designed for the manage­
ment and operation of tactical, administrative, or procurement 
organizations seriously interfere with the efficient management 
and operation of Research and Development activities
The battlefields of World War II were the training grounds for 
many post-World War II AAF leaders, and their wartime experience some­
times dictated their attitude toward R&D. An article in Air Force
^^Ibid., pp. 21-22.
l^SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 1949, p. 27.
^^Putt, "USAF R&D," p. 37.
14Air University Study, p. 2.
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magazine described the situation well:
Many of the men who are now in policy-making positions within 
the Air Force are men who were in the field during the last war, 
fighting with great courage and valor, but with airplanes that 
never seemed to go quite far enough nor carry quite enough bombs. 
Somehow they got the job done in spite of the limitations of their 
equipment, but when they came home after the war to assume admini­
strative duties made vacant by older, retiring officers, their 
first and very natural resolve was to improve upon the weapons 
they had just laid down . . .  to build a fighter that would go 
faster and turn more sharply, or a bomber that would go farther 
and carry a bigger load. These were the requirements as dictated 
by their own first-hand experience on the front. And so Research 
& Development became a job of perfecting and refining old weapons 
instead of what it was supposed to be— a search for new ones.
Six months before the appearance of the article in Air Force 
General Putt had made similar comments in his address to the Air War 
College. He remarked that there were those people in the Air Force 
who "hold that research and development must be kept under rigid control 
by 'requirements' and 'military characteristics' promulgated by opera­
tional personnel who can only look into the past and ask for bigger 
and better weapons of World War II vintage.
As late as 1960 there were descriptions of this traditional
view of R&D being given. General Roscoe C. Wilson had this to say 
about R&D traditionalism before a subcommittee of the House Appropria­
tions Committee:
There was a time when the research and development activities 
came under the material part of the Air Force and our efforts were 
confined almost entirely to improving what we already had on hand. 
Under this system, the atomic bomb, for instance, could never have
^^"Key to the Future: A Special Report on Air Force Research
and Development," Air Force: The Official Journal of the Air Force
Association, XXXIII, No. 6 (June 1950), 16 (hereafter cited as "Key to 
the Future").
^Sutt, "USAF R&D," p. 22
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been invented. It was a matter of just creeping along bit by
bit.17
But it would be unfair to the leaders that were guiding the 
activities of the Air Force after World War 11 to say their R&D 
decisions were totally controlled by traditionalism. This period was 
a time of exceptional activities; AAF and AF leaders faced numerous 
situations of crisis or near-crisis proportion between 1945 and 1950.
Perhaps the first major difficulty that confronted AAF leaders 
following World War 11 was demobilization. At the time of the Allied 
victory over Japan the Army Air Forces was made up of 2,253,000 men.
By April 1946 this strength had been reduced to 485,000. AAF manpower 
decreased further to 303,000 at the end of May 1947. The number of 
aircrew members had decreased from 413,890 on V-J day to 24,079 in 
June 1947.18
Such drastic reductions in force could hardly have failed to 
alter the conduct of affairs in the Army Air Forces. In January 1945 
fifty-four percent of the AAF's first-line aircraft were available for 
immediate use; by 31 October 1946 only eighteen percent of the combat 
aircraft were ready for combat. "Effective combat units— the most 
meaningful measure of combat strength— melted away from 218 groups on 
V-J Day to two groups in December 1946."!^ The situation was described
l̂ II.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department 
of Defense Appropriations for 1961, Part 6; Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation, Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee 
on Appropriations. 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, p. 479.
18Alfred Goldberg, "The Establishment: Worldwide Air Force," in




in these words by one author:
Following VJ-Day, demobilization was pushed through in such haste 
that our armed services were literally ripped apart. Our mighty 
air forces shrank to a remnant as pilots and crews were discharged, 
helterskelter, and great armadas of bombers and fighters junked or 
pickled. By midyear, officers who had led the AAF to victory 
assessed their skeleton commands and had to admit grimly that it 
would be impossible to put a single B-29 squadron in the air, and 
that "Today we couldn't fight our way out of a paper bag!"20
The tremors of demobilization had hardly ceased to shake the 
Pentagon when the quake of "unification" struck, and the National 
Security Act of 1947 combined the War Department and the Department of 
the Navy into a single Department of Defense. From the standpoint oc 
the Air Force, the key word describing the National Security Act of 
1947 was not unification, but rather "separation," for the Act estab­
lished the Department of the Air Force as a separate division of the
21Department of Defense.
Separation was not achieved by a mere pronouncement; it involved
a long and detailed process. Although 18 September 1947, the day the
first Secretary of the Air Force, W. Stuart Symington was sworn in, is
22celebrated as the official birth date of the United States Air Force.
The Army and the Air Force had begun planning for the separation as 
early as July 1947. As finally approved, the plan involved "some 22
20La Motte Cohu, "'Paper Bag' Air Force," Air Force: Official
Journal of the Air Force Association, XXX, No. 3 (March 1947), p. 12.
21Wihelmine Burch, "The Establishment: September 18, 1947,"
in Goldberg, History of USAF, pp. 99-103 (hereafter cited as Burch, 
"September 18, 1947"). See also "Life Begins at Forty: 'The Day Billy
Dreamed of,"' Air Force: Official Journal of the Air Force Association,
XXX, No. 9 (September 1947), 20-21, 43 (hereafter cited as "'Day Silly 
Dreamed of").
^^Burch, "September 18, 1947," p. 89.
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Army-Air Force agreements." Based upon these agreements, "formal
transfer orders" were issued. It was not until 22 July 1949 that the
23final transfer order was signed. And it was not until fiscal year
1950 that the Air Force operated on a budget presented to Congress
independently of the Army.^^ Separation of the Air Force from the Army
had made it necessary for the Air Force to develop a budget structure
and improve Air Force "skills in the field of management by giving Air
Force officers special business training in both military and civilian 
25institutions."
Additionally, in various documents of 1947 one glimpses some 
of the detailed negotiations involved in the creation of an independent 
Air Force. For example, there was a lengthy memorandum specifying 
what R&D functions the Air Force would begin to perform without War 
Department approval, what programs and equipment the Air Force would 
be responsible for, and what would be done about the division of 
personnel bet\feen the Army and the AF.^^ This same memorandum indi­
cated that in the area of personnel allocation between the Army and the
^^Goldberg, "Worldwide Air Force," p. 106.
^^Lt. Gen. E[dwin] W. Rawlings, USAF Comptroller, "Budgeting 
for the Air Force," Army and Navy Journal, LXXXVI, No. 43 (25 June 
1949), 1227.
^^Ibid.
26Major General Curtis E. LeHay and Colonel Cloyd H. Marvin, 
Memorandum for Lt. Gen J. Lawton Collins, Subject: "Proposed Action
for Separation of Army and Air Force Research and Development," 26 
August 1947, pp. 1-4. This document was found in folder 168.64-15A 
1945-47 of the Correspondence of General Curtis E. LeMay in the Air 
Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
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27new Air Force there was some disagreement. Furthermore, TAB B of
the memorandum listed fifteen officers who were to be assigned to the
Air Force and established a schedule for each one to be phased out of
28the Army's R&D program. In at least one case, the transfer of
29officers involved separate negotiations.
The relative chaos created by demobilization and separation of
the Air Force from the Army was further complicated by a deteriorating
world situation. As Walter Millis, an American military historian
wrote: "When James Forrestal took office as First Secretary of Defense
in the late summer of 1947, the nation was facing a situation as grim
30as it had been, largely, unforeseen." Having consolidated her
satellite empire in Central Europe, the Soviet Union "was intensifying
a remorseless pressure on territories beyond— on Czechoslovakia,
31Greece and Turkey."
In early 1947 Britain had announced her inability to continue 
her efforts to keep Greece from falling into the hands of the
^^Ibid., pp. 4-5.
^®Ibid., TAB B.
29Major General Curtis E. LeMay, Memorandum for the Director 
of Research and Development, War Department General Staff, Subject: 
"Release of Air Force Officer," 30 September 1947, p. 1. The memo­
randum was found in folder 168.64-15A 1945-47 of General Curtis E. 
LeMay's correspondence in the Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force 
Base, Alabama. The officer involved in these negotiations was Colonel 
Frank R. Cook.
30Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military
History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), p. 314 (hereafter cited 
as Millis, Arms and Men).
^^Ibid., pp. 314-15.
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Communists. This situation inspired President Harry S. Truman to tell
Congress and the American people on 12 March 1947 that the U.S. must
adopt a policy of supporting all free peoples resisting subjugation by
32armed minorities or outside pressure. The Truman Doctrine, as it
came to be called, placed a heavy burden on the U.S. Armed Forces, for
it "initiated a military foreign aid program which eventually included
a large number of countries throughout the world and required a great
33deal of manpower and resources from the U.S. military services."
About a year following the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine
the Russians began to restrict the flow of traffic between West Germany
and West Berlin. This resulted in the initiation of a massive airlift
to provide the necessities of life to West Berlin.Although the
35blockade was lifted in May 1949, the airlift was not officially 
concluded until 30 September 1949 to assure that reserve stocks in 
Berlin were adequate and that the international situation had been 
clarified.
Operation VITTLES, as the Berlin Airlift was known to the Air 
Force, was a massive undertaking. The airlift began on a rather small
32Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy; American Foreign 
Policy, 1945-1960 (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company,
Inc., 1962; Anvil Original, 1962), pp. 40-41 (hereafter cited as 
Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy).
^^Goldberg, "Worldwide Air Force," p. 110.
^^Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 47-48.
^^Ibid., p. 48.
^^Harold Larson, "The Deeds: The Berlin Airlift," in Goldberg,
History of the USAF, p. 241.
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scale with only eighty tons of milk, flour, and medicine being
delivered to Berlin by the United States Air Forces in Europe on 26
June 1948. But as the blockade continued it became obvious that such
a large city could be supported from the air only if a vast operation
were undertaken. The needs of the Berliners and Allied military
personnel stationed in that city were estimated originally at about
4,500 tons of supplies a day, but in October 1948 this estimate was
increased to 5,620 tons per day with 3,084 tons of coal comprising the
37bulk of the materiel.
Although the Air Force was assisted in this effort by the 
British Royal Air Force and by the U.S. Navy, extensive USAF assets 
were committed to meeting the requirements of the airlift. Air Force 
C-54 aircraft constituted the backbone of the airlift force. Approxi­
mately 400 of these four-engined cargo planes were operational; of 
these, 319 were committed to the airlift at the peak of operations.
The high point of the airlift came in mid-April 1949 when on one day 
1,398 aircraft delivered 12,940.9 tons of cargo to Berlin. In all, the 
Americans alone airlifted 1,783 million tons of supplies to Berlin
O Q
during Operation VITTLES.
In conjunction with the Berlin airlift, the Air Force was called 
upon for another major effort. National leaders were concerned that 
we might have to fight over Berlin. Their reaction to this situation 
was that the United States should "get some force into the theater if
^^Ibid., pp. 235, 240.
O O
Ibid., pp. 35-36, 241.
84
only as a precaution.” The only force available to the nation was that
of atomic weapons. And in July 1948 the decision was made to dispatch
two groups of B-29's to England where they would be within range of
39significant Soviet targets. In addition to the B-29's the Air Force
also dispatched a flight of P-80 fighter planes across the Atlantic.
This entire effort was referred to in an article appearing in Air Force
40as the "’return of the USAF to Europe."’
In the midst rf the situation described above, Air Force 
leaders were attempting to put together what they considered to be an 
adequate force to meet the worldwide commitments of the USAF. Speaking 
of the days immediately following unification, an article in Air Force 
noted: "The first task to be undertaken by General Carl Spaatz as
Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force will be the forging of a 
ready-to-fight organization 'by Christmas.' This organization was 
to consist originally of only fifty-five groups, although the Air Force 
was authorized to develop a force of seventy groups."Until the 
Korean War changed the whole perspective of requirements for national 
defense, seventy remained the magic number for the Air Force— the 
number of groups it needed to do its job."^^
39Millis, Arms and Men, pp. 322-23.
^^John G. Norris, "Airpower in the Cold War," Air Force: 
Official Journal of the Air Force Association, XXX, No. 9 (September
1948), 25-26.
^^"Life Begins at Forty: USAF," p. 20.
^^Ibid.
^^Goldberg, "Worldwide Air Force," p. 106. For a disparaging 
comment on the decision that seventy groups was the minimum size Air
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However, by 1949 the Air Force was forced to abandon its hopes
for a force of seventy groups. Congress had voted the funds in 1948
to begin a five-year aircraft-purchase program that would have provided
the equipment for a seventy-group Air Force. But in 1949 President
Truman requested enough funds to maintain a force of only forty-eight
groups during fiscal year 1950. This actually constituted a reduction
in force since the strength of the Air Force had increased to fifty-nine
44groups by December 1948.
The lack of funds to support the expansion of the Air Force to 
its desired seventy groups highlights another major problem facing USAF 
leaders during the post-World War II period. This was the problem of 
tight fiscal policies.
Between 1946 and 1950 President Truman considered a balanced 
budget to be a matter of high priority. In general, the budgeting
Force that was acceptable, see Millis, Arms and Men, p. 309. For a 
view of the rationale behind the seventy-group Air Force see : Presi­
dent's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age, pp. 24-27.
^^Alfred Goldberg, "The Establishment: Roles and Missions," in
Goldberg, History of USAF, p. 116 (hereafter cited as Goldberg, "Roles 
and Missions"). For more details on the vicissitudes of funding for 
the seventy-group Air Force see the following articles: "Congressional
Roundup," Aviation Week, L, No. 13 (28 March 1949), 15; Robert Hotz,
"Air Power Budget at Record High," Aviation Week, L, No. 16 (18 April 
1949), 12-13; "The Aviation Week," Aviation Week, L, No. 19 (9 May 1949), 
7; "News Sidelights," Aviation Week, L, No. 25 (20 June 1949), 7; "News 
Sidelights," Aviation Week. L, No. 26 (27 June 1949), 7; "Hopes 
Brighten for Bigger USAF Budget," Aviation Week, LI, No. 15 (10 October 
1949), 12-13; "Scant Hope for 58-Group AF," Aviation Week, LI, No. 16 
(17 October 1949), 14; "The Aviation Week: The Budget Victory— A Staff
Report," Aviation Week, LI, No. 17 (24 October 1949), 7; "Planes USAF 
to Buy in 1950," Aviation Week, LI, No. 24 (12 December 1949), 11; and 
John G. Norris, "Round Two in the Fight for Airpower: Will Congress
Vote Money for the Second Installment of the 70-Group Air Force?" Air 
Force: The Official Journal of the Air Force Association, XXXI, No. 10
(October 1948), 13-15 (hereafter cited as Norris, "Round Two").
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technique used by the Truman administration was to estimate revenues;
subtract domestic program costs, foreign aid costs, and debt interest
payments from the revenues; and allocate the remainder for national 
45defense. This policy resulted in the following expenditures for 
defense between FY 1947 and FY 1950:
FY 1947 $14.4 billion
FY 1948 $11.7 billion
FY 1949 $12.9 billion
FY 1950 $13.0 billion^G
As far as the Air Force's desired budget for FY 1950 was
concerned. Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington stated that it
was eight billion dollars. By the time the Army, Navy, and Air Force
finished padding their budgets to compensate for expected cuts, the
combined total sought was in excess of thirty billion dollars. One can
well imagine the agitation with which some members of Congress and the
Department of Defense greeted President Truman's submitted defense
budget of fifteen billion dollars, to be divided equally between the
47three military services.
45Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs
in National Politics (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 
1961), p. 42 (hereafter cited as Huntington, Common Defense).
46Ibid., pp. 42-43. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal tried 
to secure seventeen billion dollars for the Department of Defense for 
FY 1950.
^^"The Aviation Week," Aviation Week, L, No. 19 (9 May 1949), 7. 
For more information on budgeting in the late forties and early fifties 
see: Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal
1950," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder,
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An earlier glimpse of what the specific impact of tight fiscal 
policies meant for AAF and AF R&D programs is afforded by a 10 
September 1946 memorandum from General LeMay, Deputy Chief of the Air 
Staff for R&D, to General H. S. Aurand, Director, Research and Develop­
ment Division, War Department General Staff. The memorandum explored 
the impact of possible budget reductions from the standpoint of the 
AAF R&D program:
The present program as provided for by the F.Y. 1947 budget 
represents the minimum requirement in research and development and 
is 30% lower than the original AAF estimated program, which was 
considered to be an adequate well-balanced program. Further reduc­
tion will mean severe curtailment or complete elimination of 
research in specific f i e l d s .
One can well imagine the energy that was required from the 
leaders who sought to overcome the difficulties associated with these 
policies and events. And demobilization, separation of the Air Force 
from the Army, world crises, efforts to create an effective and combat- 
ready Air Force, and tight fiscal policies were by no means all the 
problems faced by Air Force leaders. The B-36 controversy, the estab­
lishment of mission limitations for the three services, and the question
of who should develop and use guided missiles were among the other
49major matters with which Air Force leaders had to struggle.
Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York and London: Columbia 
University Press, 1962), pp. 135-213. See also Norris, "Round Two," 
p. 13.
48Curtis E. LeMay, Memorandum for H. S. Aurand, Subject:
"Effect of 10, 20, and 30 Percent Reduction in Fiscal Year 1947 Research 
and Development Program," 10 September 1946, p. 1. The memorandum was 
found in folder 168.64-15A 1945-47 of General Curtis E. LeMay's corre­
spondence in the Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
49Goldberg, "Roles and Missions," pp. 115-19. For a summary of
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Proponents of change in the Air Force R&D policy recognized 
that these events created severe obstacles to achieving the kind of the 
Air Force R&D program they sought. Tactfully, they pronounced these 
difficulties as the reason the Air Force had been unable to give 
adequate attention to R&D.
In the letter written by Dr. von Karman to transmit the Ridenour 
Report to the Chief of Staff, USAF, he noted that the years following 
the Second World War were busy for the Air Force. One of the most 
pressing problems the Air Force faced was "to create, from the dis­
ordered fragments left by demobilization, an effective force-in-being 
capable of meeting the grave responsibilities of airpower in the support 
of national policy.Confronted with this situation, the Air Force 
placed primary emphasis on current problems and gave a lower priority 
to its research and development progr a m . A n d  in the Ridenour Report 
itself one reads much the same. After noting that in the past the Air 
Force had exhibited intentions of having a viable R&D program, the 
report remarked:
The basic reasons for the failure to carry out such good 
intentions concerning research and development are entirely under­
standable. The Air Force has been preoccupied ever since the war 
with a series of major, immediate problems which left no effort
some of the crises faced by the Air Force after World War II see: 
Trevor Gardner, "How We Fell Behind in Guided Missiles," The Air Power 
Historian, V, No. 1 (January 1958), 8 (hereafter cited as Gardner,
"How We Fell Behind in Guided Missiles").
^^Theodore von Karman to Hoyt S. Van^ ̂ nberg. General and Chief 
of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 21 September 1949, in Ridenour Report, pp. 
Letter 1 to Letter 2 (hereafter cited as von Karman to Vandenberg, 21 
Sep 49) .
^^Ibid., p. Letter 2.
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available for investment in research and development activities.
Another expression of such sentiments is to be found in a 
letter written by General George C. Kenney while he was serving as 
Commander of the Air University. He believed that the situations the 
Air Force had faced resulted in emphasis being placed on the current 
Air Force at the expense of research and development. As he put it; 
"the pressure of war and the subsequent explosive international situa­
tion have required support of a force in being which has deprived
53Research and Development of its proper emphasis."
General Kenney's letter also contained a brief comment on the 
Air University Committee, noting that the findings of that committee 
"in general coincide with those of the Ridenour C o m m i t t e e . I n  the 
study produced by the Air University Committee there appears the same 
statement that the situation and not the Air Force was to be blamed for 
past failures in the area of R&D. As it is stated in the Report: "The
pressure of day-to-day operational, materiel and political problems 
has effectively prevented the implementation of a vigorous, real 
program which produced results.
But in spite of the crises dutifully noted by the advocates of 
R&D program reforms and in spite of the continued existence of
52Ridenour Report, p. lV-1.
53George C. Kenney to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 19 November 1949, in 
ARDC Office of Command Historian, History of ARDC: 23 Jan 50-30 Jun
51, 11, p. 1 (pagination refers to the letter)(hereafter cited as 
Kenney to Vandenberg, 19 Nov 49).
^^Ibid.
^^Air University Study, TAB A, pp. 1-2.
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traditionalist elements in Air Force thinking about R&D, Air Force 
leaders at different organizational levels continued to be involved in 
a dialogue on R&D and on the policy the Air Force should adopt in 
improving its research and development capabilities. Occasionally, 
this dialogue extended beyond the Air Force to other echelons of the 
federal government. I'Jhat was the nature of R&D? IThat was the impor­
tance of R&D to the Air Force?
Outside of the Air Force the Report of the President's Air 
Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age, directed some comments to 
the importance of R&D for military aviation. The Commission, composed 
of five men, was headed by lawyer Thomas K. Finletter, who was later 
to become the second Secretary of the Air Force and serve in that 
capacity from 24 April 1950 until 20 January 1953.^^ The Finletter 
Report, as Survival in the Air Age is sometimes called, was so 
important in the eyes of the leaders of the Air Force Association that
they devoted an entire issue of their journal to recounting its
•-> 57details.
^^Carl Norcross, "Survival in the Air Age: The Report of the
President’s Air Policy Commission (Condensed)— An Introduction by Carl 
Norcross," Air Force: The Official Journal of the Air Force Associa­
tion, XXXI, No. 3 (March 1948), 5 (hereafter cited as Norcross, 
"Survival in the Air Age"); Nayne E. Scrivener, "The Men: Leaders," in
Goldberg, History of the USAF, pp. 156-57; and "The Secretaries of the 
Air Force," Air Force, Annual Air Force Almanac Issue, LVI, No. 5 (May 
1973), 48.
^^Air Force: The Official Journal of the Air Force Associa­
tion, XXXI, No. 3 (March 1948). The Air Force Association was a 
national organization established in the wake of World War II to con­
tinue the camaraderie of the war and to campaign continuously for an 
adequate airpower policy for the nation ("The Air Force Association:
Its Aims and Purposes, and its Present Leaders," Air Force; The 
Official Service Journal of the U.S. Army Air Forces, XXIX, No. 2
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In addition to devoting an entire issue of its journal to the 
report, the Air Force Association (AFA) sent copies to its members 
throughout the nation and to thousands of local, state, and national
leaders. Local AFA units held "airpower rallies" to spread the ideas
c  ̂58of the report.
Survival in the Air Age, being concerned with the broader 
subject of a national aviation policy as opposed to a specifically Air 
Force oriented program, related R&D's importance to national security.
There is little need to stress the point that intensive 
research and development in aeronautics are essential to the 
national defense and to the national welfare. No witness before 
the Commission presented a contrary view. All agreed that whatever 
money is spent for this purpose can be looked upon as a vital form 
of national insurance, a direct contribution toward maintaining 
our leadership in the air.^^
On the other hand, the Ridenour Report related R&D to the 
effectiveness of the Air Force. According to this report, competency 
in R&D was essential for the Air Force if it were to become a self- 
sufficient force.General Putt expressed sentiments similar to those
[February 1946], 45). When budget strictures forced the Array Air Forces 
to discontinue publication of its AAF Review, the journal was taken over 
and continued by the Air Force Association (General Carl Spaatz, Com­
manding General, Army Air Forces, to Members of the AAF Review staff, 19 
August 1946, in AAF Review: The Official Service Journal of the U.S.
Army Air Forces, XXXIX, No. 8 [September 1946], inside front cover).
58Ned Root, "The Finletter Report— A Year Later," Air Force:
The Official Journal of the Air Force Association, XXXII, No. 4 (April
1949), 15 (hereafter cited as Root, "Finletter Report"). The informa­
tion above comes from an italicized introduction that concludes with the 
initials JHS. This indicates that the introduction to Root's article 
was possibly written by James H. Straubel, one of the editors of Air 
Force.




of the Ridenour Report in his 17 November 1949 address to members of
the Air War College. He told these prospective leaders of the Air Force
that the research and development enterprise is the
cornerstone of operational competence. As the technical complexity 
of modern weapons increases, the technical competence of the Air 
Force must increase accordingly.
By doing the research and development work on new weapons, the 
Air Force as an organization will develop the technical competence 
and ability to assume operational responsibility for those new 
weapons.
Although the various documents that dealt with R&D may have
been in agreement as far as its importance was concerned, they were by
no means in total agreement on the nature of this enterprise. One of
the most obvious matters on which one finds a lack of consensus is
that of what the components of R&D are.
The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force for fiscal
year 1948 argued that research and development is composed of basic
62research, applied research, development, and testing. In addition to 
basic and applied research, the Ridenour Report listed initial develop­
ment, engineering, procurement, quality control, testing to specifica­
tions, technical evaluation, supply maintenance, industrial planning, 
and mobilization as parts of an "entire complex of activities.The 
briefing that was presented to General David M. Schlatter in late 1949 
or early 1950 reasserted that basic and applied research are parts of 
research and development. Additionally, "programmatic research" and
^^Putt, "USAF R&D," p. 15.
62Secretary of the Air Force, Report for FY 1948, p. 94.
63Ridenour Report, p. V-5.
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development were listed as other componentsFinally, a 13 November 
1950 RAND study suggested that research and development be divided into 
different kinds of research: pure, applied, fundamental, background,
and design research.
Basic, or pure, research was common to all the above discus­
sions of the components of R&D. And in general those documents of the 
1948-1950 period that dealt with research and development note that 
basic research is the basis of the R&D process.
In January 1948 the report of the President's Air Policy
Commission defined research as "the seeking for new basic knowledge
from which better aircraft, missiles, or other aeronautic devices may be
developed.Additionally, the report contained this statement:
During World War II we concentrated on the development of existing 
types of aircraft for production, and practically abandoned funda­
mental research in the aeronautical sciences. By VJ-Day our 
reserve of research information was largely exhausted. If we are 
to have an air establishment of the first quality, we will have to 
concentrate, as other nations are doing, on our fundamental aero­
nautical research. Development, that is the making of new aero­
nautical devices, cannot move ahead faster than our fundamental 
research.67
64Text of a Briefing for General Schlatter, p. 9.
S. Rowen, "Research and Development Resources," Project 
RAND Research Memorandum RM-496 (Santa Monica, Cal. : The RAND Corpora­
tion, 13 November 1950, withdrawn from active inventory), p. 8 (here­
after cited as Rowen, "Research and Development Resources"). U.S., 
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 80-5, "Research and 
Development: Research and Development Policies and Procedures,"
Washington, D.C., 25 March 1946, pp. 1-2 (hereafter cited as AFR 80-5,
25 Mar 49). Here R&D is divided into research, development, test, and 
operational evaluation or service testing.




Survival in the Air Age was referred to by the originators of
the Air Force Master Plan for R&D that appeared in March 1948. In this
plan one of the tasks listed under basic research was the "addition of
new knowledge which may form the basis for future w e a p o n s . A n d  in
an October 1948 article, Brigadier General S. R. Brentnall, who was
serving as the Deputy Director, Research and Development, Headquarters
Air Materiel Command, wrote:
. . . the constant probing into the field of the unknown by 
systematic investigation of natural phenomena is of the utmost 
importance in assuring our future security. Paradoxically, it has 
been found that greater progress in producing revolutionary 
materiel comes from the theoretical investigation of natural 
phenomena. This determines accurately their special character­
istics, the laws of nature that govern their behavior, and their 
relationships to other phenomena of which something is already 
known.
Such basic research alone produces new scientific knowledge 
necessary for the development of radically superior materiel. 
Thereafter it is a matter of applied research which pushes experi­
mental work along lines of attack which seem promising. All avail­
able scientific and technical resources that can be effectively 
used are brought to bear on the problem of adapting the new infor­
mation to practical usage.
Another example of the view that basic research is fundamental 
to the R&D process is found in the Annual Report of the Secretary of 
the Air Force for fiscal year 1948. According to this document, basic 
research provided fundamental knowledge to fill a reservoir upon which
^^U.S. Department of the Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Materiel, Director of Research and Development, "Air Force Master Plan 
for Research and Development," 4 March 1948, in History of Separation 
of R&D from the AMC, vol. Ill, p. 5 (hereafter cited as "AF Master Plan 
for R&D," 1948).
^^S. R. Brentnall, "Message: Basic Research is Essential to
Security," Air Technical Intelligence Technical Data Digest of the Air 
Materiel Command, USAF, XIII, Wo. 19 (1 Oct 1948), 2 (hereafter cited 
as Brentnall, "Message").
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applied research could draw to produce weapons. "Without such a re­
serve the entire research and development program eventually would 
become static.
One final example of this manner of thinking about basic re­
search should suffice to show how widespread the view was. This 
example comes from the September 1949 Ridenour Report.
Fundamental research comprises investigations carried on for the 
purpose of increasing man's knowledge and understanding of the 
natural world. . . . Almost always, the results of fundamental 
research are useful for one practical purpose or another, yet 
prediction of such usefulness cannot be made in terms of specific 
application, but only— and then with difficulty— in terms of 
fields of application. Major discoveries of fundamental signifi­
cance can almost always be traced back to their roots in a funda­
mental investigation.'^
The difficulty of predicting the usefulness of the results of 
basic research mentioned by the Ridenour Report touches on another
widely accepted idea about basic research, namely, that it is difficult
to know what the outcome of basic research will be.
Survival in the Air Age did not distinguish between different
types of research. But the definition of research given in this 
72report indicates that the drafters of the report meant "basic research"
^^Secretary of the Air Force, Report for FY 1948, p. 115.
^^Ridenour Report, p. II-2. For other examples of this view of
basic research see: E. M. Powers, Major General, USAF, Department of
the Air Force, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 
Memorandum to the Chairman, Research and Development Board, Subject: 
"Basic Research in the Military Establishment," 28 October 1V48, in 
History of the Separation of R&D from AMC, III, 1 (hereafter cited as 
Powers, "Basic Research in the Military Establishment"); "Basic Re­
search," Air Force: The Official Journal of the Air Force Association, 
XXXIII, No. 6 (June 1950), 16, 18 (hereafter cited as "Basic Research," 
Air Force, June 50); and Brentnall, "Message," p. 2.
72Supra, p. 93.
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when they used the terra "research." The following statement appears in 
the Finletter Report: "Research by its very nature is unpredictable.
No one can forecast with accuracy the time at which the end result will 
be available.
The unpredictability of basic research was also described in a 
June 1950 article appearing in Air Force. Here one finds the following 
statement:
There is, in the field of basic research, only the faintest trace 
of what can be called a predetermined objective. In truth, the 
only real goal is the broadening of man's understanding of natural 
phenomena. Since the scientist engaged in this field does not 
know precisely what it is he seeks, it follows that he cannot 
know what he is apt to find.^4
Not only was basic research considered unpredictable, but it 
was also thought to be largely uncontrollable. Survival in the Air Age 
had this to say about efforts to control basic research:
As far as research is concerned, a clear distinction should 
always be made between coordination and control. Research of 
all kinds welcomes coordination, but resists control. Researchers 
must be kept informed of the work of others in their own and in 
related fields in order to avoid duplication of effort, but it is 
fatal to try to steer their thinking toward any predetermined 
goal. . . . [Rjesearch must be unrestricted to be of v a l u e . 5̂
73President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age,
p. 92.
^^"Basic Research," Air Force, Jun 50, p. 18. Similar views 
were expressed in a companion article to "Basic Research;" see "Applied 
Research," Air Force: The Official Journal of the Air Force Association 
XXXIII, No. 6 (June 1950), 21 (hereafter cited as "Applied Research," 
Air Force, Jun 50).
^^President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age, 
p. 92. For a view of the entire R&D enterprise that highlights the 
difficulty of managing research and development, see: Arthur A. Fickel,
Memorandum for Record, 23 January 1950, p. 4, in ARDC Office of Command 
Historian, History of ARDC: 23 Jan 50-30 Jan 51, II (hereafter cited
as Fickel Memorandum for Record, 23 Jan 50). See also Ridenour Report, 
p. IX-1.
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If something is uncontrollable and unpredictable, how can it be 
managed? In discussing the functioning of management, one observer has 
written:
[The] managerial endeavor is one which seeks to bring practice 
into line with policy— to transform what i^ into what ought to 
be. Tlie dynamic, ceaseless interplay between policy and prac­
tice is better understood if policy is distinguished from 
practice at all times. On the policy level, the ideal norms are 
order, control, and the responsible carrying out of instructions.
On the practice level the actual norms are (1) tension and dis­
agreement over the mating of ends and means, and (2) the occur­
rence of the unexpected. The efforts of institutional managers 
are devoted to reducing the disruptive effects of the norms of 
practice upon the policy norms by introducing new courses of 
action which will become routine practice, for that which is 
routine is fully under control, no longer needs the vigilant 
attention of policy makers and top administrators (who are fre­
quently one and the same), and frees these managers to turn to 
other disruptive theaters of practice which have not yet been 
routinized and are demanding attention.
How could basic research ever be routinized?
And if a thing cannot be managed how can it be a part of a
highly organized, disciplined, closely directed military organization?
As a June 1950 article appearing in Air Force expressed it :
In its [R&D's] initial stages at least, it is movement down an 
ever-widening path, like running through a funnel the wrong way.
In many ways it defies direction or organization, which in many 
ways, contrarily, are the essence of the military establishment.
A military man likes to have his mission stated precisely, the 
better to organize his forces for its accomplishment. The 
scientist— at least those concerned with basic research— will 
likely accomplish more if he is given no particular mission at 
all. One is basically Bohemian, the other basically West 
Point.77
^^Thomas K. Smith, "A Study of the Origins of MlNUTEîLAiî" (Un­
published manuscript, University of Oklahoma, n.d.), p. iii.
^̂ ■'Key to the Future," p. 16. For another view of the unman­
ageable nature of basic research see Survival in the Air Age, pp.
88-90.
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This was the sort of argument employed by those who thought that 
basic research was separable from the other components of R&D and was 
no concern of the Air Force. In their discussion of aeronautical re­
search and development, the drafters of Survival in the Air Age general­
ly separated research from development by having the military services
78responsible for development while NACA was responsible for research.
The RAND study previously mentioned in this chapter tended to 
agree with the Finletter Report. This RAND report noted that it was 
generally difficult and arbitrary to separate and identify the com­
ponents of R&D. But at least basic research was sufficiently unique 
to justify its separation from the other aspects of R&D, and the author 
of the RAND report listed three reasons for separating basic research 
from the other parts of R&D.
First, the aims of, methods used, and facilities required by 
basic research differ from those required by applied research 
or development. Basic research explores avenues of interest 
with no immediate application, and the laboratory facilities 
required are in general less expensive (one exception is aero­
nautical research).
Second, the basic research phase is usually the least costly, 
the applied research phase the next costly, and the design phase 
the most costly.
Third, fundamental research provides the foundation for advance­
ment in any field. It is possible to advance without fundamental
78President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age, 
pp. 76-77. This position was taken in spite of the expression of the 
view that research was not always clearly distinguishable from develop­
ment (p. 73). It is interesting to note that a different opinion was 
expressed in the article "Applied Research," Air Force, Jun 50. On 
page twenty-one of the article the reader is told that "there is a very 
clear-cut distinction between b&sic and applied research."
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research but the great strides in most fields have usually 
occured when there was a body of basic knowledge. 9̂
One of the most pointed and detailed statements about the re­
lationship between basic research and the Air Force R&D program appears 
in a 2 March 1948 memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force.
Stuart Symington, responding to an earlier statement by the Secretary 
of the Navy that the Air Force did not understand the meaning of basic 
research, wrote:
It is quite true that the primary objective of the Air Force basic 
research program is to seek answers to problems posed by the de­
velopment program; this, for the reason that an orderly program 
for development must be backed by a series of research projects 
which will permit step-by-step advances as new knowledge becomes 
available. However, we do not wait until these problems appear 
as by-products of specific development projects; rather these 
problems are visualized long before the end products appear, and 
research projects are initiated in the proper fields to solve
them.GO
But one should not be deceived by this statement that apparently 
supports an Air Force basic research program, for Symington continues 
in these words:
While we are in agreement with the general definition of basic 
research and with the importance of basic research to the mili­
tary establishment as expressed by the Secretary of the Navy we 
do not agree that the Navy Department— or for that matter, any 
agency of the military— should pursue basic research solely for
79Rowen, "Research and Development Resources," pp. 8-9.
80Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, Memorandum for 
Secretary [of Defense James] Forrestal with copies to Secretary of the 
Army and Secretary of the Navy, Subject : "Air Force Concept of Basic
Research," 2 March 1948, p. 1, in History of Separation of R&D from 
AMC, III (hereafter cited as Symington to Forrestal, 2 Mar 48). The 
views expressed here are quite similar in some respects to those given 
in President’s Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age, p. 92. 
The wording is so similar that it suggests a possible reference to 
Survival in the Air Age by the drafter of the Symington memorandum.
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the pursuit of knowledge for its ovm sake. Truly basic research, 
having no tangible and immediate object except to increase the 
store of knowledge in some sphere, should be fostered by an 
agency having an overall outlook not strictly military. We feel, 
therefore, that it is more fitting that an agency such as the 
proposed National Science Foundation look after basic research 
of a long-term nature and having broad application.®^
Since the National Science Foundation had not yet been established "to
fill the gap, the military establishment must, for the present, pursue
basic research on a broader scale." But this was simply an interim
measure; once established, the National Science Foundation should
assume the major responsibility for basic research "which has as its
82goal the pursuit of knowledge for its oto sake." Symington's remarks
would seem to be aimed squarely at the Navy's Office of Naval Research
83that was established by act of Congress during the summer of 1946.
84This organization was responsible for research within the Navy.
The view stated in the Symington memorandum was also expressed 
in a memorandum to the Chairman of the Research and Development Board 
from Major General E. M. Powers who was serving in the office of the 
Chief of Staff, USAF. Powers stated that the Department of the Air 
Force strongly supported the establishment of a National Science
81Symington to Forrestal, 2 Mar 48, p. 1.
Q O
Ibid., p. 2.
83Baucom, Thesis, p. 46.
84Ibid., p. 44. For a discussion of the establishment of ONR 
see: The Bird Dogs, "The Evolution of the Office of Naval Research,"
Physics Today, XIV, No. 8 (August 1961), 30-35. The Bird Dogs were a 
group of Naval Officers composed of "two highly capable regular offi­
cers, . . . and four young Naval Reserve Officers having technical back­
grounds." These officers were trained by Dr. J. C. Hunsaker who called 
the men "bird dogs" (p. 31). For a general discussion of the establish­
ment of ONR see: Baucom, Thesis, pp. 43-46.
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Foundation that would have primary responsibility for government sub-
85sidizing of basic, research.
A June 1949 interoffice memorandum at Headquarters, Air 
Materiel Command, also cited Symington's memorandum as evidence that 
the Air Force supported the establishment of the National Science Foun­
dation. The drafter of this 1949 memorandum. Colonel Floyd B. Wood, 
Executive Secretary of the Air Materiel Command, considered this 
position relative to the National Science Foundation to be directly 
related to the fact that basic research is not an appropriate part of 
a military R&D program. As he stated it:
The position taken by the National Military Establishment 
on this matter can be justified on the basis that the pursuit 
of knowledge purely for the sake of knowledge is not an appro­
priate basis for the conduct of research and development for 
military purposes, and that limited military budgets do not 
permit any substantial amount of R&D activity unless aimed to­
ward the solution of specific military problems. True basic 
research, which by its very nature has no tangible or concrete 
objective, should be fostered by an agency having an over-all 
outlook rather than a strictly military point of view. The 
proposed National Science Foundation is envisioned as such an 
agency.̂ 6
Six months before the writing of the Wood memorandum the view 
that basic research should not really be a part of the Air Force R&D 
program was expressed in the fiscal year 1948 report of the Secretary 
of the Air Force. According to the report, virtually all basic re­
search in aerodynamics and thermodynamics was done for the Air Force 
by agencies outside the Air Force.
85Powers, "Basic Research in the Military Establishment," p. 1.
86Floyd B. Wood, Colonel, USAF, Executive Secretary, Air Mate­
riel Command, Memorandum to General Carroll and General Crawford, Sub­
ject: "Proposed National Science Foundation," 23 Jun 1949, p. 1, in
History of Separation of R&D from AMC, III.
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Only in such areas as electronics, where no Government agency 
conducts basic research, does the Air Force itself assume re­
sponsibility. Even in those cases, most of the work is carried 
out on a contract basis by universities, industrial concerns, 
scientific organizations, and the National Bureau of Standards.
And somewhat later in the Secretary's report one reads:
Basic research, because of its tremendous scope and its 
very great value and importance to the commercial life and gen­
eral welfare of the United States, is primarily a national 
rather than an Air Force responsibility. Yet, the Air Force 
must exercise the closest coordination possible with basic re­
search organizations, both public and private, in order to 
realize the maximum military potentialities of their discover­
ies. The Air Force must also conduct a basic research program 
of its own in the general fields not covered by other agencies 
because of the excessive costs involved or because of the purely 
military nature of the experimentation.^^
But there were those in the Air Force who thought basic research 
should be an integral part of an Air Force R&D program, even if basic 
research was uncontrollable, unpredictable, unmanageable, and produced 
only intangible results.
We have already seen that Air Force leaders considered basic
89research to be the foundation of the R&D process. And at times con­
cern was expressed that the R&D process might out-strip the reserve of
90basic knowledge and become static. We have also noted that Air Force
87Secretary of the Air Force, Report for FY 1948, p. 92.
88Ibid., p. 94. For an earlier expression of similar views 
see: Glantzberg, "Air Force and Science," p. 13. Glantzberg wrote:
"It must be remembered that basic research may have commercial as well 
as military value. Therefore it is hardly reasonable to charge the 
whole cost to the military establishment."
89Supra, pp. 94-95. Similar sentiments were expressed by 
Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier (see p. 20 above) and von 
Karman, Key to Air Supremacy (see p. 17 above).
90Supra, p. 93. Similar views were also expressed in 1947 
(supra, pp. 34). See also Brentnall, "Message," p. 2.
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leaders tended to believe that in spite of its unpredictable nature,
91the results of basic research would eventually prove useful. Just as
Georges Clemenceau thought war too important to be left to the generals,
perhaps some Air Force leaders considered science too important to be
left to the scientists.
Another apparent reason for Air Force interest in basic research
is that Air Force personnel thought that research and development was a
unified process that involved everything from the conception of an idea
to the development of equipment or weapons based on the idea. Basic
research was an inseparable part of the R&D process and provided that
process with certain essential ingredients.
In his briefing before the 3 January 1950 meeting of the Air
Staff, General Schlatter was told that the difference between research
and development is "a philosophic one, .... No one can make an
operating distinction between basic research, programmatic research,
92applied research, and development." And somewhat later Colonel Victor 
Haugen, Chief of the Aircraft Division of the R&D Directorate at USAF 
Headquarters, commented on the difficulty of cleanly separating basic 
research from "the applied research that is organic to all
91Supra, pp. 93-95. Another expression of this view may be 
found in "Basic Research," Air Force, Jun 50, p. 18. Here one reads: 
"experience has proved that almost always the results of basic research 
are useful for one practical purpose or another. Nearly all great in­
ventions have their roots in basic investigation." Another statement 
to this effect was previously quoted on p. 17 above.
92Text of Briefing for General Schlatter, p. 9.
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development."93 Then he offered one reason why basic research should be 
regarded as inseparable from the R&D process. He noted that the isola­
tion of research from development introduces
a major difficulty in the matter of recruiting competent scien­
tists for the development programs. Scientists of the quality 
desired normally insist on working under conditions where they 
can engage from time to time in fundamental investigations of 
particular interest to them. If an artificial separation exists 
which would prohibit such activity, it will be impossible to 
recruit first-class scientists for any but research programs.
Earlier, General Putt had also expressed the opinion that basic
research has a salutary effect on R&D personnel. Putt argued that
every technical organization must do some basic research "to retain and
maintain the technical competence of its staff." Allowing technical
personnel to carry on nothing but administrative functions would cause 
95them to stagnate.
Another argument for Air Force activity in the area of basic
research appears in the briefing for General Schlatter mentioned above.
In consonance with its mature understanding of technology, the 
Air Force will be an active participant in the production of know­
ledge; because knowledge cannot be economically purchased without 
such participation. And all sciences participate in the progress 
of any one of them. Furthermore, impetus to discovery is derived 
only from those who have a personal interest in the application
of such discovery.96
Thus we see that at least some Air Force leaders considered 
basic research an integral part of the R&D process, and thought that it
93Victor R. Haugen, "The Staff Direction of Research and Develop­
ment," Air University Quarterly Review, IV, No. 1 (Summer 1950), 63, 134 
(hereafter cited as Haugen, "Staff Direction of R&D").
94Haugen, "Staff Direction of R&D," p. 63.
95putt, "USAF R&D," pp. 30-32.
^^Text of Briefing for General Schlatter, p. 8.
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was essential that the Air Force R&D program include at least some basic 
research. Furthermore, it was widely accepted that basic research w;.s 
the very foundation of the R&D enterprise. Since basic research was so 
important in the minds of these Air Force leaders, it should come as no 
surprise that they would be concerned to see that it received adequate 
support when the efforts to establish a national science policy ran 
into difficulties.
In the preceding chapter we saw that a dichotomous view of 
research and development emerged in the years following World War II
97and achieved rather widespread acceptance in the federal government. 
According to this view, military R&D organizations would be responsible 
for the development-related aspects of R&D, while a civilian government 
organization would foster basic research.
Although this dichotomous image of research and development 
began to be articulated even before the end of World War II, with the 
appearance of Vannevar Bush's Science; Tlie Endless Frontier, it was not 
until 10 May 1950 that the civilian government organization was estab­
lished when President Truman signed the National Science Foundation 
98Act. Congress had managed to agree on a bill that would have estab­
lished a National Science Foundation-type organization in 1947, but
99President Truman had found the bill unacceptable and vetoed it.
In consequence, for five years government research and develop­
ment activity was guided by policies for R&D without having an
97Supra, pp. 19-30.
98Baucom, Thesis, p. 65.
^^Ibid., pp. 51-53.
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established government structure that could fully implement these poli­
cies. The existence of this situation, combined with the importance Air 
Force leaders attached to basic research, make it clear why Symington 
and other Air Force leaders would be concerned to insure that basic 
research would be supported adequately until the National Science 
Foundation was established. And perhaps the concern about adequate 
support for basic research was more than just a temporary expedient for 
those leaders who thought that basic research was inseparably related 
to the R&D process and that it made vital contributions to any effec­
tive research and development program. To rationalize Air Force support 
of basic research in a government milieu dominated by the dichotomous 
view of R&D, AF leaders articulated what may be called an "applied basic 
research" concept.
Stuart Symington's March 1948 memorandum, previously discussed, 
actually contains a hint of this image of basic research. Symington 
said that the purpose of the Air Force basic research program was to 
answer questions raised by the Air Force development program. The Air 
Force did not wait for these problems to appear, but rather tried to 
anticipate them and initiate research accordingly.Here is a form 
of basic research which cannot be eliminated from an R&D program; it is 
directly related to the R&D program itself. No effort was made to 
square this image of basic research with the view which held basic re­
search to be unpredictable, uncontrollable, and unmanageable.
Evidently, the Secretary of the Navy did not think these two
^^^The "germ" of the concept appears in the quotation from the 
given on n . QQ sunra.memorandum p. 99, p ,
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images compatible, for it was the "applied basic research" concept 
that prompted the Secretary of the Navy to attack the Air Force for 
having an "erroneous concept of the meaning of basic r e s e a r c h . T h e  
Navy's experience with the Office of Naval Research had placed it in a 
stronger political position to support basic research than was the Air 
Force. Consequently, it can be argued, the Navy could take a more 
idealistic position on military support of basic research than could 
the Air Force.
The Navy's Office of Naval Research (ONR) was sanctioned by
Public Law 558, which stated that the ONR was established
to plan, foster, and encourage scientific research in recogni­
tion of its paramount importance as related to the maintenance 
of future naval power, and the preservation of national securi­
ty; to provide within the Department of the Navy a single 
office, which, by contract and otherwise, shall be able to obtain, 
coordinate, and make available to all bureaus and activities of 
the Department of the Navy, world-wide scientific information 
and the necessary services for conducting specialized and 
imaginative research; . . ..102
The Navy would probably not have to be as careful when requesting funds
for basic research since funding for "specialized and imaginative re-
103search" was specifically authorized by Public Law 588.
On the other hand, the Air Force had no such legal status for 
its R&D program and had to be careful not to offend a Congress that 
adhered to the dichotomous view of research and development. This may 
have been one reason why the idea of "applied basic research" was
^^^Symington to Forrestal, 2 Mar 48, p. 1.
102Office of Naval Research Act, Statutes at Large, vol. LX, 
pt. 1, Chapter 727, p. 779 (1946).
103Ibid., p. 780.
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articulated by Air Force leaders. Such a view of basic research would 
rationalize Air Force support of basic research in a government milieu 
dominated by the dichotomous image of R&D. Here was an image of basic 
research that could be used before Congressional appropriations commit­
tees that thought military research should be practical.
One example of the "applied basic research" concept appears in
the Air Force R&D master plan for 1948. Here one function of basic
research was seen as the elimination of problems "imposed by or which
arise during the development p r o g r a m . A n o t h e r  example appears in
Air Force Regulation 80-4 which appeared about a year after the March
1948 AF R&D master plan. This regulation states that the Air Force
policy for basic research was :
To engage in and support fundamental studies in order to remove
existing limitations faced by the development and operations 
programs which appear to be intrinsic, but may be removed by 
new discoveries and to provide new factual knowledge which gives 
promise of contributing to new concepts, techniques, and mater­
iel of value to the Air F o r c e . ^06
Although the Ridenour Report gave a definition of fundamental 
research that tended to emphasize the unpredictable nature of such re­
search, it praised AFR 80-4 highly and recommended that the Air Force
104For a discussion of this practical orientation of the Con­
gress see: Baucom, Thesis, pp. 82-85, 93-94, 103-05. By practical I
mean, in this case, that the research should produce equipment or 
weapons. I refer to this view of research as "hardware orientation" 
on p. 82. See also Alan T. Waterman, "Government Support of Research," 
Science, CX, No. 2870 (30 December 1949), 703, 704.
^°^"AF Master Plan for R&D," 1948, p. 5.
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 80-4, 
"Research and Development: Research Policies," Washington, D.C.,
1 March 1949, p. 2 (hereafter cited as AFR 80-4, 1 March 49).
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"put a major effort into implementing the policies for research" that 
were spelled out in that regulation.
In practice, "applied basic research" made sense if one regarded 
research as something like a horse race. Since Air Force R&D experts 
would keep abreast of events in the R&D program of the Air Force and in 
the various fields of basic research, their knowledge of both areas 
would enable them to place basic research "bets" for the Air Force.
The capital for the wagers would come from appropriations for the Air 
Force research and development program. Here was a rationalization for 
the support of basic research even though it was an activity that could 
not be directed, controlled, or have its outcome predicted. The Air 
Force would not interject itself or its management structure into the 
horse race itself (the actual basic research process). It would merely 
stand apart and observe what was going on and seek to alter the betting 
odds in its favor by the strategic infusion of money. Critics, of 
course, could argue that this metaphor simply camouflaged a subterfuge 
and that, in point of fact, when the Air Force "placed its bets," it 
was spending money on basic research and infringing upon a function 
which properly should be carried out by a civilian agency, such as the 
proposed National Science Foundation.
In the meantime, the Air Force was placing bets through its 
Office of Air Research. OAR was established in 1949 "to work with those 
scientific organizations engaged in basic research, when that basic
^Ridenour Report, pp. IT-2, IV-2.
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research bears directly on Air Force p r o b l e m s . "108 functions of the
OAR staff were
(a) keeping OAR's own personnel abreast of things, and (b) cover­
ing research bets which are considered important to the AF, but 
which can’t be handled by NACA or contract. Its main purpose 
will be to serve as monitor and shepherd of a very loosely knit 
group of scientists engaged in very loosely defined explorations.
It will have the assignment— a most responsible one— of deter­
mining what broad fields the Air Force is particularly weak in, 
and sprinkle the funds at its disposal among civilians and civil­
ian institutions which are expert in those a r e a s . 1^9
The operations of the Office of Air Research reflect a decision 
by Air Force leaders that basic research was to be a part of the Air 
Force R&D program. For practical purposes, OAR was the Air Force's 
answer to the question, where on the science end of the science-and- 
technology spectrum does research and development end? That point was 
the pure-research end of the spectrum.
There was at least one official statement of this view of re­
search and development. It appears in the 25 March 1949 version of Air 
Force Regulation 80-5. This issue of the directive states that R&D 
activities "extend from the inception of ideas to their final embodie- 
ment in all types of materiel or techniques, methods and processes.
We shall also see that the Air Force had some difficulty in refining 
its image of activities in the development area of the science and
108U.S., Department of the Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force, 
Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force: July 1-December 31, 
1949 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 205.
109"Basic Research," Air Force, Jun 50, p. 19.
^^°AFR 80-5, 25 Mar 49, p. 1.
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technology spectrum.
So far, the dialogue on research and development in which the 
Air Force had been engaged since 1945 had resulted in some clarifica­
tion of just what was involved in the R&D process, for it had focused 
attention on what would be involved in the Air Force research and de­
velopment program, and it had evoked some preliminary determinations.
At the same time, various international events and organizational 
crises of the 1945 to 1950 period had tended to draw attention away 
from the R&D program of the Air Force.
Then, in the fall of 1949 the United States was confronted by 
a crisis that would focus attention on the Air Force R&D program rather 
than divert it to some other aspect of Air Force activities. For some 
time the nation's leaders had known that it was only a matter of time 
before the Soviet Union achieved the ability to produce atomic bombs.
As a January 1948 document described the situation:
If present official estimates are right we have not yet reached 
the point where other nations have atomic weapons in quantity.
On the other hand, according to these same estimates we must 
make our military plans on the assumption that they will reach 
this point soon. No one can forecast definitely the date, and 
therefore we must arrive at a time, for planning purposes, be­
yond which it would not be safe to assume that the United States 
will be immune from atomic attack.Ill
Other nations were known to be working diligently to develop an atomic
bomb, and "it would be an unreasonable risk . . .  to rely on other
nations not having atomic weapons in quantity by the end of 1952." So
this document established what it referred to as "A-day," the day by
^^^President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age,
p. 13.
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which the United States had to have an air arm in being that could dc-
112fend against an atomic attack. This date was 1 January 1953.
Toward the end of 1948 the different situations that would arise,
once the Soviet Union achieved a nuclear capability, were among the
major subjects discussed in a lengthy, serialized magazine article
which appeared in the last four issues of the 1948 volume of Air Force.
The author of the article was Bernard Brodie, then an Associate Profes-
113sor of International Relations at Yale University.
In April 1949 an article bemoaning the slow progress made in
improving the quality of the Air Force appeared in the journal of the
Air Force Association. Apparently referring to the 1953 date given
above, the article stated:
We are now 12 months closer to A-Day— twelve months nearer the 
date when we must assume "possibly hostile" nations will have 
the atomic bomb i^ quantity. Already a third of the time we 
were given to prepare for this date has passed.
It is hard to believe that the Nation's leaders were surprised
when the Russians exploded their first atomic bomb in the fall of
1949.^^^ As General Carl Spaatz, retired Air Force Chief of Staff,
remarked :
The moment anticipated since Aug. 6, 1945, has arrived.
The announcement that an atomic explosion has occured in Russia
H^ibid., pp. 14, 19.
113Bernard Brodie, "A-Bombs and Air strategy," Four Parts, Air 
Force: The Official Journal of the Air Force Association: Part I, XXI, 
No. 9 (September 1948), 44-46, 64; Part II, XXXI, No. 10 (October 1948), 
33-34, 46; Part III, XXXI, No. 11 (November 1948), 50, 52, 54-56; Part 
IV, XXXI, No. 12 (December 1948), 32-33.
^^^Root, "Finletter Report," p. 27.
^^^"The Atom," Newsweek. XXXIV, No. 14 (3 October 1949), 17.
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can hardly be a complete surprise to our military leaders.
That it comes earlier than publicly expected may jar into 
unpleasant awakening those who have continued to long for 
isolation from reality. It is a signal to all that the "cold" 
war moves onward into a crucial state,
Hera was a crisis of a different nature as far as the Air Force 
was concerned. It was not something that the Air Force-in-being could 
be expected to solve. This crisis raised questions about the Air Force 
of the future. And as General Donald L. Putt told the officers attend­
ing the Air War College in November 1949, "the Air Force of tomorrow is
today's job of Research and Development.
When remarking upon the explosion of the Russian atomic bomb, 
Spaatz called for the end of delays in providing the nation with the 
seventy-group Air Force that had previously been sought by Air Force 
leaders. Indeed, it might now be necessary to create an Air Force that 
was larger than seventy groups. "An additional 'must,'" he said, "is
the accelerated development of a radar network covering the approaches
to this continent, along with the most modern fighters, anti-aircraft 
equipment, and guided missile weapons, to meet any attack through the 
a i r . " 1 1 8
The Soviet explosion of a nuclear device did have an impact on
the USAF R&D program. As a result of this event, the USAF Scientific
Advisory Board (SAB) added to its numbers people who were knowledgeable
119of atomic weapons. It was also in response to the Russian A-bomb
^^^Carl Spaatz, "Atomic Monopoly Ends," Newsweek, XXXIV, No. 14 
(3 October 1949), 22 (hereafter as Spaatz, "Atomic Monopoly Ends").
^^^Putt, "USAF R&D," p. 42.
118Spaatz, "Atomic Monopoly Ends," p. 22.
119Sturm, USAF SAB, p. 39.
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that General Muir Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, involved the
120Scientific Advisory Board in the problem of air defense.
Fairchild asked the SAB to help draft a sound plan for national 
air defense. The initial report of the Board on this matter was pre­
sented to the Air Force on 29 November 1949. Following approval of the 
report by Generals Vandenberg and Fairchild, the Scientific Advisory 
Board formed the Air Defense System Engineering Committee (ADSEC) and 
assigned it the task of "developing 'equipment and techniques— on an
air defense basis— so as to produce maximum effective air defense for a
121minimum dollar inves tment.'"
The Committee was headed by Dr. George Valley and included
Drs. Allen F. Donovan, Charles S. Draper, Henry G. Houghton, H. Guyford
122Stever, John Marchetti, and George C. Comstock. The ADSEC held its 
first meeting in December 1949 and continued its work for two years, 
meeting every Friday with federal and Massachusetts Institute of Tech­
nology officials during the peak of its activities. Based upon the 
recommendations of the SAB and ADSEC, Lincoln Laboratory was established
by the Air Force and MIT. This laboratory ended the need for the ADSEC,
123and it was disbanded in January 1952.
IZOibid.
l̂ Îbid.
l^^Ibid., pp. 39, 138.
123Ibid., p. 40. For another indication of Soviet atomic devel­
opments affecting Air Force R&D, see: I[van] A. Getting, "Recollections
of USAF in 1950-1951," Oral History Interview, dated "10-8-73," p. 1 
(hereafter cited as Getting, "Recollections of USAF"). Here Getting 
stated: "There is no question that both General Seville and I were
stimulated by the pressure being exerted at that time by the Russians 
in their development of their A-bomb and the build-up of Russian bomber
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The Russian explosion of an A-bomb posed an international 
crisis that had clear technological ramifications for the Air Force.
It also happened to occur within a month of the submission of the 
Ridenour Report. Since the end of World War II, technical personnel 
within and without the Army Air Forces and the Air Force had been agi­
tating for reforms in the air arm's R&D program. With the Ridenour 
Report, their efforts reached a milestone similar to that represented 
by Science: The Key to Air Supremacy. But, unlike the earlier von 
Karman study, the Ridenour Report was to have a lasting and significant 
impact on the Air Force R&D program. The chance confluence of two dif­
ferent chains of events, the Soviet A-bomb program and agitation for 
reform in the Air Force R&D program, helps to account for the more 
favorable institutional response to the Ridenour Report. We shall 
examine this Report in more detail and observe the response to it in 
the next chapter.
forces." At this time. Getting was Chairman of the Radar Panel of the 
Research and Development Board. As we shall see later, about this 
time (1949) Seville was Director of Requirements in the office of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, and would become the first Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Development in 1950. For an additional perspective 
on the ADSEC, see: History of the Air Force Cambridge Research Center:
1 July-31 December 1953, Vol. XIX, Part I, pp. 247-52.
CHAPTER IV
A NEW DEPARTURE: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE AIR RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT COmiAND, 1948-1950
In spite of crises and traditionalist resistance to change— or 
perhaps because of them, in some measure— by 1950 there was growing 
recognition that something was wrong with the Air Force R&D program. 
Dissatisfaction was expressed in many ways during 1948, 1949, and
1950.
In November 1948 the Scientific Advisory Board met on three
occasions. Dr. von Karman reported the results of the meetings to
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg in January 1949.^ The Board was concerned
about several problems. First of all, responsibility for the direction
of the Air Force research and development program was divided; there
were several staff agencies at Headquarters USAF involved with R&D,
but none of them occupied ”a position commensurate with the urgent mis-
2sion of research and development in times of comparative peace." 
Secondly, the Board thought "the continuity of research and fundamental 
development work is too much exposed to the impact of current




procurement n e e d s . A n d  finally, the Air Force R&D program seemed to 
be too conservative: the program appeared to have been failing to
capitalize on some of the "most farlooking projects and technically 
superior developments."^
During a July 1949 conference of the Scientific Advisory Board 
General David M. Schlatter, who at this time was responsible for Air 
Force atomic energy activities, criticized the Air Force R&D structure 
for its diffuse character. According to Schlatter, this structure 
hampered coordination between different types of experts, such as 
those who were familiar with the capabilities of aircraft and those 
who were working on bomb developments.^ Colonel Arthur A. Fickel, 
also of the Air Force office for atomic energy, voiced a similar 
criticism during the same meeting. He stated that there was "no 
synthesis, no over-all direction" to the Air Force R&D function "be­
cause it has been diffused throughout the Air Staff and the Air Force." 
It was this "lack of formal organization" that caused the "strategic 
or operational planner [to be] miles apart from our research program 
planner."^
The Air University Study, issued toward the end of 1949, strongly 
criticized the research and development program of the Air Force. 
According to the Study, the Air Force "is now dangerously deficient in 
the capacity to insure the long term development and superiority of
^Ibid., p. 2.
4Ibid.
5SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, pp. 6-7.
^Ibid., pp. 22-23.
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American air power.” The Air Force was lagging in "exploitation of 
scientific possibilities and in the development of new techniques to 
meet future military situations." The application of technology to 
military purposes was not adequate. In short, there was not an ade­
quate foundation within the Air Force for productive operation and 
healthy growth of R&D.^
It was also near the end of 1949 that General George Kenney 
wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Vandenberg, that 
he had been "gravely concerned" for some time "about the unsatisfactory 
state of Air Force Research and Development." Continuing, Kenney 
noted: "There has been evidence from many sources that the Air Force
is seriously deficient in providing for its own future strength, .
,,8
And finally, in June 1950 we find another expression of dis­
satisfaction with the Air Force R&D program. An article in Air Force 
noted that until recently the applied scientists had "only a weak voice 
in recommending modification of the Air Force arsenal." Even that 
weak voice was further muffled by having the applied scientists 
"spread over half the area of the Air Forces [sic] organization chart." 
Since there were so many offices involved in R&D it was impossible to
9mount a coordinated effort in the R&D area.
^Air University Study, p. 1.
g
Kenney to Vandenberg, 19 Nov 49, p. 1.
9
"Applied Research," Air Force, Jun 50, p. 22. See also Trans­
script of Proceedings of Air Staff Meeting Held 3 January 1950, Room 
4C-1052, The Pentagon Building, Washington, D.C., from 10:10 AM to 
11:30 AM, General Muir S. Fairchild, Chairman, Presiding, pp. 2-3, in 
ARDC Office of Command Historian, History of ARDC: 23 Jan 50-30 Jun 51, 
II (hereafter cited as Transcript of 3 Jan 50 Air Staff Proceedings).
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In theory, the way the Air Force research and development
process operated was as follows: the requirements division of the
operations staff agency was to inform the R&D division under the
Materiel staff agency what instruments were needed to fight a war;
R&D would then produce the desired equipment. It did not work.^^
Both Operations and Materiel fell into the trap of concentrat­
ing on overhauling and adding a little more horsepower to the 
force-in-being instead of conducting a vigilant and relentless 
search for entirely new weapons. The AF stood in danger of _ 
being overtaken by the fallacy of "military rigidity" ....
By the end of 1949 the situation had become so bad that even
the traditionalists recognized the need for change. In the briefing
given General Schlatter before the 3 January 1950 staff meeting which
12was cited above as an example of traditionalism, the briefer noted 
that the Air Materiel Command (AMC) agreed with the need for "better 
formulated and managed R&D," although the Command opposed the recom­
mendations of the Ridenour Report. AMC recognized and decried the
fact that the Engineering Division spent eighty percent of its effort
13on in-service engineering. To understand what it meant to the Air 
Force R&D program to have the Engineering Division devoting eighty 
percent of its efforts to in-service engineering, one need only read 
an official description of the function of this organization. "The
^^"Applied Research," Air Force, Jun 50, p. 22.
^4bid., pp. 22-23.
12Supra, p. 75.
13Text of Briefing for General Schlatter, pp. 1-2. Although I 
could find no formal definition of in-service engineering, I assume 
this term means the modification of equipment already in use by the 
Air Force.
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primary mission of the Engineering Division of AKC is to accomplish 
scientific research, development, and engineering pertaining to Air 
Force materiel.
With such a general recognition of deficiencies in the Air 
Force R&D program and with the importance so many Air Force leaders 
assigned to research and development, one would expect there to be 
an extensive dialogue on what needed to be done to get the program 
operating properly. Such a dialogue did take place, and three of the 
most important documents in it were the Ridenour Report, the Air Uni­
versity Study, and Survival in the Air Age (Finletter Report).
The Finletter Report was the first and most general of the 
three. It recommended more funds for aeronautical R&D and listed areas 
in which research and development should be emphasized. It also pre­
sented ideas on how government R&D in the area of aeronautics should 
be managed.
The second major report to appear during this period was the 
Ridenour Report of September 1949. This document provided the Air 
Force with a plan for the improvement of its R&D program that was as 
extensive as the earlier von Karman work. Science: The Key to Air 
Supremacy.
The efforts that produced the Ridenour Report grew out of the 
November 1948 meetings of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) which 
had dealt with the need to improve the R&D facilities and practices of
14Secretary of the Air Force, Report for FY 1943, p. 190.
^^President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age, 
pp. 73, 77, 80-92, 94.
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the Air Force. General Vandenberg read the report and then met with 
Dr. von Karman and General Putt to discuss the Air Force's R&D prob­
lems. As a result of these events Vandenberg decided to call upon the 
SAB in the Spring of 1949 for a comprehensive review of USAF research 
and development.^^
Vandenberg had planned to address personally the regular spring 
meeting of the USAF SAB, but at the last minute he was called to an 
urgent meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Muir S. Fairchild 
delivered Vandenberg's address for him. Vandenberg's address asked 
the Scientific Advisory Board for advice on how to govern the function­
ing of USAF research and development facilities
Von Karman and Putt decided to establish a special committee 
to produce the requested recommendations. It was composed of two mem­
bers of the SAB, Dr. Louis N. Ridenour, Chairman, and Dr. Frank L. 
Wattendorf. The remainder of the committee was composed of James H.
Doolittle, George P. Baker, James B. Fisk, Carl F. J. Overhage, Ralph
18A. Sawyer, John M. Wild, and Raymond J. Woodrow.
The first meeting of the Committee took place on 11 July 1949 
and opened with an address by General Vandenberg. The General told 
the Committee that it was to receive the full cooperation of the Air 
Staff. He then described the post-World War II Air Force situation.
^^Sturm, USAF SAB, pp. 30-31.
^^Ibid., pp. 31-32.
18Sturm, USAF SAB, p. 32, and von Karman to Vandenberg, 21 Sept 
49, p. Letter 6. Von Karman's letter is included in the Ridenour 
Report, and its pages are numbered Letter 1 through Letter 6.
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After that war, he said, the air service deteriorated to the point 
where it had become difficult for the Air Force to meet its obliga­
tions. The Air Force had done well in meeting such world crises as 
the Berlin blockade and had managed to create a force-in-being in 
spite of personnel and fund limitations. But now it was time to de­
cide what the Air Force should be doing in the future. The Ridenour
Committee should give the Air Force a picture of what it was not doing
19that it should be doing.
In the following six weeks the Committee met about twenty
times at a dozen different Air Force, other military, and government
20facilities across the nation. The report that resulted from their
21efforts was submitted to General Vandenberg in September 1949.
The Ridenour Committee made specific recommendations for
changes in the organizational structure of the Air Force. At the Air
Staff level there should be created a single staff office— the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Research and Development (DCS/R&D)— that would be
responsible for the overall Air Force R&D program. This staff agency
would be established on a co-equal basis with other major elements of 
22the staff. At the operating command level there should be establish­
ed a Research and Development Command. This Command would be composed
19Sturm, USAF SAB, pp. 32-33. Sturm quoted Vandenberg as say­
ing of the post-World War II situation: "everything went down hill so
fast that the first thing we had to pay attention to was to get a sort 
of fire-bucket brigade ready in case something should break."
20Ibid., p. 33.
^^Von Karman to Vandenberg, 21 Sept 49.
22Ridenour Report, pp. Conclusion-1, V-2 - V-3.
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of "systems groups" with the responsibility for the development of
complete weapons systems. Additionally, the R&D Command would absorb
the Office of Air Research which the Air Force had established earlier
"to conduct research of a preliminary nature, and to review research
23and development contracts, programs, and budget estimates." The
head of the new Research and Development Command should be the DCS/
24R&D according to the Ridenour Report.
The Air University Committee worked in conjunction with the
Ridenour Committee. Some members of the Air University working group
attended each of the hearings conducted by the Ridenour Committee, and
all documents available to the Ridenour Committee were available to
the Air University Committee. Additionally, working committee members
conferred at Santa Monica, California, with the Ridenour Committee and
25Headquarters USAF research and development personnel.
The recommendations contained in the Air University Study
closely parallel those of the Ridenour Report. The former report
recommended the immediate establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for
Development (DCS/D) and the "phased consolidation of all Air Staff
26Research and Development activities under this Deputy." Furthermore, 
the AU Committee suggested that the Air Force immediately create a 
Research and Development Command and initiate "a phased assignment of
^^Ibid., pp. Conclusion-1, V-3, V-7.
^^Ibid., p. V-4.
25Air University Study, TAB E, p. 1. The working committee 
was composed of representatives of the USAF Headquarters Staff, the 
Air University Headquarters Staff, and the Air War College Staff.
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activities and functions to this C o m m a n d . A s  for the relationship 
between the commander of the new R&D Command and the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Development, the Air University Committee made no recommenda­
tion such as that contained in the Ridenour Report, that the DCS/R&D 
and the commander of the R&D Command be the same person. But neither 
did the Air University Study take exception to this recommendation in
TAB D of the Study which supposedly listed those areas where there were
. 2 8disagreements.
In addition to recommending organizational changes, the 
Ridenour Report and the Air University Study suggested additional 
steps the Air Force could take to improve its R&D program. These 
suggestions, along with those contained in other documents of 1949, 
advised the Air Force on what it must do to create an environment in 
which R&D could flourish. As Colonel Fickel stated: "We must recog­
nize that the processes of research and development demand certain
29peculiar conditions to be effective."
The Ridenour Committee expressed similar views. This group 
remarked that the traditional military organization did not provide 
the "proper environment" for the research and initial development por­
tion of R&D to prosper. "Experience has shown," the Committee recorded, 




Ibid., TAB D, p. 5.
29SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 24.
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flexibility of program are provided." These conditions were not avail­
able in the Air Materiel Command, which had responsibility for Air
30Force research and development when the Ridenour Report appeared.
To some of those advising the Air Force on how to improve its
R&D program in 1949, the university seemed to be a model that the Air
Force should seek to imitate. At least one component of research and
development, basic research, seemed to succeed best in the university
environment. The Ridenour Committee stated: "Traditionally, and in
fact today, the universities of the country are the great centers of
31fundamental research." And if the Air Force were to have an effec­
tive research and development program, it must develop strong ties with 
the universities. As the Report put it: "Air Force research and 
development cannot be maintained at the highest level of competence
without being closely associated with the general research effort of
32the nation's universities."
The Ridenour Committee was not alone in this belief. In his 
memoirs Theodore von Karman recorded his efforts to secure a close tie 
between the University of Tennessee and the Arnold Engineering Develop­
ment Center that was established near Tullahoma, Tennessee. The con­
struction of this Center was authorized by Congress in October 1949,
33  ̂ ^and construction was completed in 1951. Von Karman discussed the
30Ridenour Report, p. V-5.
^^Ibid., p. X-2.
32Ibid., p. X-1.
33Arthur K. Marmor, "The Tools: Weapons," in Goldberg, History 
of the USAF, pp. 199-200 (hereafter cited as Marmor, "Weapons").
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various advantages and disadvantages of the Tullahoma site. An ad­
vantage was the availability of an excellent power source in the form 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Dr. von Karman listed two disad­
vantages: the lack of a sufficient height to provide for direct
hydraulic drive for the powerful motors associated with the Center and 
the absence of a university close to the site. Von Karman thought the 
close proximity of a university was "vital to create the atmosphere
needed for good r e s e a r c h . H e  noted that he made several trips to
35the University of Tennessee to enlist its support for the Center.
The Ridenour Committee also recommended the establishment of a
fellowship program, in addition to the program of supporting basic
36research by contract. "The Air Force should seek legislation em­
powering it to award a modest number of predoctoral and postdoctoral
37fellowships to highly qualified students." This program would help
satisfy the "recurring requirement for staffing Air Force research and
development facilities with technically qualified young men" by
creating a number of fellowship holders "whose willingness to consider
a career with the Air Force would inevitably be greater than that of
38other graduate students and postdoctoral workers."
^^Von Karman, The Wind and Beyond, pp. 299-300.
^^Ibid., p. 300.
36Ridenour Report, p. V-7.
^^Ibid., p. X-3.
38Ibid. For some other comments on an Air Force fellowship 
program, see: 0. G. Haywood, Jr., "Basic Research in the Air Force,"
Air University Quarterly Review, VI, No. 4 (Winter 1953-54), 93-94. 
Haywood noted that the Air Force had no authority to carry out a
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Another aspect of the R&D environment that the Air Force 
should seek to establish involved exploiting the relationship between 
teaching and good research. We have seen in an earlier chapter that 
the Air Force was interested in establishing an effective school in 
its Air Force Institute of Technology. The Ridenour Report wished to 
see this school turned into a top-ranking graduate engineering school 
and noted that one of the principal factors in achieving this goal 
would be assembling a competent staff. The key to assembling a com­
petent staff was to allow its members "to conduct their own research 
and to guide the research of graduate students. Most of the physical
tools for research by the staff and by graduate students are already
39present at Wright-Patterson Field."
The Ridenour Report raised and answered the rhetorical ques­
tion of why the Air Force needed a top-ranking engineering graduate 
school of its oi\m. First of all, the Air Force was interested in many 
research topics, such as terminal ballistics, which are not the proper 
business of a civilian institution. Secondly, the Report noted that 
the Air Force at Wright-Patterson Field, for example, had extensive 
research facilities unavailable in civilian institutions and expensive 
and wasteful to duplicate. "These facilities should be used for 
research, and the proposed development of the Air Institute of
fellowship program, nor was it seeking such authority. But in a sense 
its support of basic research in universities gave it a fellowship 
program administered by those who were performing research under con­
tract to the Air Force. These people selected graduate students to 
work with them on the projects covered by the contracts, and this was 
in fact expected by the Air Force.
39Ridenour Report, p. X-4.
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Technology is the most direct and immediate way of insuring that they
, „40 are so used.
The Air University Committee agreed that the Air Force should 
provide "high-caliber graduate-level instruction at the Air Force 
Institute of Technology." But this instruction should be limited only 
to those areas of special interest to the Air Force. The Institute 
should not become a general graduate-level school, for general graduate 
education could best be acquired by sending officers to civilian in­
stitutions. The offering of graduate-level education in special areas 
would satisfy Air Force requirements for people qualified in those 
areas and provide technical personnel with the "opportunity to do a 
small amount of teaching." Such an opportunity was "an important 
factor in attracting technical personnel of the type and caliber 
needed to administer effectively Air Force research contracts with 
universities and various other research organizations."^^
General Donald Putt, a member of the Air University Committee,
brought up the matter of the interrelationship between teaching and
R&D during an Air Staff meeting on 3 January 1950. Putt observed;
a lot of the types of people we would like to attract into the
organization [R&D Command] like to do a little teaching on the 
side also, and also professors like to get their hands dirty
°̂Ibid.
^^Air University Study, TAB D, pp. 1-2. Root, "Finletter Re­
port," p. 26, discussed the possibility that the AFIT program, in con­
junction with educating officers at civilian schools, might provide a
solution to the problem of the shortage of manpower in the Air Force 
R&D program. Louis Ridenour later confirmed that the AU Study inter­
pretation of the Ridenour Report recommendations on AFIT was correct; 
AFIT should be a specialized graduate school (Transcript of 3 Jan 50 
Air Staff Proceedings, p. 44).
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with a little research; so between that combination plus the 
enormous facilities that are available in the Air Force, you can 
compete favorably with any university technically on facili­
ties.42
During the same Air Staff meeting General Fairchild asked if 
giving the Air University administrative control over AFIT would cause 
any problems. Dr. Ridenour called upon his university experience in 
assuring. Fairchild that it would not, provided the Air University did 
not "put any obstacle in the way of the senior technical people in the 
Research and Development Command becoming part of the faculty of the 
Institute of Technology, because the point General Putt mentioned was 
really very real in our minds.Doolittle echoed Ridenour, saying 
such an arrangement must not be allowed to interfere with the flexi­
bility of these "senior Air University people to do research or to 
■I A Ainstruct.
One final indication of tne belief in the beneficial relation­
ship between research and teaching is found in a memorandum that 
Colonel Arthur Fickel prepared about three weeks after the 3 January 
1950 Air Staff meeting. Fickel believed that AFIT would be "one of 
the first field activities" the new Research and Development Command 
would absorb. Once the new command acquired AFIT, it should be
"physically allied" to the Office of Air Research, the Air Force or-
45ganization that was responsible for AF basic research. Based upon
^^Transcript of 3 Jan 50 Air Staff Proceedings, p. 47.
^^Ibid., p. 48. %en Ridenour spoke of "our minds," he was 
apparently referring to the members of the Ridenour Committee.
^^Ibid., p. 49.
45Fickel, Memorandum for Record, 23 Jan 50, p. 2.
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views that seem to have been widely held in the Air Force (as we shall 
see shortly), Fickel concluded that both OAR and AFIT should be located 
in the vicinity of Washington, D.C., for "there is far greater attrac­
tion for high caliber staff" in this location.
In addition to the relationship between teaching and R&D and 
the need for flexibility and freedom in the R&D program, several other 
special conditions for effective R&D were mentioned in various docu­
ments. For one thing, the R&D program needed policies and procedures 
designed specifically for research and development activities. "USAF 
management policies and procedures . . . throttle effective and 
economical Research and Development," argued the Air University Commit­
tee. Specifically criticized were Air Force regulations. These were 
"designed for the management and operation of tactical, administrative, 
or procurement organizations," but they "seriously interfere with the 
efficient management and operation of Research and Development activi­
ties."^^ To correct this problem, "management procedures appropriate 
to the specialized nature of Research and Development activities should 
be initiated at once."^^
Much the same thing had been stated somewhat earlier in the 
Ridenour Report. After noting that special policies are needed for 
R&D, the Report complimented the Air Force on the March 1949 publica­
tion of Air Force Regulation 80-4 which "enunciated . . . most of the
^^Ibid.
47Air University Study, p. 2.
48^ ,Ibid., p. 6.
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basic policies which those experienced in research and development 
consider to be essential for making effective progress." But, the 
Committee continued, "actual practices in the Air Force differ sub­
stantially from those which are recommended in AFR 80-4." Moreover, 
a statement similar to that contained in AFR 80-4 was needed for 
development.
The Ridenour Committee was aware that the Air Force had just 
published AFR 80-4, but did not seem to think that the newness of the 
regulation was the complete reason for the degree of difference between 
stated policy (the regulation) and practice. Accordingly, they com­
mented:
Unless a fully determined effort is made to put it into effect, 
. . .  it is likely to take its place with numerous past expres­
sions of intent by the Air Force with regard to research and 
development, which have been sound in conception and principle, 
but have never been carried through.50
An earlier letter from General Fairchild to the Commanding
General of the Air Materiel Command reflects one official effort to
bridge this gap between policy and procedure. Fairchild told the AMC
Commander that Air Force Headquarters attached "unusual significance"
to the policies outlined in AFR 80-4.
Proper implementation of the policies will round out the in­
tellectual capabilities of the Air Force by attracting and 
holding highly trained scientists. These scientists are
49Ridenour Report, p. IV-1. There are indications that AFR 
80-4 may have been published as a result of the efforts of the SAB.
Von Karman to Vandenberg, 15 Jan 49, p. 2, endorsed a draft regulation 
that was being considered for adoption by the Air Staff at that time. 
This draft contained "many recommendations" of the SAB.
^^Ridenour Report, p. IV-1. For a discussion of procedures 
for research and development, see Chapter IX.
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required to recognize the implication of new fundamental dis­
coveries and applications insofar as they apply to the tech­
nological advancement of the Air Force.51
Fairchild called on the Commander of AMC to give his personal attention
52to seeing that the policies of the Regulation were implemented.
Another special need of the AF R&D program was stability of
its manning and its funding practices. Colonel Fickel was critical
of the funding system that only allocated funds for one year. R&D is
a continuous activity; it required the obligation of funds for at
53least a four year period. And both the Air University Study and the 
Ridenour Report recommended a stable budget for R&D. The latter was 
somewhat stronger on this point than the former. The Ridenour Commit­
tee stated:
An effective program of research and development can be achieved 
only when its budgetary support is relatively stable from year 
to year, since most important projects take years to bring to 
successful completion. It is likely that total Air Force appro­
priations will fluctuate from year to year, so that stability 
in the research and development budget can be obtained only by 
causing other activities to absorb the fluctuations and defi­
ciencies in funds.54
Both the Air University Study and the Ridenour Report
^^General Muir S. Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, to 
Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Subject : "Air Force Regula­
tion 80-4," 14 March 1949, p. 1, in History of Separation of R&D from 
AMC. III.
^^Ibid., p. 2.
53SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 22. Fickel also criticized 
the Air Force R&D management structure and the attitudes of Air Force 
leaders toward R&D as other sources of instability in the R&D program 
(pp. 22-24).
54Ridenour Report, pp. IV-2 - IV-3. For the comments of the 
Air University Committee, see: Air University Study, pp. 5, 7, and
TAB C, p. 1.
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considered personnel to be one of the keys to a successful R&D pro­
gram. According to the Air University Study: "The quality of Air
Force Research and Development is dependent on the individual scientif­
ic and technical competence of the personnel performing or supervising 
the f u n c t i o n . T h e  Ridenour Report made the point just as strongly:
At the very heart of the problem of improving Air Force re­
search and development and placing it on a firm basis for the 
future is the urgent need for enlightened policies for recruit­
ing and managing military and civilian technical personnel of 
high competence. An organization can be effective only when 
it has competent personnel who are given able, inspiring, and
dynamic leadership.56
The Ridenour Report and the Air University Study were not 
alone in making this point. At the 12 July 1949 SAB meeting where he 
brought up the need for stability in R&D funding and manning. Colonel 
Fickel had also said that the "essence of research progress depends on 
individual creativeness, and . . . this is engendered best through 
personal satisfaction and interest of the individual.
People were not only the heart of the R&D process, but also one 
of the major problems encountered by a military R&D program. Survival 
in the Air Age called the shortage of qualified men the most serious 
bottleneck in the military aviation research and development program. 
The cause of this problem was World War II, which produced a serious 
decline in the output of engineers and scientists from the nation's
^^Air University Study, TAB B, p. 1.
^^Ridenour Report, p. VII-1.
^^SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 17. For other similar state­
ments by Fickel, see: pp. 16, 24.
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s c h o o l s . 58 A year later, in a report made on the progress achieved 
in the implementation of the policy outlined in the Finletter Report, 
an Air Force article related the personnel shortage problem to the Air 
Force R&D program specifically. According to this article, the short­
age of personnel was still probably "the most acute of any [problem] 
in the R&D program." The Air Force had made strides toward attracting 
civilian technicians and engineers to jobs with the Air Force, but 
there was still much to be done. The Air Force simply could not
entice enough of the right kinds of people to work in its R&D pro- 
59gram.
This situation posed a major challenge for those who would im­
prove the Air Force research and development program. They must 
establish a personnel situation that would attract sufficient numbers 
of qualified people. Accomplishment of this goal would involve efforts 
along two lines: insuring that living and working conditions were
adequate, and implementing appropriate personnel policies.
Concerning the policies that should be implemented to assure an 
adequate personnel supply, the Finletter Report made several recommen­
dations. For one thing, a national program for education in the aero­
nautical sciences should be set up under "a National Science Founda­
tion." Additionally, the salary limitation of $10,000 per year 
established by the Classification Act that was then in effect should 
be lifted; with industry bidding for the services of scientists, it
58President’s Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age,
p. 94.
59Root, "The Finletter Report," p. 26.
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would be impossible to attract top-quality people at that salary.
Also, the services should allow specialization in research and not 
transfer its R&D officers to operations after a tour in the R&D 
career area. Such practices as this produced instability at the 
policy-making level of an R&D organization. Furthermore, officers 
should be encouraged to make research and development a career. Part 
of this effort would be to give them graduate training in their
specialty at leading civilian schools at the expense of the govern-
. 60 ment.
The Ridenour Report echoed many of the personnel recommenda­
tions made in the Finletter Report. Thus, an individual's R&D exper­
tise should not be dissipated by assignments outside of his career 
specialty. The Air Force must make room in its general officer ranks 
for competent officers without requiring participation in unrelated
fields of activity as a prerequisite for achieving general officer
1 61 rank.
Another major piece of advice given in this report was that
the Air Force should make an immediate inventory of technical officers
to identify and catalogue them. As soon as possible after this it
should institute a career guidance plan for them.
The plan should be drawn up with the help of the best profes­
sional advice, and should provide that technical officers be 
given assignments which use their special skills, as well as
^^President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age, 
pp. 95-96. This report also mentioned the importance of good working 
conditions and adequate housing for families of the workers (p. 95).
^^Ridenour Report, p. VII-7.
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insuring that such officers have a properly controlled rota­
tion to broaden their experience and to acquaint them with 
an adequate range of Air Force activities and operations.
The plan should also secure for technical officers an equality 
of opportunity with other officers, both for assignments and 
for promotion.
Another of the Report’s recommendations proposed the institu­
tion of a medal for "distinguished technical achievement." This 
decoration would be awarded not for accomplishment in administration of 
R&D activities, but only for "the actual achievement of ideas and dis­
coveries. . . . The new award would go to the worker who has a primary 
part in an important development." This medal would be the equivalent 
of the Distinguished Flying Cross, which had been instituted to 
recognize individual performance of Air Force flying personnel. The 
decoration recommended by the Ridenour Committee would constitute 
recognition by the Air Force that its effectiveness depended upon the
achievements of its technical personnel as well as upon those of its
63operational crewmembers.
The Air University Study concluded that the Air Force needed to 
overhaul thoroughly its personnel system in order to improve the situ­
ation for technical and scientific personnel. Air Force personnel 
policies had not provided sufficient numbers of qualified scientific 
and technical workers. To overcome this shortcoming, the Air Force 
should establish a catalogue of qualified officers on active and in­
active duty and make the technical qualifications of officers the
^^Ibid., pp. VII-7 - VII-8.
Ibid., pp. VII-6 - VII-7. For other recommendations on per­
sonnel, see Chapter VII of the Ridenour Report, pp. VII-1 - VII-11.
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overriding consideration in their assignment so that their skills 
were properly used. These assignments would be subject to the approv­
al of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Development which the Air Univer-
64sity Study would have the Air Force create.
In addition to these recommendations, the Air University Com­
mittee advised that positions of responsibility in the R&D field should 
be filled by officers who were technically and administratively quali­
fied. Civilians should also be considered for these positions. To 
assure sufficient numbers of qualified people were available, the Air 
Force should begin an educational program for officers; this program 
would rely on the Air Force Institute of Technology to provide training 
where civilian institutions were inadequate. As an added measure, 
regular commissions in attractive grades should be offered to selected 
technically qualified research officers and civilians. Advancement 
opportunities for both officers and civilians in the R&D field should
be good; for officers it should be as good as for general duty
... 65officers.
Actions on these recommendations were not slow in coming, as 
the proceedings of the 3 January 1950 Air Staff meeting show. During 
the meeting Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards remarked that as a re­
sult of the advice of the Ridenour Committee the personnel staff had 
established a control office for military personnel with technical spe­
cialties. This office controlled the "assignments, movements, and ev­
erything else" of people who were identified as technical specialists,
64Air University Study, p. 5; TAB B, pp. 1-2.
^^Ibid., TAB B, pp. 3-4.
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and their activities would be monitored by the new Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Development.^^ Additionally, a catalogue of technical per­
sonnel was being made. Once an individual acquired a technical quali­
fication, he was identified and became a "controlled individual."
These efforts, said General Edwards, should correct the deficiencies 
the Air Force personnel system had exhibited in the past, as far as 
the management of R&D people was concerned.
General Edwards also noted that the Air Force had established 
a "survey group" that was to visit the Cambridge and Watson Laborator­
ies to conduct an "on-the-ground study" to find out what made people 
quit their work with the Air Force. It was hoped that the information 
gained from this survey would enable the Air Force to recommend to the 
Civil Service Commission what might be done to improve the situation.
Another group was surveying people who had already left the employment
68of the Air Force to see what their reasons for quitting had been.
General Edwards reported one final official action the Air 
Force had taken in the area of R&D personnel management. Letters to 
major commanders had informed them of the difference between managing 
R&D personnel and handling military members of their commands.
Proper working and living conditions for R&D personnel also 
required attention. Colonel Fickel had this to say:





The facility must . . .  be attractive, not only as a labora­
tory but as a community. We are not now dealing merely with 
the stoicism of the field soldier to whom any assignment is 
still within his professional scope. The ability to attract 
and hold professional talent in the Air Force is dependent 
on providing it with an agreeable professional— not neces­
sarily military— atmosphere.70
The importance of good working and living conditions in attrac­
ting quality R&D personnel was also discussed in the Ridenour Report. 
Competent civilian technical personnel could be attracted to govern­
ment services in peacetime, said the Report, only by
employment practices which yield working conditions, including 
intellectual freedom, personal dignity and rewards, and cul­
tural opportunities that are not inferior to those freely 
available in the research laboratories of industry and the 
universities.71
72Similar comments can be found in the Air University Study.
An article on basic research in Air Force also emphasized the 
importance of good living conditions in attracting capable people to 
the Air Force research and development program. The location of 
employment should be "where there is comfortable housing, good schools, 
a reasonably cosmopolitan atmosphere, and the opportunity for the in­
dividuals of the staff to go to a concert or a play occasionally if the 
mood strikes them." This must not be considered pampering the tech­
nician or scientist; it is merely a matter of giving him what he can
obtain elsewhere. "It is a simple case of attracting the brains with
73sugar instead of the vinegar he has been fed in the past."
^^SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 17.
^^Ridenour Report, p. VII-10.
72Air University Study, TAB C, p. 2.
73"Basic Research," Air Force, Jun 50, p. 19.
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The actions undertaken to improve the personnel situation for 
R&D workers, whether trivial or significant, whether pedestrian or 
insightful, were all less important than two major changes recommended 
to improve the organization of R&D for the long haul. These were the 
establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Development and the 
creation of the Air Research and Development Command.Both recom­
mendations were implemented, and R&D management achieved unprecedented 
recognition in the Air Force, but these changes were not accomplished 
without difficulty.
The recognition of a problem does not guarantee that all who 
recognize it will propose the same solution. We have previously ob­
served the creation of the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for Research 
and Development, an office similar in some ways to the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Development, and seen that this earlier office succumbed to 
a resurgence of the traditional Air Force view of R&D management which 
held that R&D was an aspect of the materiel function in a combat or­
ganization. We have also seen that this view still had its proponents 
in the Air Force of 1949 and 1950.^^
There was opposition to the reforms proposed. In 1949 the 
center of opposition seems to have been the Air Materiel Command. In 
December of that year Brigadier General N. B. Harbold, Inspector 
General, Headquarters Air Materiel Command, addressed a memorandum on 
the Ridenour Report to General St. Clair Streett. Commanding General of 
the Air Materiel Command. Speaking of the problem of scattered
^^Fairchild, Memorandum, "Organization for R&D," 23 Jan 50,p. 1.
^^Supra, pp. 62-70.
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responsibility for R&D in the current AF organization which the Riden­
our Report criticized, Harbold stated that this "is certainly correct- 
ible by means other than the major reorganization recommended."^^ 
Moreover, Harbold contended that the idea of a separate command in the 
Ridenour reorganization scheme raises the question, "'Is Research and
Development of such importance as to require a segregation of function
77or is it only part of a larger, more important function?'" Harbold
concluded that the Air Force effort in response to the Ridenour Report
78"should be to modify or correct its existing organization."
In addition to Harbold's memorandum to Streett, which gives 
some indication of the thinking behind AMC's opposition to the Riden­
our Report, there was the view expressed in a briefing for General
79Schlatter, who became the first Commander of ARDC in February 1950, 
prior to the 3 January 1950 Air Staff meeting. Speaking of the Riden­
our Committee recommendation for the establishment of a separate R&D 
command, the briefer said:
The Air Materiel Command does not agree that this recommenda­
tion will be of over-all benefit to the Air Force. AMC thor­
oughly agrees with the need for better formulated and managed 
R&D, . . . .  AMC believes, however, that the necessary structure 
can be developed within the AMC framework, and that it should be
developed within that framework in order to prevent a difficult
B. Harbold, Memorandum to General Streett, Subject:
"Report of the Special Committee of the SAB," 5 December 1949, p. 1,
in History of Separation of R&D from AMC, III.
^̂ Ibid.
^®Ibid., p. 2.
79Sturm, USAF SAB, p. 135.
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break in continuity between the development, production, and 
maintenance of materiel.80
To overcome resistance such as that posed by AMC and bring 
about desired changes, those who sought to begin a new approach to 
R&D within the Air Force seem to have used two techniques. In the 
first place, they articulated a set of images to explain why the Air 
Force needed to make changes in its R&D program. These images proved 
to be persuasive in their effect upon top Air Force leadership. 
Secondly, there were some unique men among the proponents of change 
who were either in key positions or who possessed access to top Air 
Force leadership. These men themselves provided the leadership for 
the effort to change the Air Force R&D program. As we shall see,
James H. Doolittle and Gordon F. Seville were perhaps the two most 
important men as far as bringing about changes in the research and 
development activities of the Air Force was concerned.
One image that was developed must be set against the background 
of the battle over which military service would control strategic 
missiles. In 1946 this matter did not seem too controversial. General 
Spaatz, who became the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces in
oi
1946 and the first Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1947, believed
80Text of Briefing for General Schlatter, p. 2. The philosophy 
behind AMC’s opposition to the change is more fully developed on pp. 
9-10. Here concern is expressed that separating the components of R&D 
would be "fatal" to the R&D enterprise. Dr. von Karman, The Wind and 
Beyond, p. 304, claimed the idea of a separate major command for R&D 
"on a par with operational commands" "crystallized the opposition in 
the Air Force" to elevation of the importance of R&D.
81Ira C. Eaker, "Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, USAF: June 28, 1891-
July 14, 1974," Air Force Magazine. LVII, No. 9 (September 1974),
47-48.
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the dividing line should be based on the technical characteristics of
the missile. In that year Spaatz told Congress: "In general terms,
the Air Force develops those forms of guided missiles and rockets that
depend on the aerodynamic principles, and Ordnance develops those in
82the projectile field." And even as late as 1949 no less a figure
than Vannevar Bush was to contend that intercontinental missiles
83would be of little consequence "for the near future."
But by 1949 there were those who had begun to take the missile 
more seriously. In October of that year an article entitled "V/ho Will 
Guide the Missiles?" appeared in the journal of the Air Force Associa­
tion; its author was Ned Root, managing editor of the magazine. Root's 
article raised the question of whether the Army, Navy, or Air Force 
would control the nation's missile program:
Should any one service cop the program for its very own, 
that branch would stand to put its two sister services in all 
but total eclipse. For it is apparent that the end refinement 
of the guided missile as an instrument to carry destruction to 
the enemy— the guided missile that has "grown" to full maturity, 
will be of such a nature as to revolutionize (and in most cases 
antiquate) the carriers we now use on land, sea, and in the air.°4
Root strongly criticized the efforts of the Navy to secure 
control of the missile program. He reported: "For at least three
82U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Military 
Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1947, Hearings before the subcom­
mittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, 
p. 425.
83Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men, pp. 84-87.
^^Ned Root, "Who Will Guide the Missiles?" Air Force: The 
Official Journal of the Air Force Association, XXXII, No. 10 (October 
1949), 15.
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years now, the Navy has endeavored with every device at its disposal
to establish itself in the public mind as pre-eminent in the missile
field." This publicity effort seemed to have been achieving results,
for fifty-seven percent of all R&D money for missiles in 1949 went to
the Navy, while the Air Force received twenty-two percent and the Army
twenty-one percent, based upon figures released by the Joint Guided
85Missiles Committee.
A warning similar to that expressed by Root appears in the
Ridenour Report, only this time the threat was the Army.
The Committee understands that the Army has recently proposed 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that development and operational 
cognizance over ground-to-ground and ground-to-air guided mis­
siles be given to the Army. If this were to be done, it would 
transfer to the Army a large share of the future mission of 
the Air Force.
Faced with this competition between the service branches, how 
would Department of Defense agencies such as the Research and Develop­
ment Board decide to assign program or mission responsibility? 
According to Colonel Fickel, this would be done on the basis of three 
criteria: "The first of these is on the basis of which Department has
primary operational mission interest; the second, which has the best
technical capability; and third, which has an assigned procurement 
87responsibility." These criteria were similar to those described in 
the Air University Study:
85Ibid., p. 17. Root's article contains much of the acrimony 
of inter-service rivalry, including a rehearsal of the wrongs the Navy 
perpetrated during the earlier B-36 bomber controversy (pp. 18-19).
The Joint Guided Missiles Committee was an agency under the Research 
and Development Board of the Department of Defense (p. 19).
^^Ridenour Report, pp. IV-1 - IV-2.
87SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 14.
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Any current agreement reached between the services on roles 
and missions, and on the location of operational responsibili­
ties with respect to new weapons, has no real or lasting sig­
nificance. Evolutionary processes and logic will ultimately 
dictate that the service possessing the combination of tech­
nical competence and strategic understanding within a particu­
lar field will be the service which controls and operates 
within that field.&&
As early as May 1949 warnings were sounded that the weakness 
of the Air Force R&D program endangered the position of the Air Force 
within the Department of Defense. In a 24 May memorandum. General 
Putt compared the Air Force R&D program with that of the Army and the 
Navy. In this comparison the Air Force emerged the weakest, while the 
Navy had what appeared to be the best research and development program. 
Putt emphasized the interest that high-ranking Naval officers displayed 
in research and development and noted that the Air Force compared un­
favorably with the Navy in this respect. The shortage of high-ranking 
USAF R&D personnel "compromises the effectiveness with which USAF R&D 
needs are presented to outside organizations such as the Congress,
Research and Development Board, National Advisory Committee for Aero- 
89nanties, etc." The Navy "apparently realizes that its future depends 
primarily on research and development," Putt continued. "The Navy's 
position will become increasingly stronger since availability of R&D 
personnel and facilities is an important factor in the allocation of
88Air University Study, p. 4.
89Donald L. Putt, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, USAF, 
Subject: "Need for More Emphasis on USAF Research and Development
Activities," 24 May 1949, p. 1, in ARDC Office of Command Historian, 
History of ARDC: 23 Jan 50-30 Jun 51, II (hereafter cited as Putt,
Memorandum, "Need for Emphasis on R&D," 24 May 49).
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R&D responsibilities among the three s e r v i c e s . "^0
Colonel Fickel sounded another warning in July 1949. He
pointed out that the Air Force R&D program was weak compared to those
of the Army and the Navy. "Through many decades" the Army and the
Navy had "developed research and development structures which not only
contract for research and development but do it themselves." On the
other hand, the Air Force had until recently been dependent on the
Army, the Navy, or the aircraft industry for its R&D. Assignment of
91R&D responsibility based upon the three criteria listed above was 
going badly for the Air Force. Fickel described the situation in these 
words :
Because of this inheritance, we find in the daily decisions 
being made in atomic energy projects, that assignment of R&D 
responsibility, on the basis of the second R&D Board criterion 
of competency, has a strong tendency to be made in favor of the 
more traditionally developed structures of the Army and Navy, 
in spite of the first criterion which is generally disregarded 
or undefined, and in spite of the lack of previous atomic 
energy experience all a r o u n d . 9%
In November 1949 General Putt again sounded the alarm, dis­
cussing the weakness of the Air Force in the Pentagon's internal 
technology race. He told students of the Air War College that in 
nearly "every significant issue before joint consideration, we are on 
the defensive, and defeated or else impeded to a degree amounting to 
defeat." The source of this problem was Air Force neglect of the
90Ibid., p. 2. For another comparison that highlights the 
weakness of the Air Force R&D program relative to that of the Navy 
see: Ridenour Report, p. III-3.
91Supra, p. 144.
92SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 15.
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"planning and technological process." The Air Force was not providing
the technical leadership tha: would "cause others to turn to us for
93the necessary technology that must be evolved."
I'Jhat could the Air Force do to protect its mission and indeed
itself under such circumstances? The answer was almost obvious. To
secure a role in the development of nuclear weapons Colonel Fickel
stated that the Air Force "must reflect the work and the projects in
its program and budget, it must constantly demonstrate a growing
capability as a competent and comprehensive research and development
94unit in our national technological structure."
Somewhat later, the Ridenour Report recommended a similar
course of action. The Air Force "will scarcely be in a position to
claim for itself cognizance in such matters [as missiles]," the Report
advised, "unless its developmental achievements and its operational
proficiency rank with or are superior to those of the other Services."
Superiority in a new field could not be had merely for the wishing; it
must be earned and can only be earned "by sound achievement in research 
95and development."
In this case the advocates of change in the Air Force R&D pro­
gram seem to have articulated an image in which their efforts to im­
prove the Air Force R&D activity became an extension of the Air Force 
fight for independence from the Army. The Air Force had to give greater
93Putt, "USAF R&D," pp. 20-21. For another warning, see: Air
University Study, pp. 3-4.
94SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 15.
95Ridenour Report, p. IV-2.
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emphasis to research and development if it were to become a full 
partner of the Army and Navy under the Department of Defense.
In addition to the concern expressed about the Air Force 
position in the Department of Defense relative to her sister services, 
some anxiety existed with respect to civilian control of Air Force 
research and development.
in February 1949 Dr. Karl T. Compton, Chairman of the Research 
and Development Board, asked Dr. von Karman to comment on a proposal 
to create a new civilian R&D organization that would be activated 
within the National Military Establishment in times of emergencies.^^ 
Von Karman indicated that he did not agree with the concept and that 
he thought the idea for the organization was based on the belief that 
the military would be as unprepared for the next war from the stand­
point of R&D as they had been for World War 11.^^ Dr. von Karman also 
observed that the recommendation seemed to "assume tacitly that nothing
can be done to increase even further the efficiency and effectiveness"
98with which military funds are used. He believed that rather than
complicate the Department of Defense further by the addition of still
another R&D agency,
the main effort should be directed toward enabling the military 
Departments to appreciate their scientific problems, to organ­
ize the cooperation of science in peacetime, and to reorganize
^^Theodore von Karman to Karl T. Compton, 28 February 1949, 
p. 1, in ARDC Office of Command Historian, History of ARDC; 23 Jan 50- 
30 Jun 1951, II (hereafter cited as von Karman to Compton, 29 Feb 49), 
and Walkowicz, Memorandum, "Civilian Control of Military Research,"p. 1.
^^Von Karman to Compton, 28 Feb 49, p. 1.
98Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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their own structure so that civilian and military scientists 
have sufficient influence on decisions and are afforded the gg 
possibility of doing undisturbed, systematic scientific work.
In drafting a memorandum for the signature of General Putt, 
Major Teddy Walkowicz seized upon von Karman's phraseology and noted 
that "every conclusion" in the report that recommended the establish­
ment of the new civilian R&D organization was "based on an assumption 
that nothing has been done or can be done to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of research done by the military Departments." 
Walkowicz then penned these paragraphs for Putt's memorandum:
I believe that there are grave implications in any movement 
which will gradually place military research under civilian 
control. Certainly the margin of USAF technical superiority 
might be seriously compromised, probably with fatal results in 
the event of another conflict.
I feel that the growing tendency to weaken and probably 
eventually deprive the USAF of its research function must be 
vigorously countered. This can be done by continual strength­
ening of our research and development activities, and especially 
their administration.^®®
On two different occasions later in 1940, General Putt ex­
pressed views similar to those that appeared in the Walkowicz memoran­
dum. In May Putt informed the Chief of Staff of the Air Force:
99Ibid., p. 2.
^^^Walkowicz, Memorandum, "Civilian Control of Military Re­
search," p. 1. This memorandum is an unsigned copy marked for coordi­
nation with Colonel Glantzberg and signing by General Putt. It is 
apparently directed to the Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, General 
Fairchild, for the last paragraph of the memorandum reads: "This 
matter is considered sufficiently urgent to be brought to the attention 
of the Vice Chief of Staff prior to the luncheon meeting with Dr. von 
Karman on Tuesday 1 March 1949." I could find no evidence that the 
memorandum had been signed by General Putt, but in later pronounce­
ments on civilian control of military R&D General Putt used language 
which we have already seen in von Karman's letter to Compton and in 
the Walkowicz memorandum of 28 February 1949.
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There is increasing pressure for civilian control of military 
research. The USAF must vigorously counter this pressure by 
giving full support to R&D activities. Otherwise, the growing 
tendency to weaken and probably eventually deprive the USAF 
of its R&D function may well prove disastrous. The Air Force 
would be unable to keep its striking power up-to-date if forced 
to beg an outside organization for new aircraft, missile, 
armament, and electronic developments.101
Six months later, while addressing the students of the Air War College, 
Putt indicated his opposition and that of the Air Force to the proposal 
for the establishment of the new civilian R&D agency within the Depart­
ment of Defense. One reason for this opposition "lies in the tacit 
assumption which is evident throughout the report that nothing has
been done or can be done to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
102of research done by the military Services." Putt continued his
remarks with these words:
Over the past several years, this pressure for civilian control 
of military research has materially increased. To date, little 
or no action has been taken within the Air Force which, in the 
minds of those scientists proposing civilian control, would 
indicate the competency of the military to engage in military 
research and development activities.
I feel that the growing tendency to weaken and probably 
eventually deprive the USAF of its research and development 
function must be vigorously countered.103
The message behind these two images, a threat to the future of 
the Air Force both from her sister services and the spreading in­
fluence of civilians, was clear. The Air Force must improve its R&D
^^^Putt, Memorandum, "Need for Emphasis on R&D," 24 May 49, 
p. 2. Compare this wording with that contained in the quotations just 
above from the Walkowicz memorandum.
102Putt, "USAF R&D," p. 12. Compare the quotation given here 
with those given just above from von Karman's letter to Compton and 
the Walkowicz memorandum.
^^^Ibid., p. 15. Again, compare this wording with that contain­
ed in the quotations from the Walkowicz memorandum given above.
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program or face a bleak future in which its role in the defense of 
the nation would be steadily eroded.
Although Air Force leaders feared the effects of a controlling 
civilian influence, they did not desire to eliminate civilian partici­
pation in their R&D program. Indeed, a genuine concern seems to have 
existed that civilian scientists might cease to be associated with 
the research and development program of the Air Force.
In the Air University Study it was noted that the Air Force 
was not "establishing that partnership with science necessary to the 
exploitation of scientific frontiers," but instead was "alienating or 
ignoring vital segments of our national technical r e s o u r c e s . A  
similar statement appears in a 2 December 1949 staff study on the im­
plementation of the Ridenour Report and the Air University Study. 
According to this document the Air Force had gone far toward alienat­
ing science. And if "no visible and positive action" were taken to 
follow up on the Ridenour Report, "we will undoubtedly complete the 
alienation of science from the United States Air Force.
Although fairly popular, this image of an Air Force needing 
to improve its R&D program to protect its position within the Depart­
ment of Defense was not the most commonly used image. The image that 
seems to have been used most often in the effort to bring about change 
in the Air Force R&D program was one that pitted the Air Force of
104Air University Study, p. 1.
^^^U.S., Department of the Air Force, "Implementation of the 
Ridenour and Air University Reports on Research and Development,"
Staff Study, Headquarters USAF, 2 December 1949, p. 2 (hereafter cited 
as USAF, "Implementation of Ridenour and Air University Reports," Staff 
Study, 2 Dec 49).
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today against the Air Force of tomorrow. In an environment where re­
sources are limited, according to this image, the needs of the present 
compete with the anticipated needs of the future for the resources 
that are available; research and development is the future’s represen­
tative in the present.
Many statements of this competition appear in 1949 documents;
some are more specific and explicit than others. One of the first
appears in the Army Information Digest in July 1949 and suggests the 
source of the popularity of this image with those who were seeking to 
gain support for their efforts to change the Air Force management of 
R&D. The words are those of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg:
There are many balances which we must achieve within the
Air Force itself. We must balance our investment against the
possibilities of war today and the possibilities of war five 
or ten years from today. We must not fatally weaken ourselves 
today in order to be strong tomorrow. On the other hand, we 
must not mortgage our future by neglecting research and devel­
opment in order to gain the temporary advantage of a great 
number of today's weapons.
General Doolittle used this image more than once. During the 
12 July 1949 meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board, he announced 
that he favored sacrificing the quality of the current inventory of 
Air Force aircraft so that nuclear powered aircraft development could 
be a d v a n c e d . A  few months later, at the November SAB meeting, 
Doolittle said that a technological advantage was all that would keep
^^^Hoyt S. Vandenberg, "Building a Balanced Air Force," Army 
Information Digest, IV, No. 7 (July 1949), 4. This passage is quoted 
on p. II-l of the Ridenour Report.
^^^SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 31.
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the United States out of war.^®^ He then continued in these words:
It is far better to keep out of war than to win a war. . . . 
[To] permit a potential enemy to get ahead of us technologi­
cally . . .  is the surest way to start a war. I feel that the 
time has come to make some sacrifice from today's continuing 
emergencies in order to prepare for tomorrow's eventualities—  
to jar loose some funds, some competent personnel from the 
daily requirements in order to prepare for tomorrow's require­
ments.^®^
The Air University Study appeared about two weeks after the 
3 November meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board. In this report 
we find another example of the image of the competition between the 
Air Force of today and the Air Force of tomorrow. It occurred in the 
Committee's conclusion that the Air Force had placed such a great em­
phasis on "day-to-day operational and materiel problems" that the 
long-term development of the Air Force had been adversely affected.
A little later in the Study this explicit statement of the competition 
appears :
We are confronted constantly with two requirements:
A. To maintain a force-in-being capable of immediate and 
powerful action, and
B. To provide for a future force and capability fully 
abreast of scientific and technological potential.
These two requirements are necessarily competing, and only 
the most judicious balance of effort will adequately provide 
for both contemporary and future security.
108Sturm, USAF SAB, pp. 33-34.
109Minutes of Scientific Advisory Board Meeting, 3 November 
1949, quoted in Sturm, USAF SAB, p. 34.
110Air University Study, p. 3.
^^^Ibid., TAB A, p. 1. For other examples of the use of this 
image, see: Putt, "USAF R&D," pp. 41-42; Ridenour Report, pp. IV-3, 
VII-3 - VII-4.
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In conjunction with their pronouncements of the conflict be­
tween the Air Force of today and that of tomorrow, the advocates of 
R&D reform frequently related research and development to the creation 
of an effective Air Force for tomorrow. One instance of this appears
in the Ridenour Report where the reader is informed that the invest-
112ment of funds in R&D brings great dividends in the future. R&D
was also related to the future development of the Air Force by the
Air University Committee. The stated purpose of the study was to
"review the entire Research and Development structure of the Air
Force to determine whether or not it is adequate to provide for the
113long term development and superiority of American air power."
General Donald Putt specifically stated that the Air Force of tomorrow 
is today's job for R&D.^^^
R&D's impact on the Air Force was in the future, yet current 
crises seemed to demand more money, more people, and more attention. 
Consequently, research and development was one of those areas that was 
constantly tapped for the additional resources needed to meet present 
demands. Concise statements of this practice appear in two letters, 
written nine months apart, from Dr. von Karman to General Vandenberg.
In January 1949 von Karman told the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force that the Scientific Advisory Board was "gravely concerned" about 
the excessive exposure of R&D projects to the "impact of current pro­
curement needs." Research and development efforts "which probably will
112Ridenour Report, p. IV-1.
113Air University Study, p. 1.
114Supra, p. 113.
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have high priority in years to come seem to be the first ones which 
are pushed overboard because of current budgetary problems and pro­
curement o b j e c t i v e s A n d  in his 21 September 1949 letter which 
transmitted the Ridenour Report to General Vandenberg, von Karman 
summarized the situation of R&D with respect to current Air Force 
needs.
Research and development activities cannot be brought to full 
effectiveness without making corresponding sacrifices else­
where in the Air Force. A decision to correct some of the 
deficiencies in the present research and development situation 
will be valueless unless it is implemented in terms of compe­
tent men, money, and effort; and such men, money, and effort 
must come from a fixed, possibly even a declining, total Air 
Force allocation. It is my feeling, and that of the Commit­
tee, that the effectiveness of research and development is so 
uniquely important to the continued supremacy of the Air Force 
and the continued security of the nation that the necessary 
sacrifices must be made. Steps should be taken to insure that 
the process of successive cuts and economy measures within the 
Air Force do not form a growing avalanche which hits research 
and development with its maximum impulse, destroying essential 
agencies and projects of this vital part of the Air Force 
Organization.
The major problem for research and development in the Air 
Force was that too many regarded R&D as a resource reservoir to be 
drained each time an emergency arose that called for more resources 
than were available in the operating and support forces. A reasonable 
way to overcome this problem was to raise the priority of R&D and 
isolate it from the tremors that crises produced throughout the Air 
Force.
Colonel Fickel told the 12 July 1949 meeting of the Scientific 
Advisory Board that the Air Force's "first emphasis in peacetime must
^^^Von Karman to Vandenberg, 15 Jan 49, p. 2.
^^^Von Karman to Vandenberg, 21 Sept 49, pp. Letter 5 -Letter 6.
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be the maintenance of the best Air Force development process which the 
nation can s u p p o r t . S i n c e  every quantitative reduction or insta­
bility in an R&D program produces a deterioration in the quality of
the research product, variations in the support of the Air Force must
118be absorbed by "changes in the quantity of our Air Force in-being."
That it was time to increase the priority of reserach and
development was the major theme of the Ridenour Report. According to
Doolittle, who was a member of the Committee that wrote the report:
The fundamental thought behind the Ridenour Report was that a 
time had come for a change in emphasis. Of necessity, in the 
past, our principal emphasis in all of our Air Force thinking 
and activities was on the present because of the tremendous 
problems with which you were faced; but the time has now come 
to give more emphasis to the f u t u r e .
Doolittle believed it was necessary to overemphasize the future if you
are to get anything done, in view of the pressure of today's problems.
"If you have a toothache today, you want to correct it right now.
You don't think about taking remedial steps to see that you don't get
120smallpox ten years from now." Doolittle's idea of how to take care
of the future was to separate responsibility for the future from
responsibility for the present. "I am inclined to go along with the
idea of separating the future from the present and putting it in one
121single staff function." And Doolittle was not the only one who 
thought this way.
117SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 20.
H^ibid., pp. 20-21.
119Transcript of 3 Jan 50 Air Staff Proceedings, p 34.
120Ibid., p. 35. See also Air University Study, TAB A, pp. 3, 6.
121Transcript of 3 Jan 50 Air Staff Proceedings, p. 39.
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The Air University Study noted that there was no one "general 
staff agency in the USAF today responsible to the Chief of Staff for 
thinking about the future." This made it impossible to fix responsi­
bility for this function when the task of looking out for the future 
of the Air Force was not performed. Provided one accepted the ideal 
that there were two major tasks associated with the accomplishment of 
the Air Force mission— "the one to operate an Air Force in-being, and 
the other to provide an effective Air Force for the future"— then one 
could not believe that it was correct to "bury the responsibility for
the Air Force of the future under the logististic responsibility for
122the Air Force of the present."
The 2 December staff study on the implementation of the Riden­
our Report and the Air University Study expressed a similar view of 
the situation of R&D in the Air Force prior to 1950. "In effect, the 
Chief of Staff has four Deputies responsible to him for the Air Force
of today. He has no Deputy responsible to him for the Air Force of 
123the Future." After noting that there was "an urgent need for a 
functional, organizational structure to direct, administer, and oper­
ate research and development activities within the Air Force and 
correlate" AF R&D with outside agencies, the staff study concluded that 
a Deputy Chief of Staff for Development and an Air Force Research and
172Air University Study, TAB A, p. 2.
TOOUSAF, "Staff Study— Implementation of Ridenour and Air 
University Studies," 2 Dec 49, p. 2. For another statement on this 
situation in virtually identical words see: Peter Schenk, Interview,
16 October 1952, in ARDC Office of Command Historian, History of ARDC: 
23 Jan 50-30 Jun 51, II, p. 2 (pagination refers to the interview).
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Development Command should be established.
Frequently, when the future Air Force was discussed, the need 
to assure the proper interaction between R&D, strategy, and tactics 
was also mentioned. The role that the new R&D structure of the Air 
Force would play in bringing about this interaction was given as 
another reason the Air Force should make the changes advocated in the 
Ridenour Report and the Air University Study.
A belief in the importance of this interaction was expressed
frequently in 1949 and 1950. One example of this appears in General
Putt's November 1949 Air War College lecture. In addition to making
the point that the future Air Force is the responsibility of research
and development. General Putt told the Air War College that the
"evolution of a sound R&D program requires interaction between strategy 
125and technology." General Gordon P. Seville, who shortly was to be­
come the first Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, remarked during 
the 3 January 1950 Air Staff proceedings that the determination of 
future Air Force requirements should come from an interaction of tech­
nical and tactical experts.
Another example of this view of the importance of the inter­
action between R&D, strategy, and tactics appears in a June 1950 
article in Air Force. Speaking of the applied scientist, the article 
states :
^^^USAF, "Staff Study— Implementation of Ridenour and Air Uni­
versity Studies," 2 Dec 49, p. 1. For a similar expression of this 
image see: "Applied Research," Air Force, Jun 50, p. 23.
1 Putt, "USAF R&D," p. 20.
1 Transcript of 3 Jan 50 Air Staff Proceedings, pp. 39,43.
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In a broad sense he is part military philosopher and strategist 
as well as scientist. For given a general outline of the Air 
Force’s task, he must not only strive to develop a better turbo­
prop engine, but keep constantly alert to the possibilities of 
doing away with the turbo-prop by the invention of something 
better— something that will give greater facility to the accom­
plishment of the Air Force’s grand o b j e c t i v e . 127
How to achieve the desired interaction was seen by some as
being a major problem for the Air Force. Thus we see General Schlatter
stating that one of the two major questions confronting the Air Force
was "how can the Air Force achieve an effective interaction between
technical developments and the science and art of applied military air 
128power?" This view was echoed by the Air University Committee in
their report: "Interaction between strategy and science is a primary
requirement for an effective Air Force of the future. This interaction
129is not now being achieved."
The Air Force had tried in various ways to achieve a connection
between strategy, tactics, and R&D. In 1949 General Putt told the
House Appropriations Committee:
It is intended that selected leaders in research and technology 
be kept familiar with the Air Force strategic plans and policies 
in order to maintain close relationship between our strategic 
planners and those engaged in the research and development pro­
gram. The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board composed of some 
20 of the Nation’s outstanding scientists, headed by Dr. Theodore 
von Karman, is an important element in this relationship.
Research and development plans and programs are closely inte­
grated on the staff level with those of strategic and tactical
planning organizations.130 
1 27"Applied Research," Air Force, Jun 50, pp. 21-22.
128SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, pp. 1-2.
129Air University Study, TAB A, p. 3.
^^^House Appropriations Committee, Hearings on Military Appro­
priations for 1950, Part 2, p. 503.
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For Colonel Fickel, the RAND Corporation helped the Air Force
integrate strategy, tactics, and R&D. During the 12 July 1949 meeting
of the Scientific Advisory Board, Fickel spoke to the members about
"our desired inter-dependency between strategic planning and technical
research and development" and remarked that the "evaluation services
provided by RAND" was the "necessary catalyst which will give us a
proper reaction so that we can truly carry out our function of devel-
131oping the Air Force in the light of our technical age."
In spite of such ways in which the interaction was supposed to
be brought about, the Air Force was apparently failing to accomplish
its goal in this matter. At least one person. General Putt, stated
bluntly that the Air Force did not understand what the proper relation-
132ship between strategy, tactics, and R&D was. He further stated
that the Air Force had "not yet established that partnership between
the strategist and the scientist which is mandatory to insure that
superior strategy and technology which is essential to future success
133against our potential enemies."
The cause of this problem as Colonel Arthur Fickel saw it was 
organizational. Fickel decried the lack of a formal organization for 
development in the Air Force and said this deficiency "is precisely the 
reason why we find the so-called strategic or operational planner miles 
apart from our research program p l a n n e r . H e  continued as follows:
131SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 21.
1 Putt, USAF R&D," p. 22.
l̂ îbid.
134SAB Transcript, 12 Jul 49, p. 23.
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We have a theory that out of strategic plans comes guidance 
direct to the Research and Development organization. It cer­
tainly does not, and it never will. There is an extensive 
translation to be made, and in peacetime you will find that the 
translation is more often in the other direction— from the re­
searcher to the planner. I wish to lay great emphasis on that 
point because everything that we have ever done has indicated 
that the planner must turn to the researcher to find out what 
he thinks he ought to think
A solution may be the provision of a Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Air Force Development; having cognizance for the Chief of 
Staff over the Air university, over the Proving Ground Com­
mand, and over a Research and Development Command that is not 
part of the Air Materiel Command.
Such an establishment would assure "a continuous top side correlation 
between professional military planning and professional technical 
p l a n n i n g . F i c k e l  emphasized that the development staff must not 
simply be composed of ex-warriors, but must be manned by people with 
experience in developmental work. Neither should they be strictly 
ex-laboratory workers, but people who have worked with military tech­
nical problems.
The Ridenour Committee also considered reorganization a solu­
tion to the interaction problem. According to the Committee's report, 
a Deputy Chief of Staff for R&D would serve to end the confusion 
caused by "scattered responsibility" for research and development.
This Deputy would also be one way in which the Air Force might assure 
itself of "sufficient impact of research and development on long-term 





staff support for Air Force research and development activities.
Summarizing the thinking of those who considered it essential 
for the future well-being of the Air Force to have an R&D organization 
that was co-equal with the other components of the Air Force, the 
Ridenour Report declared:
Long-term, over-all planning for the Air Force as a whole 
can be carried on effectively only by the combined efforts of 
the major staff elements concerned on a co-equal basis. Such 
planning by top-level staff elements must of necessity be based 
upon the employment of newly conceived equipment, since the 
development of just one new weapon can completely alter a given 
concept of waging war. The representation of research and de­
velopment at top staff levels is essential to the accomplish­
ment of the Air Force mission in National Defense. It will 
insure on the one hand the best technical opinion on development 
possibilities and prospects in the determination of war plans 
and operating policies, and will facilitate on the other hand 
the effective programming and planning of research and develop­
ment activities and facilities to meet the requirements of the 
Air Force of the future. Only by this reciprocal interaction 
of research and development on plans and of plans on research 
and development can the Air Force attain the progress in 
weapons and strategy essential to the national security.139
Virtually the same view is found in the Air University Study. 
TAB A of this report listed eight reasons the Air Force should make 
the organizational changes the Study was recommending. Number eight 
stated that interaction between strategy and science is a primary re­
quirement for an effective future Air Force, and this was not cur­
rently being achieved. A means of accomplishing this interaction 
other than through voluntary means must be realized: a Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Development at Headquarters USAF would be one way of
138Ridenour Report, p. Conclusion-1.
139Ibid., pp. V-3 - V-4, It will be recalled that tradition­
alists opposed a co-equal status for an R&D staff office.
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doing t h i s . 140
The drafters of the Air University Study seemed to recognize 
that their advice would arouse the opposition of traditionalists, and 
they took pains to see that traditionalist arguments would not be 
allowed to prevent implementation of their recommendations. In anti­
cipation that the traditionalists would use the failure of the former 
Deputy Chief of Air Staff for R&D as an argument against their own 
suggestion of the establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Development, the Air University Committee presented their oifn version 
of the reason for the failure of the former DCAS/R&D.
The Committee recognized that the previous experience with 
General LeMay's air staff office for R&D might be "used as the basis 
for argument contrary to the recommendations contained in this re­
port." After exploring the "relationships and functioning" of the 
previous office, the members of the Committee concluded that there 
was no similarity between the office they now proposed to establish 
and the LeMay office. LeMay's office had not been a part of a "homo­
geneous staff structure at Deputy Level. It was a special office or 
a carbuncle.Additional problems with LeMay's former office in­
cluded a shortage of personnel and the failure of the AAF to concen-
142trate R&D functions in the office.
^^^Air University Study, TAB A, pp. 2-3.
^^^Ibid., TAB A, p. 5.
^^^Ibid. Another problem for LeMay's office may have been 
that there was no organization at the command level to do its bidding. 
Some directives from LeMay's office would probably have had to be 
carried out by the Air Materiel Command which was organizationally 
under the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Materiel. It might also be
164
On can hardly read the objections given in the briefing to 
General Schlatter prior to the 3 January 1950 Air Staff meeting with­
out concluding that this defense of the new DCS/D was perceptive and 
politically shrewd. In presenting AMC's opposition to the establish­
ment of an Air Staff position for R&D, the briefer had this to say:
There is admission that there should be some unity [in] top- 
level judgment on questions of technological change in the 
Air Force. However, previous attempts are pointed out as 
being failures (such as General LeMay's position in 1945-46; 
and the Aircraft and Weapons Board of 1946-47).
Exactly how the "reciprocal interaction of research and de­
velopment on plans and of plans on research and development" (as the 
Ridenour Report had expressed it) was to be achieved was a matter of
some concern to top Air Force leaders. The problem was discussed ex-
144tensively during the 3 January 1950 meeting of the Air Staff. The 
crux of the question was the military requirement which, according to 
General Gordon P. Saville, was itself the answer at any given time to 
two questions: "What have you got? and what do you want?”^^^ A re­
quirement can be established only by an agreement between "what you 
might call the consumer people and the producer people, one of whom
tends to represent what you want and the other tends to represent what
. ,,146you can have.
noted that Dr. von Karman considered General LeMay too conservative in 
R&D matters (The Wind and Beyond, p. 302).
^^^Text of Briefing for General Schlatter, p. 3.




Saville did not think that the current way in which the Air 
Force established its requirements was effective. Requirements could 
not be "generated by a group of technical specialists coming in and 
saying that this is what we do, do you want it?" Neither could the 
Air Force establish its needs by means of having "a group of tactical 
people who go to the technicians . . . saying, 'This is what we want; 
you guys produce it.'" Saville thought this matter "a continuing 
business, just like all of my Indians spend all of their time talking 
to all of Putt's Indians t o d a y . S o  the correct approach to assure 
the proper integration of R&D, strategy, and tactics was to combine 
the Directorate of Requirements that was under the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Operations with the Directorate of Research and Development 
that was under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel.
And this was the way in which the Air Force formed the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Development (DCS/D). The two major subdivisions
of the DCS/D were the Directorate of Operations Requirements, which
used to be in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
and the Directorate of Research and Development, which had formerly
. 149been a part of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel.
^^^Ibid., p. 40. At the time of this meeting Saville was the 
Director of Requirements in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Operations, and Putt was the Director of Research and Development in 
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel (Schenk, Interview, 
p. 2).
^^^Transcript of 3 Jan 50 Air Staff Proceedings, p. 43.
149"Key to the Future," p. 17, and U.S., Department of the Air 
Force, General Orders Number 9, Washington, D.C., 23 January 1950, 
p. 1 (hereafter cited as General Orders Number 9, 23 Jan 50). See 
also: Sturm, USAF SAB, p. 35.
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The concept of operation for this new office of Deputy Chief
of Staff for Development was described as follows in Air Force:
In close liaison with the War Plans people, the Director of 
Operational Requirements will make a constant study of require­
ments in Air Offense, Air Defense, Tactical Air, and Air Trans­
port.
At the same time, the Director of R&D will study means of 
improving Equipment, Electronics, Armament, and Aircraft and 
Guided Missiles. By putting both offices under the same 
roof to live together day by day it is hoped that henceforth 
neither one will get ahead of, nor fall behind, the other or­
ganization . 150
Thus, it would seem that although the broad concept of having a deputy 
chief of staff responsible for research and development took form in 
the thinking and writing of members of the Scientific Advisory Board, 
concrete details of how the office would be organized and function 
came from within the military ranks of the Air Force, specifically 
from General Gordon P. Saville.
The similarity between the actual organization of the new 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Development and Seville's thoughts as ex­
pressed in the 3 January 1950 Air Staff meeting indicates that he was 
the articulate military spokesman and perhaps the military thinker 
behind its organization. It is not surprising that Saville was 
selected to be the first DCS/D.
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Schenk has provided an interesting 
account of the role of leadership in bringing about the Air Force
^^^"Key to the Future,” p. 17.
^^^Ibid., and U.S., Department of the Air Force, Special 
Orders Number 16, Washington, D.C., 24 January 1950. Paragraph two of 
these orders confirmed verbal orders of the Secretary of the Air Force 
relieving General Saville from his duties as Director of Requirements, 
DCS/0, and assigning him to the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Research and Development (Development).
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reorganization that included the establishment of the Deputy Chief of
152Staff, Development. Schenk appears to have been one of those
figures who, like Walkowicz, exerted more influence on affairs than his
rank would indicate. He has been referred to as one of Saville's
"henchmen" and as a member of a "kitchen cabinet" in the Air Force R&D
hierarchy. He served as a member of the Radar Panel of the Research
and Development Board and as executive officer to the Chief Scientist 
153of the Air Force.
According to Schenk, change in the Air Force R&D structure was 
sought by four different types of people: the dissatisfied field
operator who thought a better means of establishing requirements would 
mean better equipment; "the dissatisfied technical officer who sought 
to improve the internal management of R&D in the Air Force"; the 
scientist who saw the weaknesses of the Air Force R&D program from the 
outside (Dr. Ridenour for example); and General Muir S. Fairchild 
(USAF Vice Chief of Staff) who saw the problem from above, understood 
the problem, and "had the courage and authority to put across unpopular 
but vitally needed reforms.
152Schenk, Interview.
153Getting, "Recollections of USAF," pp. 1-2. Getting also re­
ferred to Walkowicz as a member of this "kitchen cabinet." Schenk also 
became President of the Air Force Association (Ralph H. Hardin, "How 
Real Is Our Shortage of Scientific Manpower?" Air Force: The Magazine 
of American Airpower, XLI, No. 9 [September 1958], 52).
154Schenk, Interview, pp. 2-3. For an adverse, if not bitterly 
cynical, view of Fairchild's actions in bringing about change in the 
AF R&D structure, see: Ethel M. De Haven, History of Separation of
Research and Development from the Air Materiel Command (Wright-Patter- 
son Air Force Base, Ohio: Historical Division, Office of Information 
Services, Air Materiel Command, December 1954), pp. 74-91 (hereafter 
cited as De Haven, Separation of R&D from AMC). De Haven claimed that
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Putt was the "dissatisfied technical office," and Saville was 
the unhappy field operator. Schenk claimed that Saville desired 
closer working relations between the R&D Directorate in the Office of 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, and the Directorate of Requirements 
in the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. Saville established 
close relations with General Putt, the Director of Research and Develop­
ment.
Ifhen Putt disclosed his campaign of reorganizing the management 
of R&D within the Air Force, Saville enthusiastically concur­
red, because Putt's aims coincided with Seville's, although they 
were independently arrived at from rather different points of 
view. Both saw that joining forces would be to mutual advan­
tage.1^5
Saville was more firmly entrenched in the operational part of
the Air Force than was Putt, and Seville's personal friendship with the
Vice Chief of Staff, General Fairchild, was a valuable entree to the
highest level of authority in the Air Force.
The combination of temperament and personality— Putt, the care­
ful thinker (scientist in uniform), and Saville, the flamboyant 
and erratic— at times brilliant— operator was ideal for the 
purpose of putting across the establishment of DCS/D and ARDC
whatever plan for the separation Fairchild had died with him on 17 
March 1950 (p. 91). De Haven stated that her work was an effort to 
give the Air Materiel side of the controversy that surrounded this 
separation (p. V).
^^^Schenk, Interview, p. 2. Donald L. Putt to Donald R. 
Baucom, 2 October 1974, p. 1 (hereafter cited as Putt to Baucom), 
confirms the alliance between Putt and Saville. Putt pointed out that 
there was some disagreement over the organization of DCS/D and that 
Saville won the point. Seville's organizational desires were the ones 
that were followed in this matter. Putt noted that in the end he was 
happy that Saville's ideas had prevailed, for the organization turned 
out well.
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against the almost unanimous opposition of the Air Staff.
Saville's comradery with operational officers in the Air Force 
was not the only encrée to top-level Air Force leaders that was avail­
able to those who sought to change the Air Force approach to R&D.
Perhaps even more important in this respect were the services of James 
H. Doolittle. Here was a man whose many accomplishments allowed him to 
speak to the Air Force as General Doolittle, to the nation's scientific 
community as Dr. Doolittle, and receive a hearing from both parties.
Doolittle had taken a doctoral degree in aeronautical engineer­
ing at Massachusetts Institute of Technology prior to World War II.
He was a famous combat leader, having led the first aerial attack on 
Tokyo, for which he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. He 
also had commanded various combat units during the war, including the 
Twelfth Air Force. He eventually rose to the rank of lieutenant gener­
al. Additionally, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, when he served 
on the Ridenour Committee and worked on the implementation of that 
Committee's report, he was an executive of the Shell Oil Company. He 
was a man with outstanding credentials and reputation in Air Force
X58operations, in industry, and in the research and development community.
156Schenk, Interview, p. 2. It should be noted that Putt had 
studied at California Institute of Technology under von Karman in the 
late 1930's. A close relationship existed between these men until von 
Karman's death (Putt to Baucom, pp. 1-2, and von Karman, The Wind and 
Beyond, p. 294).
157T[eddy] F. Walkowicz, "USAF Scientific Advisory Board," Air 
Force; The Magazine of American Airpower, XXXVIII, No. 6 (June 1955),
54.
158Doolittle has been called a pioneer of air power. For in­
formation on his exploits and accomplishments, see: Carroll V.
Clines, [Jr.], Jimmy Doolittle: Daredevil Aviator and Scientist, Air
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In a 1965 interview Doolittle discussed his role in the re­
organization activity associated with the Ridenour Report. Doolittle 
remarked that Generals Spaatz and Vandenberg were inclined to ask his 
advice on technical matters because he had had some technical experi­
ence. Because of his academic training, he could communicate with the 
scientists. As Doolittle put it:
. . .  I think I was useful as a link between the military and 
the academic people. I could talk to them because I had had 
some academic training; I could talk to the military and I think 
I was useful in bridging that gap, so my greatest activity in 
connection with the Ridenour Report was to participate actively 
in its sale to the Chief of the Air Staff.^
General Doolittle also made the same point in an earlier letter to
General Earle Partridge. Of his role in getting the Air Research and
Development Command started, Doolittle wrote: "All of this was largely
the result of my personal needling of Van [General Hoyt Vandenberg]
and the recommendation of the Ridenour Board, of which I was a
. ,,160 member.
Force Academy Series, ed. by Carroll V. Glines, [Jr.] (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1972); Carroll V. Glines, Jr., The Compact History 
of the United States Air Force, revised ed. (New York: Hawthorn Books, 
Inc., 1973), pp. 100-01, 104, 131, 133, 166-69, 211, 214, 228-29, 237. 
For information on Doolittle's education see: Oral History Interview
Number 625 with James H. Doolittle, Lieutenant General, USAF (Retired), 
21 April 1969, p. 11, Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama; and Glines, Jimmy Doolittle, pp. 54-59. See also: "USAF
Almanac: United States Air Force— Facts and Figures," Annual Air Force 
Almanac Issue, Air Force Magazine, LVI, No. 5 (May 1973), 154.
159Oral History Interview Number 623 with James H. Doolittle, 
Lieutenant General, USAF (Retired), p. 27, Air Force Archives, Maxwell 
Air Force Base, Alabama.
^^^James H. Doolittle to Major General E. E. Partridge, 5 March 
1951, in Partridge Correspondence, Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama. For a similar view of Doolittle's role in changing 
the Air Force R&D program, see: De Haven, Separation of R&D from AMC,
p. 57.
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Vandenberg appears to have thought highly of Doolittle's advice 
in R&D matters. During the 3 January 1950 Air Staff meeting, he had 
asked that Doolittle and Ridenour be available to assist in getting 
the Ridenour plan implemented. To be sure that things went according 
to plan, Vandenberg said, "technical guidance of a very high quality" 
had to be available.
Perhaps this need for high quality technical guidance explains 
why Vandenberg appointed Doolittle as his special adviser to assist in 
resolving conflicts between the Air Materiel Command and the Air Re­
search and Development Command during the reorganization associated
162with the implementation of the Ridenour plan. Such matters which 
could not be settled by the two commanders were to be forwarded, along 
with the conflicting views, through General Doolittle to Vandenberg. 
Doolittle would study the situation and make a recommendation to 
Vandenberg. A similar procedure was to be followed in matters of con­
flict between the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Development and 
Materiel.
The Air Force officially established its new Air Research and
^^^Transcript of 3 Jan 50 Air Staff Proceedings, p. 38.
162Hoyt S. Vandenberg to Commanding General, Air Materiel Com­
mand, and Commanding General, Air Research and Development Command, 
Subject : "Appointment of Lieut. General Doolittle as Special Assistant
to the Chief of Staff," 28 March 1951, p. 1, in ARDC Office of Command 
Historian, History of ARDC: 23 Jan 50-30 Jun 51, II (hereafter cited as 
Vandenberg to Commanding Generals, AMC and ARDC, 28 Mar 51). Getting, 
"Recollections of USAF," p. 2, reported that Ridenour and Vandenberg 
had a "disagreement" over what Getting believed was an article Ridenour 
published in Life.
163 Vandenberg to Commanding Generals, AMC and ARDC, 28 Mar
51, p. 1.
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Development Command and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Development on 
23 January 1950.^^^ This reorganization was the culmination of five 
years of efforts by such men as von Karman, Ridenour, Putt, Saville, 
and Doolittle. It had not been a simple matter of laying out and im­
plementing in a receptive organization a management plan for R&D. The 
Air Force already had an operating R&D structure with its own policy 
and procedures. The advocates of change had to convince Air Force 
decision makers like Vandenberg and Fairchild that the then current 
way of managing research and development was inadequate and that their 
method offered a chance of significant improvement.
The articulation of images that related R&D to the strength of 
the Air Force and its ability to accomplish its mission was important 
in "selling the top." By phrasing their images in terms that related 
to operational effectiveness, the advocates of change were able to 
communicate with the non-technical officers who had to make the policy 
and organizational decisions that determined how the Air Force would 
manage R&D. The power of these images to persuade was strengthened by 
the fortuitous timing of the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb. The 
technological and military implications of the Russian bomb were in­
escapable.
Finally, credit is due those men who had a foot in each camp—  
the operational and the R&D— for playing a major role in bringing 
about change in the Air Force R&D program. Specifically, in the 
officer corps, Doolittle and Saville played key roles through their
164General Orders, No. 9, 23 Jan 50, p. 1; Fairchild, Memoran­
dum: "Organization for R&D in the USAF," 23 Jan 50, p. 1.
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operational contacts with key Air Force leaders, while in the technical 
and scientific community, von Karman and Ridenour played equally im­
portant roles.
The establishment of the new organizational structure was not a 
total victory, however, nor did the scales fall in a trice from the 
previously blind eyes of the conservative traditionalists. While the 
advocates of change had seen to it that the Air Force gave R&D a 
higher priority in its organizational hierarchy, there were still non­
believers. They were still in positions of power and influence, and 
there was much unfinished work to be done.
CHAPTER V
END OF THE BEGINNING: 1950 AND AFTER
This study has identified certain threads that emerge from the 
welter of events surrounding Air Force efforts to establish an effec­
tive research and development program between 1945 and 1950. These 
threads include the existence of a traditionalist strain of thought 
that would subordinate R&D to the materiel function of the Air Force, 
the role of leadership in bringing about changes in Air Force manage­
ment of research and development, and the problem of the appropriate 
conduct and supervision of basic research as it related to and nour­
ished the research and development process which produced the advanced 
weapons.
The threads include, further, the articulation of images that 
would justify changes in Air Force management of R&D and a discussion 
of policies that the Air Force should implement to assure itself of an 
effective R&D program. But since history is a continuum, if it is 
anything, these threads do not end neatly with the organizational 
changes the Air Force made in 1950.
Traditionalist thinking continued to exert influence on Air 
Force management of research and development well into the 1950*s. In 
April 1951, General Doolittle, in his capacity as special assistant to
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the Chief of Staff for technical matters, reported formally to General 
Vandenberg that progress on the implementation of the Ridenour Report 
was being slowed due to the resistance of people inside and outside 
the Air Force who "are primarily concerned with today’s problems, [and 
who] question the advisability of giving substantially increased em­
phasis to research and development at this t i m e T h a t  certain policy 
makers in the Air Materiel Command still opposed the separation of 
research and development from AMC was clear to Doolittle, for he 
attacked what he called the Air Materiel philosophy of R&D, the view 
that there was nothing wrong with research and development under AMC 
control that more people would not cure. As General Doolittle saw it, 
the separation of R&D from AMC which he favored would weaken the self- 
sufficiency of AMC; he realized this explained the resistance to
^J[ames] H. Doolittle, Memorandum for General Hoyt S. Vanden­
berg, Subject: "Report on the Status of Air Force Research and Devel­
opment," [20 April 1951], p. 1 (hereafter cited as Doolittle to Van­
denberg, Memorandum, [20 Apr 51]). This document may be found in the 
Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. I have seen a 
second version of this memorandum which appears in U.S., Department of 
the Air Force, History of Separation of Research and Development from 
the Air Materiel Command, Vol. IV, Air Force Archives, Maxivell Air 
Force Base, Alabama (hereafter cited as History of Separation of R&D 
from AMC, IV). The version of Doolittle's memorandum that is found in 
volume IV is hereafter cited as Doolittle to Vandenberg, Memorandum,
20 Apr 51. The pagination of these two documents is different, and 
they do not contain exactly the same information. But there are ex­
tensive identical passages that appear in both documents. Although it 
is undated, the first version cited in this footnote is probably the 
final version, while the second version cited is perhaps an early 
draft. The first version cited is more diplomatic than the second, 
for the second version contains comments that might be considered 
disparaging to the Air Materiel Command. Presumably, it was con­
sidered unwise for an official who was mediating between ARDC and AMC 
to appear to exhibit animosity toward one of the parties involved in 
the mediation.
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change being exhibited by the Air Materiel Command.^
Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the continued existence 
of traditionalist thinking about Air Force R&D is a 6 October 1953 
letter from General Thomas D. White, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, to the ARDC Commander. In this letter General White stated:
In order to secure improved balance and economy within the 
materiel area, including Research and Development, it has become 
apparent that realignment of Research and Development functions 
and organization within the Air Force is essential. After 
careful study and consideration of the problem of better inte­
gration of the efforts of the Air Force to secure weapons and 
supporting equipment and services of the highest possible 
quality at the least cost in money and time, it has been de­
cided to assign responsibility for administration of Research 
and Development matters in Headquarters USAF to the DCS/M, in 
addition to the materiel functions for which he now has respon­
sibility. The DCS/D will continue to have responsibility for 
research and initial phases of development in the Air Force.
He will report to and be responsible to the DCS/M for those 
functions.3
Under this policy, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel 
essentially became the R&D czar for the Air Force, for in addition to 
authority over the DCS/D he was given authority to do the following:
2Doolittle to Vandenberg, Memorandum, 20 Apr 31, pp. 3-4. For 
other statements about AMC resistance tc the establishment of ARDC, 
see: Leighton I. Davis, Lieutenant General, USAF (Retired), Burbank,
Cal., 26 April 1973, Interview Number 668 in the United States Air 
Force Oral History Program, Interview Conducted by Major Lyn R.
Officer and Hugh Ahmann, pp. 39-40 (hereafter cited as Davis, Inter­
view 668); Bernard A. Schriever, General, USAF (Retired), Washington, 
D.C., 20 June 1973, Interview Number 676 in the United States Air 
Force Oral history Program, Interview Conducted by Major Lyn R. Officer 
and Dr. James C. Hasdorff, pp. 22-23 (hereafter cited as Schriever, 
Interview 676); and infra, p. 179.
3General Thomas D. White, Vice Chief of Staff USAF, to Command­
er Air Research and Development Command, Subject: "Realignment of
Research and Development Functions and Organization in the USAF,"
6 October 1953, (Copy), p. 1.
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A. Resolve conflicts involving function, missions, and or­
ganization within the materiel field, including Research and 
Development.
B. Direct the movement, assignment, or reassignment of per­
sonnel through normal command and staff channels, when and where 
he may deem such action essential to the discharge of his re­
sponsibilities .
C. Direct elimination, consolidation, or reassignment of 
functions and missions within the materiel field, including 
Research and Development, as required.
D. Review the adequacy of installations and facilities 
within ARDC and AMC, and initiate action to activate, deacti­
vate, consolidate, or eliminate where considered necessary.4
In the face of this continuing traditionalism, leadership con­
tinued to play an important role in the process of change in the Air 
Force R&D program. In this case, the role was to provide as much 
protection as possible for the infant R&D organization.
An example of this effort to protect the research and develop­
ment organization is the manner in which the second commander of the 
Air Research and Development Command was selected. The commander's 
name was Earle E. Partridge, and the man who played the most important 
role in his selection for the commander's job was James H. Doolittle.
Partridge and Doolittle were good friends who had served to­
gether in World War II, and they corresponded frequently.^ In 1951,
4Ibid. These policies remained in effect until August 1955 
when General White, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, restored 
the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, to its previous 
status as a separate Deputy Chief of Staff (U.S., Department of the 
Air Force, Analysis Division, Assistant for R&D Programming, DSC/ 
Research and Develoment, "Organizational Evolution of DCS/Research 
and Development: [1945-1964]," n.d., p. 5).
^Correspondence of General Earle E. Partridge, Air Force 
Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
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while Doolittle was serving as special assistant to General Vandenberg, 
Partridge was serving in the Far East as the Commander of the Fifth 
Air Force, the tactical element of the Air Force then engaged in the 
Korean War.^
In an April 1951 letter Doolittle informed General Partridge 
about his own duties as special adviser to General Vandenberg. He 
then asked Partridge when he was coming home and what job in the Air 
Force Partridge would like when he completed the tour he was serving at 
the time. Doolittle wrote, "This is all unofficial, but it might be 
possible for me to assist you in achieving your desires— provided I 
knew what they were."^
Partridge replied to Doolittle that his situation was such that 
he did not wish to return to the United States at that time. He did 
indicate to Doolittle that he disliked service in Washington and would
g
"much prefer a command in preference to a staff job."
About a week later Doolittle told Partridge that Major General 
"Slats" Schlatter who had played a key role in organizing the Air 
Research and Development Command and served as ARDC's first commander, 
had "been asked for another command job."
^E[arle] E. Partridge to J[ames] H. Doolittle, 24 May 1951, 
Correspondence of General Earle E. Partridge, Air Force Archives, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, p. 1 (hereafter cited as Partridge 
to Doolittle, 24 May 51), and R. Frank Futrell, "The Deeds: The Korean 
War," in Goldberg, History of the USAF, pp. 243-57.
^J[ames] H. Doolittle to E[arle] E. Partridge, 2 April 1951, 
Correspondence of General Earle E. Partridge, Air Force Archives, 
Maxwell Air Fbrce Base, Alabama.
g
Partridge to Doolittle, 24 May 51, p. 1.
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You, a smart cookie and the guy who has been using our equip­
ment in actual combat for the past year, are in a better position 
than anyone else, from the point of view of actual experience, 
to speak for our quality requirements and therefore to replace 
Slats. Bill Craigie^— with his excellent technical background—  
will complement you perfectly.
The going will not be smooth. A.M.C. is, naturally, op­
posed to losing part of their self-sufficiency and does not 
believe in the A.R.D.C. as set up. The aircraft industry looks, 
unfortunately and erroneously, at the new command as the first 
step in government taking over the aircraft industry, as an 
agency that will get research funds which could more effectively 
be spent by industry, and as an added and unnecessary complica­
tion in their contacts with government.
Most of the A.R.D.C. people come from the A.M.C. and many 
retain their A.M.C. affiliations and are prejudiced against 
the whole plan.^^
You are going to have a fight on your hands. The C.G.,
A.R.D.C. does not have to be a profound technologist— though, 
of course, it would be ideal if he had technical knowledge along 
with the other necessary attributes— provided he has proper tech­
nical support. He must believe in research and development as a 
means to improve A.F. equipment. He must be an organizer, 
builder, administrator, and he must be a fighter. That is 
you.
Partridge became the second commander of Air Research and Development
Command on 24 June 1951 and served in that capacity until 20 June 
121953.
Doolittle's mention of Bill Craigie in his 29 May 1951 letter
9Major General Laurence C. Craigie.
^^For an example of what this meant, see: Davis, Interview
668, p. 40. Here Davis claimed Major General "Freddie" Dent who was 
in charge of the ARDC Engineering Division at Wright Field was fired 
for "playing footsie under the table" with AMC friends. Fred R. Dent, 
Jr., to E[arle] E. Partridge, 3 December 1951, Correspondence of 
General Earle E. Partridge, Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama, 3 pp., pertains to this episode.
^^J[ames] H. Doolittle to E[arle] E. Partridge, 29 May 1951, 
Correspondence of General Earle E. Partridge, Air Force Archives, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, pp. 1-2.
12"AFSC's Leaders through the Years," Air Force Magazine, 
Annual Air Force Almanac Issue, LVII, No. 5 (May 1974), 69.
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to Partridge brings to mind another Air Force leader who played an 
important role in the Air Force R&D program. Like Partridge, Major 
General Laurence C. Craigie possessed outstanding operational creden­
tials. In October 1942 he became the first American military pilot
13to fly a jet plane. During the Korean War he served as Vice Com­
mander of the Far East Air Force and, along with Admiral C. Turner 
Joy, was a delegate to the Panmunjom armistice conference. Upon 
completion of his duties in the Far East, Craigie became the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Development near the beginning of 1952.^^
Partridge and Craigie, with their ties to the operational Air 
Force, were strong leaders at a time when strong leadership was needed 
for the fledgling Air Research and Development Command and the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Development. Although the boundaries of ARDC re­
sponsibilities on the research end of the R&D spectrum were reasonably 
well defined by the articulation of the "applied basic research image," 
the dividing line between production and development was unsettled, 
and it caused considerable contention between AMC and ARDC.
The nature of the conflict over this dividing line can be 
glimpsed in documents generated during the period following the
^^John C. Warren, "World War II, 1939-45: The War At Home," 
in Goldberg, History of the USAF, p. 93; Craigie, Interview 637, p. 26. 
Craigie's discussion of the flying of America's first jet aircraft 
extends from p. 26 to p. 30.
14U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Depart­
ment of the Air Force Appropriations for 1953, Hearings before a sub­
committee of the Committee on Appropriations. 82d Cong., 2d sess., 
1952, p. 300 (heareafter cited as House Appropriations Committee, 
Hearings on DAF Appropriations for 1953).
^^Ibid.; Sturm, USAF SAB, pp. 46, 135.
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establishment of the ARDC and the DCS/D in 1950. In April 1951
Lieutenant General Kenneth B. Wolfe, Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel,
complained to General Saville about the manner in which R&D personnel
had behaved during a 6 April 1951 meeting dealing with "accelerated
service testing" which materiel representatives thought was no concern
of R&D staff members. Although General Saville’s staff had been in-
foirmed previously that accelerated service testing was none of their
concern, R&D staff members still attended the 6 April conference. Of
this meeting General Wolfe wrote, less than a week later:
. . . R&D personnel attended this meeting and endeavored to 
confuse the issue by irrelevant discussion of functions and re­
sponsibilities of ARDC by quibbling over interpretations of 
General Twining's letter dated 2 February 1951, which clearly 
stated both AMC and ARDC responsibilities.^^
Two months later, Wolfe and Saville retired from the Air
18Force. According to an article in the Dayton Daily News, Wolfe’s
departure from the Air Force "was related to an intra-organizational
dispute growing out of the recent separation of procurement and re-
19search and development."
^^General N[athan] F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, to 
Commanding General Air Materiel Command and Commanding General Air 
Research and Development Command, Subject: "Organization for Research
and Development in the USAF," 2 February 1951 (hereafter cited as 
Twining to Commanding Generals, AMC and ARDC, 2 Feb 51).
^^Lieutenant General K[enneth] B. Wolfe, Memorandum to Major 
General Gordon P. Saville, 11 April 1951, p. 1 (Copy), in History of 
Separation of R&D from AMC, IV.
18Photostatic Copy of "Two Generals Said Retiring; Hint A.F. 
Row," Dayton Daily News, 11 Jun 1951, no page number, in History of 
Separation of R&D from AMC, IV.
19Ibid. l-Jhen ARDC became a separate command responsible for 
R&D, the weapons procurement function remained with AMC. This was a 
compromise apparently designed to placate AMC (Schriever, Interview 
676, pp. 22-23).
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While the conflict between Wolfe and Saville is indicative of 
the difficulties surrounding the separation of R&D from the materiel 
function at Headquarters USAF level, the debate over responsibility 
for support engineering illustrates the difficulty of establishing a 
boundary between the materiel and R&D functions at the operating com­
mand level. There was more than one definition of support engineering 
given during the debate, yet the one that was used by General S. W. 
Chidlaw, AMC Commander, seems to have been widely accepted. According 
to Chidlaw, support engineering "is defined as that engineering service 
rendered to the Maintenance and Procurement Divisions of AMC in connec­
tion with the correction of Unsatisfactory Report conditions of in-
20service and in-production aircraft and equipment."
After the decision was made to establish the Air Research and 
Development Command there were those who thought that the division be­
tween ARDC and AMC should be made in such a way that the research
21function would go to ARDC and development to AMC. General Chidlaw 
was one of those who wished to separate the functions of ARDC and AMC
20Lieutenant General B. W. Chidlaw, Commanding General, Air 
Materiel Command, to General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, 
USAF, Subject : "Resources for AMC Support Engineering," 23 October
1950, p. 1 (Copy)(hereafter cited as Chidlaw to Twining, 23 Oct 50), 
in History of Separation of R&D from AMC, IV. Twining used a similar 
definition for "AMC Engineering Responsibility" which he said was "all 
engineering and testing applicable to a production item and other modi­
fication of equipment in service use" (Twining to Commanding Generals, 
AMC and ARDC, 2 Feb 51, p. 1).
21Doolittle to Vandenberg, Memorandum, 20 Apr 51, p. 10, and 
Transcript of "Conference Held in Engineering Division Control Room,
12 January 1951, for Discussion of Relationship between Air Materiel 
Command and Air Research and Development Command," p. 3 (hereafter 
cited as Transcript of 12 Jan 51 Conference), in History of Separation 
of R&D from AMC, IV.
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along this line between research and development.^^ If General Vanden­
berg agreed, Chidlaw "would like to see the line of demarcation drawn
at the research end of the spectrum and that the division of assets and
23responsibilities be made at that point."
This proposal was opposed by Major General David M. Schlatter,
Commanding General of ARDC. According to Schlatter: "If we confine
it [ARDC] to scientists only, it doesn't warrant the dignity of being
a command.General Putt, the Director of Research and Development
under the Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, supported 
25Schlatter.
Putt would not even accept the counter-proposal of Chidlaw that 
his command be allowed to establish a support engineering organization 
with sufficient resources to allow AMC to perform the engineering 
duties Chidlaw thought belonged to AMC. Putt criticized such terms as 
"support engineering" and "in-service engineering" as being confusing. 
For Putt, improvement of an aircraft and design deficiency correction 
were developmental functions. Putt thought that the cut-off point for 
research and development should be . the point at which an item had been 
developed sufficiently to render production feasible. All research and 
all development up to this point belonged under the Air Research and 
Development Command.
22Transcript of 12 Jan 51 Conference, p. 3.
23Ibid., p. 7.
24Ibid., p. 3.
^^Ibid., pp. 4, 8.
26Ibid., pp. 4-6, 8.
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But in spite of the opposition of Doolittle, Putt, and others, 
AMC leaders for the moment seemed to carry the day. On 2 February 1951 
General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, di­
rected a letter to the Commanding Generals of AMC and ARDC. According 
to Twining, the division of functions and responsibilities between the 
two commands would be established as follows:
Responsibilities— The following definitions for Research, 
Development, and AMC Engineering Responsibility will be accepted 
as a base line of departure.
Research— Theoretical analysis, exploration, and experi­
mentation directed to the increase of knowledge and with it the 
power to control phenomena, but without completely defined goals.
Development— The Extension of the investigative find­
ings and theories of a scientific or technical nature into 
practical application for experimental or demonstration pur­
poses including the construction and testing of experimental 
models or devices, but excluding operation and service tests.
AMC Engineering Responsibility— All engineering and 
testing applicable to a production item and other modification 
of equipment in service use.2?
Twining's letter granted authority to AMC to fund and to man an organi-
28zation to carry out its engineering responsibilities.
However, Twining's letter was not to be the final word on the
matter of the dividing line between AI-IC and ARDC. Here, obviously, was
29a point of disagreement between ARDC and AMC; and, as we have seen,
in February 1951 James H. Doolittle was appointed special assistant to
30General Vandenberg to resolve disputes between these two commands.
27Twining to Commanding Generals, AMC and ARDC, 2 Feb 51, p. 1.
®̂Ibid.
29Supra, p. 171.
30Although the supporting document cited on p. 171 above
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In a 5 March 1951 letter to General Partridge, Doolittle wrote the
following about his assignment as Vandenberg's special assistant:
My present job is to supervise the separation of the Siamese 
twins (Supply, Maintenance and Procurement on the one side. 
Research and Development on the other, with the cut taking 
place somewhere in the Engineering area which lies between) 
and see that neither patient dies. Putting it a little simp­
ler, I am responsible for setting up a sound Research and 
Development establishment to look into the future and, at 
the same time, assure minimum interference with the solution 
of our day to day problems. This is going to require a neat 
piece of tightrope walking. Can't do it and keep everybody in 
love with Doolittle.31
Doolittle officially stated his views on the matter of the
division of responsibilities between ARDC and AMC in his memorandum of
20 April 1951 to General Vandenberg. After noting that an artificial
separation between development and engineering had been attempted,
Doolittle wrote:
Actually, research, development, and engineering cannot be 
wisely or soundly separated. Development is a function which 
runs continuously from the concept of an idea to the obsoleting 
and abandoning of the process or product that resulted from the 
idea. Frequently, as with the B-17 for example, by far the 
greater part of development takes place after an airplane is in
actual s e r v i c e . 32
concerning Doolittle's appointment is dated 28 March 1951, I have seen 
a copy of a personal message from Vandenberg to Chidlaw, dated 15 
February 1951, informing Chidlaw of Doolittle's appointment ([Hoyt S.] 
Vandenberg to [B. W.] Chidlaw, personal telegraphic message, 15 Feb­
ruary 1951, (Copy), in History of Separation of R&D from AMC, IV).
31J[ames] H. Doolittle to E[arle] E. Partridge, 5 March 1951, 
Correspondence of General Earle E. Partridge, Air Force Archives, Max­
well Air Force Base, Alabama, p. 1.
32Doolittle to Vandenberg, 20 Apr 51, p. 10. The B-17 was a 
four-engined bomber aircraft used extensively in the European theater^ 
during World War II. The aircraft was manufactured by the Boeing 
Aircraft Corporation.
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Concerning the establishment of an engineering organization by AMC,
Doolittle remarked:
With the establishment of ARDC, the creation of a new AMC Direc­
torate of Production and Service Engineering is a step in the 
wrong direction. It is wasteful of personnel and will serve 
only to prolong the existence of the present unsatisfactory 
situation.33
Doolittle had agreed with General Twining when he decided to assign
AMC responsibility for "'all engineering and testing applicable to a
production item and other modification of equipment in service use."^^
But further study had convinced Doolittle that this decision was wrong;
all engineering, including AMC's Production and Service Engineering
should be turned over to ARDC. AMC should be left with strictly main-
35tenance and procurement responsibilities. The result, according to
Doolittle, would be that "ARDC now becomes the one USAF research and
development agency, whereas AMC remains the one USAF production and
36maintenance organization."
AMC's February victory did not last long. By 28 March 1951 
the engineering question was beginning to be decided in favor of ARDC. 
On that day General Vandenberg directed that all "facilities, installa­
tions, buildings and personnel under the control of the Director of 
Research and Development, Air Materiel Command, as of 2 February 1951" 
be transferred to ARDC. He also directed ARDC to "provide on a
^̂ Ibid.
^^Ibid. Doolittle has quoted from Twining's 2 February 1951 
letter. See p. 184 above.
35Doolittle to Vandenberg, 20 Apr 51, pp. 10-11.
^^Doolittle to Vandenberg, [20 Apr 51], p. 9.
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continuing basis such engineering, laboratory, and testing services as
are required by Air Materiel Command in support of the AMC programs for
37materiel in production and in service."
A 16 July 1951 letter from General Twining shows that AMC's 
efforts to establish an engineering role and organization for itself 
had failed. Twining stated that the assignment of engineering respon­
sibility to AMC had been a temporary expedient until a thorough study 
of the situation could be completed. Having finished the study. Head­
quarters USAF issued Air Force Regulations 23-2 and 23-8, both dated 
22 May 1951, which established "the responsibilities of ARDC and AMC. 
These two documents state the ultimate goal of this Headquarters in 
connection with the establishment of ARDC." These directives were to 
be used as a guide for the implementation of the instruction in
Twining's letter of 16 July and to resolve "ARDC-AMC organizational 
38problems."
Air Force Regulation 23-8 stated that the mission of the Air
Research and Development Command was :
A. To attain and maintain qualitative superiority of mate­
riel and to conduct or supervise scientific and technical 
studies required for the accomplishment of the Air Force 
missions.
37General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, USAF, to Command­
ing General Air Materiel Command and Commanding General Air Research 
and Development Command, Subject : "Organization for Research and De­
velopment in the USAF," 28 March 1951, p. 1 (Copy), in History of 
Separation of R&D from AMC, IV.
38General N[athan] F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, to 
Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, and Commanding General, Air 
Research and Development Command, Subject: "Organization for Research
and Development in the USAF," 16 July 1951, p. 1 (hereafter cited as 
Twining to Commanding Generals, AMC and ARDC, 16 Jul 51), in History of 
Separation of R&D from AMC. IV.
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B. To seek new basic knowledge from which improved aero­
nautical equipment, materiel, weapons, and techniques can be 
developed.
C. To undertake the development and recommend the adoption 
of appropriate new and improved devices and systems for the 
conduct and support of air warfare including aircraft, missiles, 
weapons, techniques, and procedures applicable to Air Force
purposes.
And Air Force Regulation 23-2 established the mission of the Air Mate­
rial Command:
A. To provide adequate and efficient systems of procurement, 
production, maintenance, and supply for the United States Air 
Force.
B. To provide general over-all logistical support for all 
activities and agencies of the United States Air Force.
C. To train specialized units for the accomplishment of 
specified logistic functions in the oversea areas and thea­
ters.40
The "Concepts and Principles" section of both regulations are 
very similar and in some places contain identical paragraphs. Both 
regulations contain the same paragraphs describing the logistics and 
the R&D functions. Of research and development, AFR 23-8 states:
There is a continuing responsibility throughout the Air 
Force for maintaining and improving the functional quality of 
materiel during its life, from the inception of design to the 
phase-out of the resulting item from inventory. The responsi­
bility for implementing this function is assigned to the Air 
Research and Development command.41
39U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 23-8, 
"Organization— Air Commands and Air Forces; Air Research and Develop­
ment Command," Washington, D.C., 22 May 1951, p. 1 (hereafter cited as 
AFR 23-8, 22 May 51).
40U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 23-2, 
"Organization— Air Commands and Air Forces: Air Materiel Command,"
Washington, D.C., 22 May 1951, p. 1 (hereafter cited as AFR 23-2,
22 May 51).
^^AFR 23-8, 22 May 51, p. 1. See also: AFR 23-2, 22 May 51,
p. 1.
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Concerning the logistics function, AFR 23-2 states:
There is a continuing responsibility throughout the Air 
Force for the logistics function including procurement, pro­
duction, maintenance, and supply. This function includes 
checking new designs from the standpoint of producibility and 
ease of maintenance, producing materiel in accordance with 
qualitative specifications, and meeting quantitative require­
ments, routine quality control of materiel in quantity pro­
duction, and maintenance of materiel in service use. The 
responsibility for implementing this function is assigned 
to the Air Materiel Command.
Both regulations also call for "continuous and active collaboration, 
cooperation, and coordination among representatives of the interdepend­
ent development, logistic, and operational agencies" which include 
ARDC, AMC, the Air Proving Ground, and other major air commands "to 
insure the maximum effective use of Air Force materiel, equipment, 
facilities, and services.
In these two regulations, then, we see the institutionalization 
of the thoughts General Doolittle had expressed in his 20 April 1951 
memorandum to Vandenberg. Research and development was to include 
everything from the original idea, through the technical development of 
an item of equipment, to the actual production of the equipment. The 
process of maintaining and improving the quality of the equipment 
throughout its lifetime would be an R&D function also.
Within this concept of R&D there was no justification for the 
creation of a support engineering branch in the Air Materiel Command. 
Such support would be provided by ARDC. As General Twining stated in
p. 1.
p. 1.
42AFR 23-2, 22 May 51, p. 1. See also: AFR 23-8, 22 May 51,
43AFR 23-2, 22 May 51, p. 1. See also: AFR 23-8, 22 May 51,
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his 16 July 1951 letter: "ARDC must give first priority to providing
AMC with engineering services required to insure continued maximum
effectiveness of the force-in-being and maximum flow of equipment now
44in quantity production."
Twining’s letter called for a phased assumption of ARDC re­
sponsibility for the quality of Air Force equipment. There was to be 
no "abrupt change in the responsibilities of the Air Materiel Command" 
with regard to equipment that was already in the hands of Air Force 
units, in the quantity-production stage, or in the service test 
stage.General Twining's description of the results of this phased 
process seems to have come right out of Doolittle's 20 April 1951 memo­
randum. Twining's words in this case were:
Thus, as a new cycle of equipment replaces the materiel now in 
operational units, ARDC will become the one USAF research and 
development agency, whereas AMC will remain the one USAF pro­
duction and maintenance organization.46
The result of the years of discussion of what research and
development involved seems to have produced an image in which everything
from the support of basic research, if not the actual carrying out of
basic research, to the modification of a production item was included
under the rubric of research and development.
In August 1951 the Air Force published a regulation, AFR 80-13,
designed to purge conflicting terms from the language used to discuss





R&D.47 Although this directive provided definitions of basic research, 
applied research, and development, its general discussion of R&Ü noted 
that there were problems in trying to separate and classify the com­
ponents of research and development. This discussion summarized the 
point to which Air Force thinking about R&D had come by 1951 and is 
worth quoting at length.
Sharply delineated areas which correspond to the commonly 
understood meanings of the terms research, development, produc­
tion engineering, maintenance engineering, and service testing 
cannot be marked out. The development process is a continuous 
one which extends from the inception of an idea, through its 
embodiement in a product or process, to the final obsoleting 
and abandonment of the process or product resulting from the 
idea. Thus, not only activities identifiable as research but 
also activities commonly referred to as "engineering" are encom­
passed in the customary definition of development. It is more 
convenient for the present purpose to draw a distinction be­
tween those activities which have a bearing on the qualitative 
performance of Air Force materiel and those activities con­
cerned with the quantitative or logistic problems connected 
with Air Force materiel. The former class of activities will 
be here defined and hereafter identified as development, even 
though much of the work involved is commonly referred to as 
"engineering"; the latter class of technical activities, that 
is, those which affect logistic problems, will be identified 
as production engineering and maintenance engineering. The 
distinction between activities which affect quality of materiel 
and activities which affect quantity of materiel is important 
in the present connection, because it is this distinction which 
determines whether primary responsibility shall rest with re­
search and development agencies or with logistic a g e n c i e s . 48
In August 1952 the Air Research and Development Command pub­
lished a guide for contractors which adhered to the R&D doctrine
47U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 80-13, 
"Research and Development: Definitions of Research, Development, Pro­
duction Engineering, Maintenance Engineering, and Service Testing," 
Washington, D.C., 7 August 1951, p. 1 (hereafter cited as AFR 80-13,
7 Aug 51). On page two of this regulation one reads: "Terms, phrases,




pronounced in AFR 80-13. This guide depicted the ARDC mission as being
threefold: to seek new basic knowledge, to develop "new and improved
devices, processes, and techniques," and to "maintain qualitative
49superiority of materiel." In carrying out its mission, the "Air 
Research and Development Command procures Basic Research, Applied Re­
search and Development."^^
IVhat the procurement of these things meant can be seen by look­
ing at the definitions for basic research, applied research, and de­
velopment that are contained in the guide. Basic research was defined 
as :
Fundamental, theoretical, or experimental investigation to in­
crease man's knowledge and understanding of the natural world. 
Immediate application is not a direct objective of the investi­
gation.51
The ARDC guide for contractors defined applied research as:
The application of the results of basic research to accomplish 
specific objectives. It includes the systematic survey of a 
field of research in order to discern and support application 
to the design of specific devices.
49U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Research and Develop­
ment Command, "Research and Development in the United States Air Force," 
August 1952, p. 4 (hereafter cited as USAF ARDC, "R&D in the USAF,"
Aug 52).
5°ibid., p. 6 .
^^Ibid., p. 8 . U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Research
and Development Command, "Research and Development in the United States 
Air Force," September 1957, p. 7 (hereafter cited as USAF ARDC, "R&D in 
the USAF," Sept 57), provides a definition of research that is what I 
call the applied basic research image. "Fundamental investigation of 
all activities wherein the discovery of applications of interest to the 
Air Force may be expected. It includes theoretical analysis, explora­
tion and experimentation directed to the increase of knowledge and with 
it the ability to utilize that knowledge."
^^USAF ARDC, "R&D in the USAF," Aug 52, p. 10.
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And finally, according to this guide, development was
The extension of the investigative findings and theories of a 
scientific nature into practical application, including the 
construction and testing of prototype models or devices, and 
such design changes affecting qualitative performance as may 
be required during the service life of any item.̂ 3
The guide for contractors was designed to explain the function­
ing of ARDC so that those contractors interested in participating in 
the Air Force research and development program would know how to es­
tablish contact with the C o m m a n d . A s  such it represents one of 
ARDC’s efforts to fulfill its responsibilities to provide the Air Force 
with what was needed to produce superior equipment— an R&D program that 
included everything from the basic search for new knowledge to the 
modification of operating equipment.
Defining the limits of research and development was not the 
only problem the R&D enterprise posed for Air Force leaders. As was 
previously noted,the Ridenour and Air University Committees advised 
the Air Force that special management policies were needed for research 
and development. This advice offers an interesting contrast with the 
image of R&D which held that at least the basic research portion of re­
search and development was unmanageable.^^ Would even special policies 
make it possible to really manage R&D?
The debate over this question extended outside the Air Force and
^̂ Ibid.
^Sbid., p. 1 . 
^^Supra, pp. 130-31. 
^^Supra, pp. 95-97.
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goes beyond the time limits of this study. But at least some Air Force 
leaders thought they could manage research and development, and in 
December 1952 they published their rules for managing the unmanageable 
in Air Research and Development Command Manual (ARDCM) 80-4. Here they 
stated:
It is axiomatic that research and development workers must have• 
some authority and freedom, and that the various levels of 
management must manage. The Manual [80-4] proposes to reconcile 
this conflict. . . . First, it provides for the organization of 
research and development work; then it establishes the tools for 
the coordinated planning, scheduling, and approval of that work 
and the necessary resources to accomplish it. This approval 
effects the release of authority to all concerned to act freely 
and decisively within the limits of the approved plan. Respon­
sible individuals and agencies assume first the responsibility 
of completing their jobs on time and within the plan; and second, 
the responsibility of informing and assuring the higher levels 
that their first responsibility is being discharged. The higher 
levels will lend the necessary support to all aspects of the 
plan. They will moreover focus their management interests on 
deviations from the approved plan; on evaluation; and on de­
veloping new plans, policies, and p r o g r a m s . 57
But saying you are going to do something does not necessarily 
mean that you will or can do that thing. There are indications that 
research and development management may not have been as simple as the 
quotation from ARDCM 80-4 would have one believe.
Armed Forces Management is a journal "designed to interchange 
the latest techniques and developments in the management field between 
industry and the Armed Forces." As such it examined "all phases of
U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Research and Develop­
ment Command, Air Research and Development Command Manual 80-4, Head­
quarters Air Research and Development Command, Baltimore, Maryland,
1 December 1952, p. 4 (hereafter cited as ARDCM 80-4, 1 Dec 52).
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management" and analyzed "their application to the services.
In December 1956 an article by E. R. Rechel, Director of Chemi­
cal Research at the Frankford Arsenal, appeared in Armed Forces Manage­
ment. Apparently, the matter of whether or not research could be
managed was still being debated, for Rechel took as his thesis "raanage-
59ment principles do apply to scientific research." The moment of ' 
creation which was a highly personal experience formed the basis for 
the claim that research could not be managed. But Rechel claimed that 
creation constituted a minor part, time-wise, of the research process 
and that most of the process could be broken down into six common ac­
tivities that could be used by managers to check the progress of a re­
search project.
Another article in Armed Forces Management, this one an inter­
view with Clifton T. Foss, an electrical engineer and R&D executive, 
indicates that the management of research and development was still 
something new as late as April 1957. Foss stated: "Most of us were
inclined to say that research would reach a given point at some acci­
dental time just depending upon luck and success and one thing and 
a n o t h e r . B u t ,  Foss said, "we have gone to pretty rigidly scheduling 
both the time and cost of research. . . . Today we do schedule
58Advertisement of Armed Forces Management, Armed Forces Man­
agement , II, No. 12 (September 1956), 47.
59E. C. Rechel, "Why Science Needs Modern Management Principles,' 
Armed Forces Management, III, No. 3 (December 1956), 20 (hereafter cited 
as Rechel, "(fhy Science Needs Management").
*°Ibid., pp. 20-21, 23.
^^"Research— Alternate Approach," An Interview with Clifton T. 
Foss, Armed Forces Management, III, No. 7 (April 1957), 24.
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research. And, we schedule development.
In an October 1958 article Marvin E. Mundel, Vice Director of 
the Management Center of Marquette University, argued that the failure 
to recognize the similarities and differences between management of 
production and management of research was the cause of the "conflict 
between managers of the establishment (and their staffs) and the re­
search groups." In those areas where production and research were 
similar "the usual management engineering techniques could be applied
with their usual extreme usefulness and economy." And there were more
63of these manageable areas than is frequently admitted.
Although much more evidence could be educed to support the 
argument that the management of research and development and the princi­
ples of this management remained unsettled even into the Sixties, we
shall examine only one other example illustrating the fluctuating state
64of Air Force R&D management practices after 1950. It was about the 
^̂ Ibid.
Marvin E. Mundel, "Military R&D . . . How to Make It More Ef­
fective," Armed Forces Management, V, No. 1 (October 1958), 21.
^^See, for example, George Davies, "'Inventiveness' Needs Man­
aging," Armed Forces Management, VIII, No. 4 (January 1962), 39-41;
"New Controls Planned for R&D," Armed Forces Management, VIII, No. 10 
(July 1962), 29, 32, 34; W[illiam] M. Capron, The Klystron Story; A Case 
Study in Research and Development, U.S. Air Force Project RAND Research 
Memorandum (Santa Monica, Cal.: The RAND Corporation, 22 May 1956; with­
drawn from RAND's active inventory); Burton Klein and William Capron, 
Suggestions for Maintaining the Technological Superiority of the Air 
Force: Special Memorandum (Santa Monica, Cal.: The RAND Corporation,
22 February 1957), see especially pp. v, vii (here is a specific criti­
cism of ARDCM 80-4), 51, 56-57; and Stever Report, especially pp. 2-7, 
12-14.
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time that the DCS/D and ARDC were established that the "systems man­
agement" concept began to have a noticeable effect upon how Air Force 
leaders thought about research and development.
The systems management concept was explained in 1960 by Air 
Force Regulation 375-1. According to this directive, the existing 
management structure of the Air Force centered around functional group­
ings of responsibilities that were based on the type of work an organi­
zation performed. The types of work included such things as planning, 
operational activities, R&D, maintenance and supply, and personnel. 
Systems management, according to this regulation,
is the process of organizing and employing functional agencies 
to accomplish approved systems program objectives. Systems 
management affords formal recognition of the character of 
today's complicated and long lead time systems.
The systems management concept sought to accomplish the integration of 
the various agencies involved in producing a "system." The system it­
self was composed of the equipment, personnel, techniques, etc., needed 
to perform a particular task.^^ An example of a system is the
^^U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 375-1, 
"Systems Management: Weapon/Support Systems Management," Washington, 
D.C., 31 August 1960, p. 1 (hereafter cited as AFR 375-1, 31 Aug 60).
^^Ibid., pp. 1, 3. For excellent discussions of what comprises 
a system, see: D[onald] L. Putt, "The Systems Approach to Air Weapons
Development," "Preprint" of Address Prepared for Presentation at the 
Annual Meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers, Detroit, Michi­
gan, 12-16 January 1953, p. 2 (hereafter cited as Putt, "Systems 
Approach"); and T. G. Belden, "R&D Management: Systems Concept," USAF 
Research and Development Quarterly Review, 4th Quarter FY 1953, 30 June 
1953, p. 130 (hereafter cited as Belden, "Systems Concept"). Belden 
defined system as "an integration of components and techniques to 
satisfy a military operational requirement." Belden also wrote: "a
weapon system is made up of aerodynamic and propulsion systems, an arma­
ment system, and so on through all the components and techniques neces­
sary for the particular weapon system to accomplish its military re­
quirement" (p. 131).
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MINUTEMAN missile system which is composed of such things as the mis­
sile, the ground support equipment, and the trained crews.
Military men began to think about equipment in terms of systems
as early as World War II, when the differences between systems and com­
ponents were first clearly recognized.There is evidence that this 
mode of thought began to have a significant influence on Air Force 
thinking about the management of research and development as early as 
1951. In April of that year at the direction of the Vice Chief of
Staff, USAF, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Development prepared a staff
study titled "Combat Ready Aircraft: How Better Management Can Improve
68the Combat Readiness of the Air Force." The individual who seems to 
have been most responsible for the preparation of this study was Colonel 
Bernard Adolph Schriever.^^
Schriever's report noted that one of the greatest weaknesses in 
past Air Force efforts to secure combat-ready aircraft was the inability 
to recognize the operational, technical, and logistical functions and 
provide for their proper execution in the process of producing the
67Ridenour Report, p. IX-I.
^^U.S., Department of the Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Development, Headquarters USAF, "Combat Ready Aircraft: How Better Man­
agement Can Improve the Combat Readiness of the Air Force," A Special 
Report Based on an Air Force Study Completed April 1951, Washington,
D.C. (hereafter cited as USAF DCS/D, "Combat Ready Aircraft").
69J[ames] H. Doolittle to E[arle] E. Partridge, 15 November 
1951, Correspondence of General Earle E. Partridge, Air Force Archives, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, p. 1 (Copy) (hereafter cited as Doo­
little to Partridge, 15 Nov 51). For a biographical sketch of General 
Schriever, see: "Pentagon Profile: Lt. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever,"
Armed Forces Management, VII, No. 5 (February 1961), 31-32.
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combat-ready aircraft.70 There are valid technological, logistical,
and operational interests involved in each phase of the production of a
combat-ready aircraft; these interests must be protected and balanced
71constantly throughout the process of creating a weapon system. Among 
the recommendations of the Schriever study was the following:
Internal development and procurement organizations within 
the Air Force must incorporate a management level with responsi­
bility and authority to plan, budget, and control development 
and procurement activity in terms of complete weapons systems.
Such a management component must exist above the operating labor­
atory and technical division level of activity in order to exert 
adequate control. This management function must exist at all 
appropriate levels within the development and procurement 
families to prevent competition for funds, personnel, and 
facilities between sub-agencies, particularly within Develop­
ment, whose concern is with parts rather than with the 
whole. . . .
Weapons system control— as a management tool— will better 
gear the development and procurement agencies to fulfill the 
conditions required for Combat Readiness of weapons systems.
General Doolittle was impressed with Schriever's study and con­
sidered the implementation of systems management procedures important 
for achieving an effective Air Force R&D program. He wrote to General 
Partridge that he was "most concerned" about several things. One of 
these was "the rapid implementation of effective procedures for systems 
management of our R&D program, together with a program to get a suitable 
number of top-notch project engineers for ARDC." Another item of major 
concern to Doolittle was "the attainment of the objectives outlined in 
Colonel B. A. Schriever's study on Development and Procurement of Combat
^^USAF DCS/D, "Combat Ready Aircraft," p. 1.
^^Ibid., pp. 1 2 , 21-22.
^^Ibid., p. 23.
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Ready A i r c r a f t . "73 Toward the end of 1951, Doolittle directed that 
Colonel Schriever be scheduled to brief two meetings: one was a gather­
ing of personnel from ARDC and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Development, and the other was a conference of ARDC and AMC per-
1 74sonnel.
In early 1953 General Donald L. Putt explained how systems 
management worked in the Air Force. In an address prepared for the 
annual meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers Putt said that 
the key to the process was the creation of a Development Planning Ob­
jective by the Assistant for Development Planning in the office of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.^^ This document "expresses in 
rather broad terms the development objectives for a . . . weapons 
system" and may cover a ten to twenty year period. After approval by 
the Chief of Staff, a Development Planning Objective becomes "a guide 
for the formulation of . . . General Operational Requirements" by the 
Director of Requirements in USAF Headquarters. The Operational
73Doolittle to Partridge, 15 Nov 51, p. 1. For a glimpse of the 
activity surrounding adoption of systems management techniques by ARDC, 
see: Major General L[aurence] C. Craigie, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Development to Lieutenant General E[arle] E. Partridge, Commanding 
General of the Air Research and Development Command, 17 March 1952; and 
Colonel E. Godfrey, ARDC Deputy for Comptroller, Memorandum for General 
Partridge, 19 March 1952. Both documents are in the General Partridge 
Correspondence at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
^^Doolittle to Partridge, 15 Nov 51, pp. 1-2; and J[ames] H. 
Doolittle, Special Assistant to the USAF Chief of Staff, to Commanding 
General Air Research and Development Command and Commanding General Air 
Materiel Command, Subject: "Briefings on Various Aspects of ARDC-AMC
Relationships," 15 November 1951, Correspondence of General Earle E. 
Partridge, Air Force Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, p. 2.
^^Putt, "Systems Approach," p. 3.
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Requirements document divides the weapons system into subsystems such 
as navigational systems, bombing systems, etc., and is sent to the 
Directorate of R&D, DCS/D, Here the various tasks necessary to meet 
the requirements are written into development directives which are sent 
to the Air Research and Development Command. At ARDC the work necessary 
to perform the various tasks is planned and the work assigned to the 
various research, development, and test centers of ARDC.^^
Once the system is broken down into the work required to produce 
the system, and the work is assigned to all the centers for completion, 
the creation of the system becomes a management problem to see that "a 
complete weapons system will be developed and ready for combat at the 
proper time." This is accomplished in the office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Development and in the Air Research and Development Command 
by having agencies in both organizations that are responsible for the 
development of specific system types such as strategic air systems, 
tactical air systems, and other major air weapons systems.
From Doolittle's view of Schriever's "Development of Combat 
Ready Aircraft" and Putt's discussion of systems management in the Air 
Force, it appears that Schriever was one of the leading Air Force pro­
ponents of systems management. Schriever achieved extensive prestige 
and considerable fame as the "principal military architect" of America's
^^Ibid., p. 4.
^^Ibid., p. 5. For a similar discussion of systems management, 
see: Donald L. Putt, "Air Weapons Development Systems," Army Informa­
tion Digest, VIII, No. 8 (August 1953), 8-13, (hereafter cited as Putt, 
"Air Weapons Development Systems").
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ICBM forces during the late Fifties. While the power and prestige 
of Schriever were rising, so, it appears, was the influence of systems 
management. Organizational changes are not always convincing evidence 
of the importance of a particular policy, nor are isolated administra­
tive pronouncements , but taken together they sometimes become straws in 
the wind. Such was the case with the weapon system concept. In 1955 
"development and implementation of the weapon system concept" was "one 
of the most critical of ARDC functions." And in August of that year a
Deputy Command for Weapon Systems was established in ARDC headquarters.
79This office contained the Directorate of Systems Management- In 
December there appeared an article by Lieutenant General Thomas S.
Power, in Armed Forces Management. Said Power bluntly, "air research 
and development is built around what is known as the 'weapon system'
_ It 80concept.
Less than three and a half years later, in April 1959, General 
Schriever was named the Commander of the Air Research and Development
78U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Henry M. Jackson speaking on 
the retirement of General Bernard A. Schriever, 89th Cong., 2d sess.,
29 August 1966, Congressional Record, CXII, Pt. 16, 21115 (Jackson's 
comments extend onto p. 21116). See also: U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Senator John Stennis speaking on the retirement of General Bernard A. 
Schriever, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 29 August 1966, Congressional Record, 
CXII, Pt. 16, 21060 (Stennis' remarks extend to p. 21061). Stennis 
said Schriever had played a "primary and decisive role" in the develop­
ment of the ICBM.
79"Organization: Headquarters ARDC Organizational Adjustments," 
USAF Research and Development Quarterly Review, 1st Quarter FY 1956,
30 September 1955, p. 36.
80Thomas S. Power, "Managing the Air Force Research and Develop­
ment Program," Armed Forces Management. II, No. 3 (December 1955), 6 . 
Power's article contains an indication of the influence of Schriever's 
1951 report; see p. 8 .
203
Command. On 1 April 1961, following a two-year study of systems man­
agement by the Air Force, the Air Research and Development Command 
officially became the Air Force Systems Command; thenceforth, ARDC was
to be known as AFSC. General Schriever played a key role in this re- 
81organization. The result of the change was that the Air Force "con­
centrated all development and procurement of systems— space, aeronau-
82tical, electronic, and ballistic— in a single new command, AFSC,"
The mission of this new command made it responsible for the R&D, test­
ing, production, and procurement that were necessary to produce an
83operational aerospace system.
81"Air Force Systems Command," Air Force and Space Digest: The 
Magazine of Aerospace Power, Annual Air Force Almanac Issue— 1962, XLV, 
No. 9 (September 1962), 160 (hereafter cited as "AFSC," Air Force, Sept 
62); Schriever, Interview 676, pp. 23-26; and "Air Force Systems Com­
mand," Air Force and Space Digest; The Magazine of Aerospace Power, 
Annual Air Force Almanac Issue— 1961, XLIV, No. 9 (September 1961), 158 
(hereafter cited as "AFSC," Air Force, Sept 61). In the interview, 
Schriever claimed the reorganization was inspired by an offer from Under 
Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to assign responsibility for 
missile development to the Air Force if the Air Force would correct the 
problems that centered around the relationship between AMC and ARDC. 
Schriever at least implied that his personal contact with Gilpatric was 
important in bringing about the Department of Defense offer. Since 
Schriever favored the creation of an AFSC-type organization earlier, but 
was meeting with stiff opposition from other Air Force leaders, it may 
be that he "back-doored" them through his contact with Gilpatric. Sev­
eral other sources relate the changes in the Air Force organization to 
the rising importance of missiles. See: Bernard A. Schriever, "The
Operational Urgency of R&D," Air University Quarterly Review. XII, Nos.
3 & 4 (Winter and Spring, 1960-61), 233 (hereafter cited as Schriever, 
"Operational Urgency of R&D"); and Claude Witze, "Organizing for the 
Space Age," Air Force and Space Digest: The Magazine of Aerospace Power. 
XLIV, No. 4 (April 1961), 39.
82"AFSC," Air Force. Sept 61, p. 158.
88"AFSC," Air Force. Sept 62, p. 160.
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Although responsible for research required to produce aerospace 
systems, the Air Force Systems Command was no longer in charge of the 
Air Force basic research program. The applied research, or initial 
development, portion of the AFSC mission and the advanced technology 
portion of its mission were still handled by the Air Force Systems Com­
mand in its Research and Technology Division.But the "research 
elements of the ARDC" were taken over in 1961 by a new Office of Aero­
space Research (OAR), a separate agency, that reported directly to the 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. OAR was to function as a major air 
command.
This change in Air Force organization was in part inspired by 
a new view of the relationship between the various stages in the 
creation, production, and use of a weapons system. There were, accord­
ing to one account, seven stages in the process of acquiring a weapons 
system: basic research; applied research; advanced development; system
research, development, test, and engineering; system production; opera­
tional use; and obsolescence. ARDC had been responsible for the first 
four of these stages, while AMC had been responsible for the fifth one, 
and the using commands for the last two. After the 1961 reorganization, 
the Office of Aerospace Research assumed responsibility for basic re­
search, and the Air Force Systems Command became responsible for: 
applied research; advanced development; system research, development, 
test, and engineering; and system production.
^^Ibid. p. 165.
^^"Air Force Functions Shifted," Armed Forces Management, VII, 
No. 8 (May 1961), 17.
®^Ibid., p. 18.
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This was not the final refinement, of course, of Air Force
thought on so appealingly intricate and debatable a subject as the
management of research and development. Nearly a decade later, on
1 July 1970, the Office of Aerospace Research was merged back into the
Air Force Systems Command. AFSC was once again made responsible "for
the full range of Air Force research, development, test, and évalua-
87tion" that had once been intended for ARDC (AFSC's predecessor). Un­
der the Systems Command, the Office of Aerospace Research became the
88Air Force Office of Scientific Research.
Through these vicissitudes of Air Force organization and re­
organization of its research and development activity and the debate 
over suitable management principles for R&D, one feature seems to have 
remained fairly constant following 1950: the importance attached to
research and development by the Air Force. Increasingly, after the 
Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in 1949, the United States seemed to 
have come to visualize itself as engaged in a crucial technological 
race or "war" with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet nuclear explosion was followed by a sequence of 
Russian technical achievements that seemed to evoke closer American 
scrutiny of the quality of the Air Force R&D program. One such achieve­
ment was the development of a truly impressive jet fighter, the MIG-15. 
This airplane challenged American control of the air over Korea, during 
the early Fifties. Good fortune, rather than shrewd anticipation and
87"A Major Command: AFSC— A Step Ahead of History," Air Force 
and Space Digest, LV, No. 5 (May 1972), 81.
®®Ibid.
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deliberate providence, was a key element in the process that made
available an American fighter aircraft, the North American F-86 "Sabre
Jet," which could meet the challenge of the MIG.
As originally designed in May 1945 the F-86 was to be a
straight-wing fighter aircraft. Serendipitously, a team of technical
personnel sent to Germany in the spring of 1945 returned to the United
States with captured German data on the swept-wing airfoil concept.
Based largely on the high-speed performance advantage indicated by the
German data, the decision was taken to convert the F-86 from a straight-
wing configuration to the sweptback-wing configuration the Germans had
89used on "the full-swept version of the ME-262." At high speeds the
swept wing has the unique property of yielding a higher lift-to-drag
ratio than does a comparable straight wing. The employment of swept
wings was an important factor in achieving high speed in both the
90MIG-15 and the F-86.
In aerial combat during the Korean War, American F-S6 ’s des-
91troyed eleven MiG’s for every one F-86 lost. The success of the
Sabre was frequently mentioned in discussions of Air Force research and
92  ̂ ..development. Of this episode Theodore von Karman wrote :
89T[eddy] F. Walkowicz, "Birth of Sweepback," Air Force: The 
Official Journal of the Air Force Association, XXXV, No. 4 (April 1952), 
72. The ME-262 or Messerschmitt-262 was a twin-engined jet fighter 
plane used by the Germans in World War II.
onIbid., pp. 30-31.
91Putt, "Air Weapons Development Systems," p. 8 .
92Ibid.; Marmor, "Weapons," p. 210; House Appropriations Com­
mittee, Hearings on DAF Appropriations for 1953, p. 1076; and "Organiz­
ing for the Technological War: An Air Force Magazine Staff Study,"
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The operational groups were amazed at the performance of the 
Russian MIG, which was introduced into combat for the first 
time. Only one airplane, the North American F-86 Sabre Jet, 
equipped with sweptback wings based on captured German Luft­
waffe data, could outperform the MIG sufficiently to swing the 
balance in favor of the United States. That tore into military 
complacency and resulted in a more receptive atmosphere to re­
search.93
The F-86 affair was followed by the advent of thermo-nuclear
bombs. On 1 November 1952 the United States exploded the world's first
94hydrogen bomb on Eniwetok Island. Less than a year later the Russians
95exploded their first hydrogen bomb on 12 August• Shortly after the 
explosion of the Russian hydrogen bomb the Von Neumann Committee infoirm- 
ed the Air Force that it was possible to put hydrogen bombs with high 
explosive yields in small containers, thereby convincing Air Force 
leaders of the feasibility of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.
In 1957 Russia placed the first artificial earth satellite in
97orbit. Here was more evidence of the high quality of the Soviet
Air Force; The Magazine of American Airpower, XL, No. 12 (December 
1957), 45 (hereafter cited as "Organizing for Technological War," Air 
Force, Dec 57).
93  ̂ ^Von Karman, The Wind and Beyond, p. 304. Millis, Arms and 
Men, noted that the appearance of quantities of "excellent Soviet jet 
airplanes" in Korea was evidence of the "power of the Soviet military 
technology" (p. 340).
94Emme, Aeronautics and Astronautics, p. 70.
95Ibid., p. 72.
^^Von Karman, The Wind and Beyond, p. 301; Sturm, USAF SAB, 
pp. 75-76. Sturm claimed that the fall of 1953 von Neumann report was 
followed a year later by another report that concluded: '"yields as
high as 1 megaton per ton of weight were possible.'" This finding con­
firmed "'that a thermonuclear weapon could be incorporated in a ballis­
tic missile.'"
97Emme, Aeronautics and Astronautics, p. 91.
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military technology, and it led to the disturbing belief that the 
Russians could have a substantial number of ICBM’s operational by 
1960.98
In January 1958 Trevor Gardner, who had served as Special As­
sistant for Research and Development to the Secretary of the Air Force 
99(1953-1955), sought to explain historically how the United States and 
the Air Force lost "the technological leadership of the world in air- 
missile power."^80 Gardner noted that the "national guided missile 
program, and particularly that phase of it entrusted to the U.S. Air 
Force, has become the subject of continued notice and comment in the 
press and so a matter of daily interest and concern to every John and 
Jane Doe in the land."^^^
Gardner continued his comments with an appraisal of the politi­
cal ramifications of events in the guided missile field.
Awesomely fantastic devices, which seem more properly to belong 
to the pages of science fiction, are pressing topics of debate 
in the halls and committee rooms of the Congress. Indeed, it 
seems certain that the progress and management of the missile 
development program will rank as a primary issue in the forth­
coming contest between the political parties.
98James H. Douglas, Secretary of the Air Force, "The Year Since 
Sputnik," Air Force: The Magazine of American Airpower, XLI, No. 11 
(November 1958), 47.
99Dan Kimball, "Trevor Gardner: 1915-1963," Air Force and Space
Digest: The Magazine of Aerospace Power, XVLI, No. 11 (November 1963), 
101.
^8®Cardner, "How We Fell Behind in Guided Missiles," pp. 3-13. 




This situation was placed in the spotlight of national interest by the
successful orbiting of the first Earth satellite, "Sputnik," by Russia.
As Gardner expressed it,
. . . Sputniks I and II found the Air Force essentially without 
a program capable of meeting the challenge for the control of 
space, toward which the Soviet rival has chalked up the first 
success. Perhaps more immediately painful, the Air Force faced 
the da\m of the space age in the unfortunate position of appear­
ing to the public, to the other services, and to itself, as 
technologically less-than-best in the race for IRBM's, ICBM’s, 
satellites, and anti-ballistic-missile missiles.
Gardner's assertion that the missile development program would
become a major political issue proved to be prophetic. Concern over an
alleged missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union was
104a major campaign issue during the 1960 race for the Presidency.
A consequence of all these technological events and their con­
sideration by the government and the public was an unusually emphatic
103Ibid., p. 4. Concerning the impact of Sputnik at the nation­
al level, Edward A. Kolodziej, has written: "Sputnik forced the issue
of national security into the public's consciousness" (The Uncommon 
Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 [N.p.: Ohio State University Press,
1966], p. 263 [hereafter cited as Kolodziej, Uncommon Defense]).
^^^Theodore C. Sorensen, "Election of 1960" in vol. IV of 
History of American Presidential Elections: 1789-1968, ed. by Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr. (New York, Toronto, London, and Sydney: Chelsea House 
Publishers in association with McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971), pp. 3451, 
3453, 3465; and Kolodziej, Uncommon Defense, p. 334. On 9 January 1958 
General Schriever appeared before the Senate Preparedness Investigating 
Subcommittee to help them "define and evaluate the kind of performance 
and programs required to give our country undisputed leadership in the 
field of ballistic missiles and astronautics." The immediate problem, 
as Schriever saw it, was: "How can we close the gap that now exists
between our country and the Soviet Union with respect to the availa­
bility of these weapons systems?" (U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on 
Armed Services, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, Hearings 
before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services. 85th Cong., 1st and 2d sess.. Part 2, p. 1676.)
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highlighting of the already-existing image of the relationship between 
the United States and Russia— an image of two nations engaged in a pro­
foundly grave technological race as a result of the international 
tensions initiated by the "cold war" of the late Forties. Following 
the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in 1949, references to this tech­
nological race appear with increasing regularity in documents dealing 
with Air Force research and development. Toward the end of the Fifties 
such references become quite common. A cursory review of literature 
that discusses Air Force R&D between 1949, when the Air Research and 
Development Command was being gestated, and 1961, when the Air Force 
Systems Command was established, reveals over twenty references to this 
competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. A few 
examples of these references will serve to indicate something of the 
nature of this image.
A January 1958 article in Armed Forces Management suggests that 
the Russian explosion of its first atomic bomb in 1949 may have been 
the beginning of this race. The article was written by General Samuel
E. Anderson who was the Commander of Air Research and Development Com­
mand at the time he wrote the article. It is introduced by these head­
lines: "Soviet scientific competence was already known as early as
1950." In the article itself General Anderson wrote:
. . . military men realized that, although we were recording 
rapid research and development progress, so were the Soviets.
They knew that the country’s technological lead in many scien­
tific areas was dwindling; had, in fact, been dwindling steadily 
since the world's first A-bomb drop over Hiroshima.
Example?
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Only four years later, the Soviets scored their oim technologi­
cal breakthrough and detonated their oto A-bomb.1^5
From his discussion of the Russian atomic bomb, Anderson moved to a
review of other Soviet technological achievements, such as the MIG-15
fighter plane, the detonation of a hydrogen bomb a year, after our first
explosion of such a bomb, and the BISON bomber which was comparable to
our own Br52 bomber.
Some two years before the appearance of Anderson's article.
Dr. Horton Guyford Stever, Chief Scientist of the Air Force, discussed 
the Soviet challenge to American technological superiority in Air 
Force. After citing many of the same examples of Soviet technical 
achievements that Anderson would later cite, including the atomic bomb 
and the MIG fighter, Stever wrote that Russian emphasis on science was 
a "factor which favors Russia in this technical race."^^^ For Stever, 
the "grimmest" aspect of the competition for the United States was
Russia's superior training rate for scientific and engineering per-
- 108 sonnel.
Two months later, Teddy Walkowicz published an article in Air 
Force in which he stressed the importance of the hydrogen bomb in
^^^Sfamuel] E. Anderson, "Research and Development— Key to Air 
Supremacy," Armed Forces Management, IV, No. 4 (January 1958), 10-11.
106Ibid., p. 11. The B-52 is an eight-engined jet bomber manu­
factured by Boeing and still in use by the Air Force.
^^^H[orton] Guyford Stever, "Science and the Military," Air 




American-Russian relations. Walkowicz warned of the consequences if 
Russia should achieve a technological breakthrough such as the develop­
ment of an unusual delivery technique for its nuclear weapons. He 
listed the ICBM as an example of such a delivery system. Of the com­
petition between the Soviet Union and the United States he wrote:
Clearly the R&D race— and not World War III— is our last 
stand. If we keep ahead in it, if the major technical surprises 
are on our side, the Soviets may remain deterred and there may 
be time to convert the H-bomb and even the super-horror weapons 
that come after it to mankind's peaceful progress.
Shortly following the orbiting of the Soviet satellite Sputnik 
I, an article titled "Organizing for the Technological War" appeared 
in Air Force. I n  this article the editors invoked an R&D image to 
describe the world situation of their day:
The world has now entered upon the scientific age, marked by 
a technological war between the US and the USSR, in which the 
Soviets are currently gaining by an inspired pioneering spirit, 
and by our default. Since the end of World War II, Soviet 
science has forged ahead unrelentingly. During the same period, 
American science has been bogged down by a bureaucracy which 
places major emphasis on economy and red tape and little empha­
sis on results. . . .
The race for the conquest of space is today's major engage­
ment in the technological war. And we must win it, for the 
nation which dominates space will be in a position to dominate 
the world.
Furthermore, we are in a dynamic situation in which science 
is creating new threats to our security faster than it can de­
velop adequate countermeasures.. Thus, at some point, the loss 
of a significant engagement in this war may prove fatal. In 
short, either the US promptly goes ahead in the technological 
war and stays there, or human freedom will eventually succumb 
to Communist tyranny by default.m
109T[eddy] F. Walkowicz, "Waterloo USA?" Air Force: The Magazine 
of American Airpower, XXXVIII, No. 12 (December 1955), 50.




Following this introduction, the editors proceeded to discuss actions 
that needed to be taken to assure the U.S. of an effective R&D effort.
Finally, an article appearing in the Winter and Spring, 1960- 
1961, edition of the Air University Quarterly Review contains still 
another discussion of the technological competition which had become a 
national political issue. Its author was Lieutenant General Bernard A. 
Schriever. Here one reads:
It may be said that warfare has acquired a new phase—  
technological war. In the past, research and development were 
only preparation for the final and decisive testing of new sys­
tems in battle. Today the kind and quality of systems which a 
nation develops can decide the battle in advance and make the 
final conflict a mere formality— or can bypass conflict alto­
gether.
There can be little doubt that we are now engaged in a tech­
nological war. The opponents in this war represent the two most 
highly developed plans for the organization of human society—  
one by total absorption into the state, the otner by free asso­
ciation between groups and persons. The side that first achieves 
unquestioned superiority.in technical capability as well as nu­
merical strength may well prevail over the other without any 
overt test in b a t t l e . 112
In such a technological war, "the laboratory, the assembly line, and
the test range comprise the combat theater," Schriever declared.
Furthermore, R&D had "become almost an operational function, inseparable
113from the strategic performance of the systems which it produces."
112Schriever,"Operational Urgency of R&D," p. 230.
113Ibid., p. 234. For a few other examples of this image, see: 
Putt, "USAF R&D," p. 12; Donald L. Putt, "The Four Freedoms of the Air 
Force: I. Freedom from Natural Barriers," Air Force, XXXIV, No. 11
(November 1951), 22; Donald A. Quarles, "Security in the Hydrogen Age: 
Research and Development," Air Force: The Magazine of American Airpower, 
XXXVII, No. 10 (October 1954), 56; John F. Loosbrock, "We Are Beating 
Ourselves— Right in the Pentagon," Air Force: The Magazine of American 
Airpower, XXXIX, No. 3 (March 1956), 43; Trevor Gardner, "Lagging Re­
search and Development," Air Force: The Magazine of American Airpower, 
XXXIX, No. 1 (January 1956), 31; Thomas D. White, "At the Dawn of the
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Schriever’s reference to R&D as becoming "almost an operational 
function" points to the accomplishment of those who had sought to re­
vise Air Force management of research and development between the end 
of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War. These men had 
endeavored to achieve their goal of an effective Air Force R&D program 
through such measures as establishing educational and personnel pro­
grams that would provide the Air Force with an adequate number of com­
petent research and development workers. They had attempted to create 
an environment within the Air Force that would allow R&D to flourish, 
These advocates of change thought that the Air Force needed special 
policies to manage R&D, and they had attempted to formulate such poli­
cies.
Finally, they had sought to increase the priority of R&D in the 
Air Force primarily by means of a reorganization that created, on the 
one hand, a Deputy Chief of Staff for Development at the top head­
quarters level and, on the other hand, a major operational command, the 
Air Research and Development Command. The DCS/D was designed to make 
R&D equal in importance to the two major elements of the Air Force—  
operations and logistics— at the planning level. The creation of the 
Air Research and Development Command was intended to elevate R&D to the 
status of operations and logistics at the functioning level where the 
plans and directives of Headquarters USAF were executed.
As we have seen, all of the problems were by no means settled
Space Age," The Air Power Historian. V, No. 1 (January 1958), 17; and 
"Are We Using or Abusing Technology?" Air Force and Space Digest; The 
Magazine of Aerospace Power, XLIV, No. 10 (October 1961), 45-46.
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by the reorganization of 1950. The devising of special policies for 
R&D at that time opened the way to the subsequent development of the 
Air Force's systems management techniques, and these produced another 
reorganization in 1961, when ARDC became the Air Force Systems Command. 
There was also another temporary resurgence of traditionalism that 
resulted in the subordination of DCS/D to DCS/M between 1953 and 
1955.114
But in spite of this second resurgence of traditionalism, the 
most lasting legacy of the 1950 reorganization was a permanent depar­
ture from the traditional view of research and development which held 
that R&D was a subordinate function of materiel or logistics. Over the 
span of time since early Army Signal Corps days, aviation research and 
development had been admitted to the top policy-making levels of the 
Air Force as the third panel of a triptych that included traditional 
logistics and operations. As Air Force policy makers saw it, if the 
elements of this triptych were properly combined or interacted properly, 
an effective military air arm could be maintained in the nation's de­
fense arsenal.
The reorganization of 1950 signified the Air Force's recognition 
of R&D as a major element of Air Force institutional activity. The 1952 
guide for contractors published by ARDC described the situation well:
The United States Air Force is organized on a functional 
basis. In the field of materiel which includes weapons, equip­
ment and techniques, the three important functions directly 
involved are :
114It might also be noted that the special personnel program 
implemented by the Air Force for R&D personnel by January 1950 (Supra, 
pp. 137-38) had been abandoned by 1958 (Stever Report, p. 2).
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1. The Development Function
2. The Logistics Function
3. The Operational Function
The Air Force organizations involved in these three func­
tions which are so closely inter-related in providing the Air 
Force with the proper quality and quantity of materiel are:
(1) the Air Research and Development Command— responsible for 
research and development and the technical quality of materiel 
and equipment; (2) the Air Materiel Command— responsible for 
the logistics function which involves quantitative aspects of 
Air Force materiel and equipment, including procurement, supply 
and maintenance; and (3) the Air Proving Ground Command in co­
ordination with the Operational Commands which are responsible 
for Operational Suitability Testing and Combat employment of 
air weapons and related equipment.115
After 1950 the Air Force was to change its research and develop­
ment organization several times. But the importance of F.&D in the eyes 
of Air Force leaders did not essentially diminish. Rather, the Air
^^^USAF ARDC, "R&D in the USAF," Aug 52, p. 2. The September 
1957 version of this document contains a virtually identical statement 
(USAF ARDC, "R&D in the USAF," Sep 57, p. 1). See also USAF DCS/D, 
"Combat Ready Aircraft," pp. 5-7. Here three functions are described 
as essential to achieving a conbat ready aircraft: operations, tech­
nology, and logistics. According to "Combat Ready Aircraft," to assure 
itself of achieving combat ready aircraft, the Air Force should adopt 
the organizational and procedural recommendations offered. One of these 
recommendations reads:
The responsibility for, and the authority over, the Opera­
tional, Technical, and Logistical functions must remain in the 
hands of the specific agencies charged with these functions 
throughout the life span of an aircraft.
Then follows in italics :
The establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Development 
on an equal status with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel, together with the 
establishment of an Air Research and Development Command co-equal 
with the Air Materiel Command and the operational combat commands 
of the Air Force will assist, organizationally, in the attainment 
of this objective (p. 24).
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Force came to assign more importance to research and development as a 
result of an entire series of fresh technological crises that became 
translated into the image of a technological "war" or race between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. How best to secure the maximum 
benefits from H&D continued to be a matter of serious managerial 
debate within and among the Air Force, the Department of Defense, and 
the Congress. But the vital necessity of research and development in 
the effort to attain an effective Air Force was not seriously questioned 
thereafter.
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
The major repository for the material used in writing this 
dissertation is the Air Force Archives located in the Air University 
Library at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The correspondence of 
several General Officers is located there. Of particular importance 
for the subject of Air Force research and development is the corres­
pondence of General Earle E. Partridge. Only part of General Curtis E. 
LeMay's correspondence is kept at Maxwell, but some of the letters and 
documents in these LeMay papers do deal with the early post-World War 
II period in Air Force R&D. There are also numerous folders of memo­
randa, letters, etc., that are filed according to which Air Force 
office or agency generated or received the documents. All of this 
material is well-indexed in the card files of the Archives.
In addition to the correspondence, a number of oral history in­
terviews with principal Air Force leaders such as James H. Doolittle 
and Bernard A. Schriever is maintained in the Archives. These inter­
views often help one gain insights into some of the activities and 
events that lie in back of official reports, correspondence, and direc­
tives.
As far as directives are concerned, one can find many of the 
important regulations that govern Air Force R&D activities in the 
Authority Branch of the Air University Library. In addition to
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regulations, official letters and some manuals are maintained in the 
authority section.
The Air University Library itself has many documents that are 
useful to one interested in Air Force research and development. These 
include complete runs of such journals as Air Force, which has under­
gone numerous modifications in its title, Air University Quarterly 
Review, Armed Forces Management, and Air Power Historian. Speeches 
delivered to the different schools that make up the Air University and 
to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces may also be found in 
either the Archives or in the Air University Library. These addresses 
were delivered by such men as Vannevar Bush, Alan T. Waterman, and Hugh 
L. Dryden.
The Archives and the Air University Library also hold a large 
number of official histories of the Air Force and the Army Air Forces.
The official history holdings of the Archives are especially extensive. 
Here one finds several multi-volume histories which frequently include 
one or more volumes that contain collections of the documents or copies 
of the documents used in writing the history. These supporting-docu- 
ments volumes are rich sources for those interested in studying aspects 
of Air Force history.
Listed below are all of the major sources used in preparing 
this dissertation. Additionally, a few documents not cited in foot­
notes have been listed where they are believed to be of particular 
interest to those interested in Air Force research and development.
Individual memoranda and personal letters have been listed in the 
bibliography where they are cited frequently in the dissertation or are 
of special importance.
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APPENDIX II
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AÎÎD TERMS
AAF Army Air Forces.
AC/AS Assistant Chief of Air Staff.
AC/AS-4 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Supply.
AFA Air Force Association.
AFB Air Force Base.
AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology.
AFM Air Force Manual.
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ARDC Air Research and Development Command.
ARDCM Air Research and Development Command Manual.
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When Used in relation to the Air Force of the 1945-1950 
period, this term refers to flying activities, especially 
those directly related to combat, such as strategic 
bombing, troop transport, air-to-air combat, and air 
defense.
Office of Scientific Research and Development.
Scientific Advisory Board.
Scientific Advisory Group.
